39. Summary of Information by Edwards, Don
Santa Clara Law
Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Watergate Hearings Law Library Collections
1974
39. Summary of Information
Don Edwards
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/watergate
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons,
Legal History, Theory and Process Commons, and the Politics Commons
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Library Collections at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Watergate Hearings by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Automated Citation
Edwards, Don, "39. Summary of Information" (1974). Watergate Hearings. Book 40.
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/watergate/40
.t 
II •. 
TABLE OF CONTEhlS 
WA::LERGATE 
A. The Organization of the 1,[hi te House 
and its Relationship to CRP 
B. The Approval of a Political Intelligence 
Plan Including the Use of Electronic 
Surveillance 
C. The Implementation of the Political 
Intelligence Plan 
D. The President's Response to the Arrests 
E. Containment - July 1, 1972 to Election 
F~ Payments 
G. Clemency 
H. Deception and Concealment 
I. The President's Contacts with the Department 
of Justice, March 21 - April 30, 1973 
J. April 30, 1973 to the Present 
APPENDIX A 
APPENDIX B 
/\'])T1SE 01' PRESIDENTIAL POl;.tERS 
A. Introduction 
B. Illegal Intelligence-Gathering 
1. 1969-71 Wiretaps 
2. Joseph Kraft Wiretap and Surveillance 
3. The "Huston Plan" 
4. The Donald Nixon Surveillance and 
Hiretap 
5. Daniel Schorr Investigation 
C. Special Investigations Unit 
[11948]
III 
IV 
D. Concealment of Evidence of Intelligence-
Gathering Activities 
1. Concealment of Records of 1969-71 
Wiretaps 
2. Concealment of the Plumbers Activities 
3. The Offer of, the Position of FBI Director 
to Judge Byrne 
E. Mlsuse of the Internal Revenue Service 
F. Kleindienst Appointment - ITT 
G. The Department of Agriculture 
H. Improvements Made by Government Agencies to the 
President's Properties 
1. Conclusion 
THE REFUSAL OF THE PRESIDENT TO COMPLY HITH SUBPOENAS FROM 
THE CO~TTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 
A. The Committee's Subpoenas and the President's 
Resp onses 
1. Efforts of Committee to Obtain Pertinent 
Materials from Woite House 
2. The President's Response to Letters and 
Subpoenas 
B. The Power of the House in an Impeachment Inquiry 
C. Analysis of the President's Asserted Reasons 
for Noncompliance with the Subpoenas 
1. Relevance or Need 
2. Presidential Claim of Executive Privilege 
D. The President's Refusal to Comply with the 
CO!llillittee's Subpoenas as Grounds for Impeachment 
WILLFUL TAX EVASIO:.l 
[11949]
Nation: 
INTRODUCTION -- WATERGATE 
On April 30, 1973 President Richard M. Nixon addressed the 
In recent months, members of my Administration and· 
officials of the Committee for the Re-election of the 
President - including some of my closest friends and most 
trusted aides - have been charged with involvement in what 
has come to be known as the Watergate affair. These 
include charges of illegal activity during and preced-
ing the 1972 Presidential election and charges that responsible 
officials participated in efforts to cover up that illegal 
activity. 
Last June l7,.while I was in Florida trying to get a few 
days rest after my visit to }1oscow, I first learned from 
news reports of the Watergate break-in. . I immediately 
ordered an investigation by appropriate Government authorities. 
On September 15, as you "'ill recall, indictments ,,,ere brought 
against seven defendants in the case. 
As the investigations went fon-lard, I repeatedly asked 
those conducting the investigation whether there was any 
reason to believe that members of my Administration ",ere in 
any way involved. I received repeated assurances that there 
were not. Because of these continuing reassurances, because 
I believed the reports I was getting, because I had faith 
in the persons from ,,,hom I ,,'as getting them, I discounted 
the stories in the press that appeared to implicate members 
of my Administration or other officials of the campaign 
committee. 
Until }1arch of this year, I remained convinced that the 
denials were true and that the charges of involvement by 
members of the wnite House Staff "ere false. . Hm.,rever, 
ne" information then came to me Hhich persuaded me that 
there was a real possibility that some of these charges 
\<lere true, and suggesting further that there had been aa 
effort to conceal the facts both from the public, from 
you, and from me. 
i 
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Richard M. Nixon, before entering on the execution of his 
office as President of the United States, has twice taken, as required in 
in Article II, Section 1, Clause 7 of the Constitution, the following 
oath: 
I do solemnly_swear that I will faithfully execute 
the Office of the President of the United States, and 
will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and 
defend the Constitution of the United States. 
In Article II, Section 3, the Constitution requires that 
the President "shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." 
Under the Constitution, the executive power is vested in the President. 
Of necessity, the President must rely on subordinates to carry out 
hi£ ~::.!::~~t!-:'::ions in the execution of his ,.,ffice. 
In his statement of April 30, President Nixon told the American 
people that he had been deceived by subordinates into believing that none 
of the members of his Administration or his personal campaign committee 
were implicated in the Watergate break-in, and that none had participated 
in efforts to cover up that illegal activity. The President had said he 
recently received new information that persuaded him there was a real 
possibility that some of the charges were true and he declared his 
determination to "get to the bottom of the matter." 
Almost fifteen months later the Committee on the Judiciary 
is fac~d with the responsibility of making recommendations whether or 
not the House of Representatives should exercise its Constitutional power 
of impeachment. 
ii 
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The critical question this Committee must decide is whether 
the President was duped by his closest political associates or whether they 
were in fact carrying out his policies and decisions. This question must 
be decided one way or the other. 
It.must be decided whether the President was duped by his 
subordinates into believing that his personal agents and his key political 
associates were not involved in a program of illegal electronic sur-
veillance for his political purposes; or whether, in fact, Richard M. Nixon, 
in violation of the sacred obligation of his Constitutional oath, 
authorized illegal intelligence-gathering activities against his 
political opponents. 
It must also be decided whether the President was duped by 
his subordinates into believing that his personal agents and key political 
associates had not been engaged in a systematic cover-up of the illegal 
political intelligence operation, of the identities of those responsible, 
and of the existence and scope of other related activities; or whether, 
in fact, Richard M. Nixon, in violation of the sacred obligation of 
his Constitutional oath, has used the power of his high office for over 
two years to cover-up and conceal responsibility for the Watergate 
burglary and other activities of a similar nature. 
In short, the Committee has to decide whether in his statement 
of April 30 the President was telling the truth to the American people, 
or whether that statement was part of a pattern of conduct designed not 
to take care that the 1m.;s were faithfully executed, but to impede their 
faithful execution in his political interest and on his behalf. 
iii 
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The Committee has found that much of the evidence pertinent 
to this question and other questions is within the custody and control of 
the President. In defiance of subpoenas legally authorized, issued 
and served by the Committee on behalf of the House of Representatives, 
President Nixon has denied the Connnittee access to this evidence. 
Nevertheless, the Committee has considered evidence that is 
substantial. This report summarizes that evidence. The report begins 
with an account of how President Nixon organized his personal staff to 
implement his policies and instructions in his execution of the office 
of President of the United States. 
iv 
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THE ORGA?HZATION OF THE ImITE HOUSE 
AND ITS RELATIONSEIP TO CRP 
From January 1970 until February 1973, Alexander 
Butterfield was the personal aide to the President. His office was 
next to the Oval Office; his responsibilities were to insure the 
"smooth running of the President's official day." (House Judiciary 
Co~ittee, Testimony of Alexander P. Butterfield, 7/2/74, T 2388-89. 
Hereinafter cited as Butterfield testinony, 7/2/74) He was thus in 
a unique position to knmv how President Nixon operated his Presidency. 
Butterfield testified that during his first term President 
Nixon spent almost all of his working time with one of a handful of 
Assistants: on domestic Batters, John Ehrlichman; on political 
matters, Charles Colson; on foreign affairs, Henry Kissinger; on 
all matters of policy, direction, implementation, politics, public 
position and strategy with his chief of staff, H. R. 3aldeman --
but the vast majority of his time with Haldeman. (Butterfield 
testimony, T 2398, 2400, 2402, 2456) According to Butterfield, 
lialdernan "was an extension of the President": 
... [T]here was no question in anyone's mind at 
any tine that he [Haldeman] was, in effect, the 
chief of staff. He was far and away the closest 
person to the President. There Has never any com-
petition with regard to Hr. Ealdeman's role. ~e 
was everything that Sherman Adams was to President 
Eisenhm,7er, in my vie,·;. ~:e \vas an extension of 
the President, in my view. (T 2394-95) 
Haldeman ,,,as the alter ego. Haldeman ,,-as almost 
the other President. I can't e8phasize that 
enough. (T 2516) 
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Haldeman had no independent schedule. He was always at the call of 
the President. (Haldeman test~ony, 7 SSC 2871) Haldeman ordinarily 
spent several hours a day with the President -- a "good six to 
seven times as much time with the President as anyone else." 
(Butterfield testimony, T 2458) Except for daily press surnoaries, 
virtually all written material addressed to the President was 
screened and transmitted through Haldeman. (Butterfield testimony, 
T'2446-49) Hhen the President ITade a decision he would authorize 
one of his aides, almost always Haldeman, to see that it was 
1/ 
executed. 
testified: 
(Butterfield test~ony, T 2462-63) Butterfield 
~The President] cOI!Ullunicat~d l:-y telephone with a 
great many people at night, in the evenings, and 
during the day. But his normal co~~unications, 
oral and in ~rriting, Here just to Halde:nan, 
Ehrlic~~an and Kissinger. It would be quite un-
usual for him to cOQEunicate with anyone else --
perhaps a few tines to Colson during that 1972 
ca'npaign year. But aillost always Hith Haldeman, 
almost al\\rays with Ealdeu2n. (T 2516) 
~/ Haldeman implemented Presidential decisions through his own 
staff assistants. La,rrence Eigby, Haldeman's personal aide and 
chief administrative assistant, supervised the flo," of persons, 
papers, telephone calls. and correspondence to Haldeman. Gordon 
Strachan served as Ealdeuan's principal political assistant; he 
regularly prepared Political Matters Me~orandum for Haldeman on 
the status of the 1972 election caDpaign, and often carried out 
HaldeJTlan's decisions, Dwight Chapin acted as the President's 
Appointments Secretary and reported directly to Haldeman on matters 
concerning the President's schedule and travel. Bruce Kehrli, the 
Hhi te House Staff Secretary, v.rho oversaV.T the day-to-day flow of 
papers within the \fuite House, worked under Butterfield, but fre-
quently reported directly to Haldeman. (Butterfield testimony, 
T 2398, 2400-02) 
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Butterfield testified that Haldeman was not a decision-
maker, but an "impleI:lenter." All important inforI:lation in Haldeman's 
possession was relayed to the President; all decisions of consequence 
were made by the President. Butterfield testified that it would have 
been "altogether out of character" for Haldeman to have done any-
thing, except to decide minor staff manageflent questions, without 
the knowledge of the President: 
MR. JENNER: Was there any occasion during all 
of the time that you were at the 
White House that there came to 
your attention that Haldeman ever 
did anything without the knowledge 
of the President? 
MR. BUTTERFIELD: No, never. 
MR. JENNER: Dealing wH.h HhiteHouse affairs! 
MR. BUTTERFIELD: No, never, nothing unilaterally 
at all. He was essentially -- I may 
have said this -- but an implementer. Mr. 
Haldeman implemented the decisions 
of the President as did Mr. Ehrlich-
man, but perhaps to a lesser extent. 
But, Haldeman especially was an imple-
menter, because the President ran his 
own personal affairs. He was not a 
decision maker . . . . I can hardly 
recall the decisions, any decisions 
that he made, unless that it was that 
the White House staff mess personnel 
would wear jackets or something along 
that line. He implemented the President's 
decisions. The President was the decision-
maker. The President was 100 percent in 
charge. (T 2528-29) (See also Haldeman 
testimony, 7 sse 2872) 
Mr. Mitchell's testimony is to the same effect: 
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MR. THORNTON: 
MR. MITCHELL: 
.. 
HR. THORNTON: 
MR. HITCHELL: 
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Did you ever check to determine whether 
or not the information relayed to you 
through Mr. Haldeman was a correct reflec-
tion of the President's instructions? 
There may have been occasions, Congressman, 
but 1 would have to say that in most all 
instances that I can recall, Mr. Haldeman's 
representations to me of the President's 
position were truthfully and fully stated. 
Did you ever check _~th the President 
to determine whether information you 
had passed toward him through Mr. 
Haldeman had been received by him? 
No, I don't believe I did, but I think 
there again, the record of actions 
coming from such line of communication 
would indicate that they were fully 
and faithfully conveyed. (Mitchell 
Testimony, 7/10/74, T 3479-80) 
II. 
Haldeman's responsibility extended to the President's campaign. 
During the summer and fall of 1971, Haldeman personally reviewed and 
supervised plans for the development of the re-election committee and 
the assignment of staff to it. He established formal rules and proced-
ures for the transfer of employees from the \ihite House staff to the 
re-election committee; waiver of these rules required his personal 
approval. (Impeachment Inquiry Staff memorandurl, "Background Informa-
tion, Hhite House Staff and President Nixon's Campaign Organizations,H 
11-l3. Hereinafter cited as Staff memo, 11Background-T"TIite House/eRP") 
John Mitchell had hiring authority once he became responsible for 
the day-to-day operations of the campaign committee in mid-197l; 
. but Haldeman still reviewed the hiring of key personnel and 
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vetoed several employnent recommendations. (House Judiciary COIIlI!1ittee, 
Political Matters Memoranda, 12/6/71, 47, 49-51; 1/18/72, 66; 7/29/72, 
112-13. Hereinafter cited as Political Matters Memoranda) 
Haldeman and other vlhite House staff members were active 
in formulating campaign strategy. The highest level decisions on 
domestic policy and campaign tactics were discussed by the "political 
group," consisting of Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Clark MacGregor, Bryce 
Harlow, Charles Colson, Mitchell, and Harry Dent. This group met 
regularly in the vlhite House. Others, primarily White House personnel, 
handled other areas of the campaign. A group headed by Colson coordi-
nated CRP press releases and speeches by surrogates for the President. 
(Political Matters Memoranda, 3/3/72, 91-92, 543-49) 
A copy of each document subrritted to the campaign director 
(first Hitchell and later MacGregor) ",as also submitted to Haldeman's 
assistant, Gordon Strachan, who collected these documents and suo-
marized them for Haldeman in the "Political Hatters ?vlemoranda." 
(Political Hatters Memoranda, 3/3/72, 85) These memoranda covered 
the whole range of the issues involved in running a campaign. 
Butterfield testified that these nemos "",ould not go to the President 
under normal circumstances, 11 but Halde::lan ''\vculd relay the infornation 
,,,hen he spoke to the President next." (Butterfield testimony, T 2625) 
After revieHing these memoranda, Halde.c-:can \wuld note the actions to 
be taken. Strachan would contact the appropriate CRP personnel to 
implement lialdefil.an's instructions. (See Strachan's Marginal Notes, 
[11958]
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Political Matters Memoranda) In addition, Haldeman ~et with campaign 
director Mitchell on a weekly basis, to discuss such subjects as cam-
paign financing, personnel and strategy. (Mitchell testimony, T 3462) 
Haldeman was regularly informed of even the most minor administrative 
decisions, including the rental of office space, (Political Matters 
Memoranda, 6/29/72, 108; 11/16/71, 35; 12/16/71, 56) rejecting press 
requests for interviews with c~~paign staff (Political Matters Memo-
randa, 8/11/72, 126) and the formulation of CRP's field organization2l 
plan. (Political Hatters Hemoranda, 2/1/72, 74; 3/3/72, 81; 7/29/72, 
118) Haldeman insisted upon clearing every piece of advertising and 
promotional material. (7 SSC 2870; Political Matters Memoranda, 
1/18/72, 64; 6/6/72, 95-96) 
The President was attentive to the details of i·Jhite House 
operations and directives. After certain Watergate disclosures, in 
late April 1973, the President stated that, in 1972, for the first 
t~e in his political career, he left nanageillent of his campaign to 
others, concentrating instead on his duties as President. (Presiden-
tial Statements, HJC Compilation, 4/30/73, 16) The ~nite Bouse 
~/ 
edited transcript of the April 4, 1972 Presidential conversation 
and tape recordings of September 15, 1972 Presidential conversations, 
hmvever, show that the President ,,'as fully a\vare of and actively par-
ticipated in deciding the details of the campaign. The April 4, 1972 
/ The President furnished to the Co~®ittee an edited tr8nscript of 
this conversation in June 1974 in response to a }=OLlse Juciiciary CO:.t-
mittee request. 
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transcript reflects the President's knowledge of and dominate role 
with regard to specifics of the campaign. He, Haldeman and Mitchell 
discuss the details of the site for the 1972 convention (the Presi-
dent decides it will be changed to Miami), the Wisconsin Democratic 
primary, and the prospects for various Democratic Presidential 
hopefuls, a letter of support for the President from columnist 
1Jilliam F. Buckley, the Ashbrook caopaign, various individuals and 
their responsibility in the President's re-election campaign, and 
the President's prospects and organization in ,~isconsin, California, 
Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Ne,.;r York, New Jersey, Texas, Ohio, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Massachusetts and VerDont. 
mission, Book I, 104-16) 
(President's sub-
Butterfield testified that the President "made the big 
decisions," "anything having to do ,.;rith strategy ,",ould emanate from 
the President" and that the President ,.;ras in charge. (Butterf ield 
testimony, T 2624-25) Butterfield testified that the COD@ittee was 
an extension of the political ~~TIite House. (Butterfield testimony, 
T 2486) 
III. 
The COT:ll1littee has seen and heard from Fred LaRue, John 
}1itchell, John Dean, Charles Colson, and Herbert Kalmbach. Their 
testimony in substance and on the whole fully corroborates Butter-
field's description of how President Nixon conducted his Presidency. 
[11960]
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Of course, there are some differences, most notably Colson's testi-
mony as to the direct relationship he developed with the President by 
3/ 
1972. But such differences are to be expected and seem only to 
add weight to the proof of the fact that President Nixon required 
discipline ·of h~self and his subordinates; that he established 
orderly procedures; that he preferred to communicate his decisions 
through Haldeman and to receive information and reports from Haldeman; 
that he, as President, was in charge; that he made the decisions; 
and that he was running his staff and his re-election campaign for 
President. 
3/ Colson testified however, that Haldeman had a practice of asking 
for anything that ,"ent to the President, even froG the fe,,' senior 
staff members who had access to the President. (Colson testi~ony, 
7/15/74, T Lf395) lie acknm"lec::;eci that he was ansHerable to Haldeman. 
(Colson testimony, 7/15/74, T 4488) 
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APPROVAL OF A POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE PLAN 
INCLUDING THE USE OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 
The evidence available to the Committee establishes that 
on May 27 and June 17, 1972 agents of CRP, acting pursuant to a 
political intelligence plan (which included use of illegal elec-
tronic surveillance), authorized in advance by John }litchell, head 
of CRP, and H. R. Haldeman, the President's Chief of Staff, broke 
into the DNC Headquarters at the l""aterga te for the purpose of 
effecting electronic surveillance; and that this was part of the 
President's policy of gathering political intelligence to be used 
as part of his campaign for re-election. The illegal activities 
contemplated by the plan were implemented and supervised by Howard 
Hunt and Gordon Liddy, \vho from July 1971 to the time of their 
transfer to CRP were employed by the President to conduct investi-
gations, and who had been authorized to engage in illegal covert 
activity under the supervision of John Ehrlichman. 
1. 
On August lOs 1971 H. R. Haldeman, Chief of Staff to 
President Nixon, gave instructions that Gordon Strachan, Patrick 
Buchanan, Dwigh t Chapin, and Ron Halker should develop recommend-
ations for IIpolitical intelligence and covert activities II in con-
nection with the President's campaign for re-election in 1972. 
(Political Hatters, Memoranda, 8/13/71,2) It is a fair inference 
[11962]
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that Haldeman was implementing the President's policy with respect 
to the tactics he wanted used in his re-election campaign. The 
President has stated his belief that in politics "everybody bugs 
everybody else," and that he could understand the desire for elec-
tronic surveillance, prior to the Democratic Convention.(House 
Judiciary Committee, Transcripts of Eight Recorded Presidential 
Conversations, 4 (hereinafter cited as HJCT)) As a result of 
Haldeman's instructions, a political intelligence proposal, Operation 
Sandwedge, was developed. Operation Sandwedge contemplated elec-
tronic surveillance and ''black bag" capability. (Book VII, 1341) 
Dean was assigned responsibility for a planning study of Operation 
Sandwedge and other "covert" intelligence activities. (Book VII, 
1363-64) 
The planning study was completed in early October 1971. 
When Strachan reported to Haldeman that the then Attorney General 
Mitchell had not made the "hard decisions" on CRP planning studies, 
Haldeman instructed Strachan to arrange a meeting with Mitchell. 
(Book VII, 1363-64) Mitchell was one of the President's closest 
political associates, his former law partner, and Director of the 
President's 1968 campaign. Haldeman, Mitchell, Nagruder, and Strachan 
met in November 1971 to discuss Operation Sandwedge. (Political 
Hatters Memoranda, 10/27/71, 201) The talking paper prepared by 
Strachan for Haldeman to use at this meeting notes that Sand\·ledge 
has received an "ini tial 50" and asks "are \ve really developing the 
[11963]
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capability needed?" and, "Should his IDean's] involvement be expanded 
to something more than mere White House contact?" (Political Matters 
Memoranda, 10/27/71, 202) The talking paper also listed topics to be 
discussed between Haldeman and Mitchell when Magruder and Strachan 
were not present. One topic asks, "Who should ~le designate to increase 
the surveillance of EMK from periodic to constant?" and "Is there any 
other candidate or group, such as Common Cause, about whom we should 
obtain damaging information?" (Political Matters Memoranda, 10/27/71, 
213) The copy of the talking paper provided by the White House to 
this Committee cuts off from the bottom of the page a portion of the 
full text of one of these topics. The text of that topic contains 
the statement, "From Campaign funds I need 800-300 for surveillance. 
(Political Matters Memoranda, 10/27/71, 212) 
On December 2, 1971, Haldeman was informed by his assistant, 
Gordon Strachan, that Sandwedge had been scrapped. (Book I, 34-35) 
Haldeman was also informed that "ins tead" of Sandwedge, Liddy, ''who 
has been working with Bud Krogh," the head of the Plumbers unit, Hould 
handle political intelligence as well as legal matters at CRP, and 
would "lork with Dean on the "political enemies" project. (Book I, 
34- 35) Mitchell has tes tified he approved the transfer of Liddy to 
CRP. Four days later, Haldeman approved Liddy's transfer to CRP at 
a salary increase of $4,000 over his White House salary, although a 
policy that there Here to be no such salary increases was then in 
effect. (Book I, 49-50) With the selection of Liddy and the approval 
" 
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of his transfer by Haldeman from the White House to CRP, it was clear 
that the decision had been made and implemented to set up a political 
intelligence gathering unit for the campaign. All that remained was 
approval of a particular proposal and its funding. 
In late January and early February 1972, after consultation 
with Plumbers unit member Howard Hunt, Liddy proposed a $1 million 
intelligence program to Mltchell, Magruder, and Dean at a meeting in 
the Attorney General's office. (Book I, 58-60) The proposal included 
the use of mugging, kidnapping, prostitutes, photography, and elec-
tronic surveillance. (Book I, 59) According to Dean and Magruder, 
Mitchell directed Liddy to prepare a revised and more realistic pro-
posal. (Book I, 57, 60) Mltchell has denied this. (Book I, 58) 
However, in February 1972, Liddy returned with a $500,000 intelligence 
program which contemplated electronic surveillance at the DNC head-
quarters. (Book I, 66-67) After this meeting, ,,,rhich Dean reported to 
Haldeman, Dean expressed his opposition to a political intelligence 
operation that included activities like burglary and wiretapping. 
(Book I, 66-74) Haldeman did not order the termination of these 
campaign activities, but rather he told Dean that he agreed with 
Dean's vie,,, that the \vhi te House should have nothing to do wi th this. 
(Book I, 66,73-75) 
Sometime in February or March 1972, Liddy and HUI1t met wi th 
Colson. (Book I, 105, 110-11) Hunt and Liddy had taken part in the 
Plumbers operation, including the Fielding bre.ak-in. Hunt was a 
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friend of Colson. (Book I, 113) During this meeting, according to 
Colson, he called Magruder, the CRP Chief of Staff, and told him "to 
resolve whatever it waS Hunt and Liddy wanted to do and to be sure he 
had an opportunity to listen to their plans. 1I (Book I, 105) Magruder 
has testified Colson told him to "get off the stick" and get Liddy's 
plans approved, and that information was needed, particularly about 
O'Brien. (Book I, 113) 
II. 
On March 30, 1972, in Key Biscayne, Florida, the Liddy'Plan 
was again reviewed at a meeting attended by Mitchell, Magruder, and 
Fred LaRue. They reviewed the proposal for electronic surveillance 
and, according to Magruder, approved its revised budget of either 
$250,000 or $300,000. (Book I, 115-56) }fugruder's testimony that 
Mitchell approved the Liddy Plan is corroborated by Reisner's 
testimony that shortly after March 31, 1972 Magruder told him to tell 
Liddy that his plan had been approved (Book I, 129); by Strachan's 
testimony that }lagruder reported the approval of a "sophisticated 
poli tical intelligence gathering system" on March 31, 1972 (Book I, 
148); and by Stans' testimony that Hitchell confirmed after Harch 
31, 1972 Nagruder's authority to authorize substantial cash payments 
to Liddy. (Book I, 182) 
In a Political Hatters Nemorandum dated Narch 31, 1972, 
Strachan informed Haldeman that Magruder reported that CRP now had 
a "sophisticated political intelligence gathering system including 
a budget of [$]300 [,OOO].~ (Book I, 148, 150-53) 
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On April 4, 1972 Haldeman met with Mitchell. A talking 
paper which Strachan had prepared for Haldeman for that meeting included 
a question on the adequacy of the political intelligence system. (Book 
I, 162-64) Following this meeting, Haldeman and Mitchell met with the 
President. (Book I, 157) 
The President has furnished to the Committee an edited trans-
cript of this meeting. According to the edited transcript, the subject 
of' a political intelligence operation was not discussed. The April 4 
transcript is the only material furnished by the President to the Com-
mittee in response to its subpoenas for recordings of Presidential 
conversations occurring prior to March 17, 1973. 
The Liddy Plan was designed to be non traceable in the event 
something went wrong. Professionals (Liddy and Hunt) had been hired 
as the chief operatives. Liddy had agreed not to use CRP employees 
in his operation. (Hugh Sloan testimony, 2 SSC 542) Cuban-Americans 
were used to make the entry: they could be portrayed as anti-Castro 
extremists if discovered. But things did not go according to the plan. 
Contrary to his agreement, Liddy used CRP Security Director McCord to 
install electronic surveillance equipment. (Book I, 216-18) And at 
the scene of the crime the police discovered thirty-two sequentially 
numbered $100 bills (Book II, 85), part of the proceeds of CRP 
campaign contribution checks (Hugh Sloan testimony, 2 SSC 576-77), 
and do·cumentation tying the burglars to Howard Hunt. (Book II, 84) 
--------. 
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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE PLAN 
The plan to gather political intelligence for use in the 
President's re-election campaign got under way in April 1972. (Book 
I, 172-75) With Mitchell's approval, ~CRP Treasurer Hugh Sloan dis-
bursed approximately $199,000, in cash, to Liddy prior to June, 1972.--1 
(Book I, 178-79) Of this sum McCord spent approximately $65,000 on 
technical equipment and related expenditures. (Book I, 190) Magruder, 
Mitchell, and Haldeman later received the fruits of the illegal 
intelligence activities at the DNC. (Book I, 189, 191-94, 234-36) 
The first break-in of DNC occurred on or about May 27, 
1972. (Book I, 216-17) During the first or second week in June, 
1972, Magruder received transcripts of conversations intercepted 
at the DNC Headquarters transcribed on paper labeled "Gemstone." 
(Book I, 234-35) According to Magruder, these transcripts were 
shown to Mitchell. (Boole I, 235) Magruder's assistant, Robert 
Reisner, corroborates this. (Book I, 237) On one occasion Magruder 
asked Reisner to place a group of the Gemstone papers in the file 
labeled "Mr. Mitchell's file," the file ordinarily used by Nagruder 
in meetings between himself and Hitchell. (Book I, 238) Magruder 
1 Sloan testified that when he asked Stans the purpose for which 
the money would be spent, Stans, who had discussed the matter with 
Mitchell said, "I do not want to knm'l and you don't \.,rant to know." 
(Book I, 179) 
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also received prints of the documents photographed during the initial 
]j 
entry into the DNe headquarters. (Book I, 234) 
The Hhite House also received the reports obtained through 
the break-in and bugging. Through Strachan, Magruder forwarded the 
information to Haldeman's office. (Book I, 165-66, 168-69) In the 
March 13, 1973 meeting, there are two references to wiretap information. 
The President described the Watergate operation as "a dry hole, huh?" 
and then said '~eah. Yeah. But, uh, Bob one time said something 
about the fact we got some information about this or that or the other, 
but I, I think it was about the convention, what they were planning, 
I said [unintelligible]. So I assume that must have been MacGregor, 
'1:./ 
I mean not MacGregor, but Segretti." (HJCT 72) Later in the 
conversation, Dean, referring to the DNC incident, stated that "People 
just, here, would -- did not know that that was going to be done. I 
think there are some people who sa\V the fruits of it, but that's 
another story." (HJCT 74) 
On March 21, 1973 Dean told the President the wiretap infor-
mation was given to Haldeman. 
I'la>JIlLYI'. 
DE"\ ~" 
Pm>lI)E)."T. 
lh:"\~. 
J>I:l":"lI\E~T. 
DL\". 
• . • The "l]fflJ"lllatioll \I,1S COJll11liY O\"C'l' Jl\~IC lO 
SlI<lclwll. SOlllE' "i" it \\"as !,"j\"l'l1 h) I"I:!1(h'lll~1l1, nil, 
l1wl"l' is 110 douht ,tiJout it. l' ,;--
])i(11w 1,llo\\" \\h,lf it \\",1::; (,()1l1in!2: {rom? 
T don't 1"e,11I\" bUll," if lw \\"'1I11c1. 
~ ot lll'l'l'SS81:i h'" 
~ot 1l('('(',:;sn1"ij"\"" "1"'I:lt'S not JlI'(,l'o3snrih. 1.'11-
St1';(('h,111 klll'\\" \lli;lt it \\";1<: frolll. " 
St"raclwn kne\\" \\")I:ll. it \\',1'< {rOll)" ~O oOlll)t about it. 
flud \\"jlC'tlle1" S( r:I\"h:111-1 h;l \"1' 11<'\"<'1" ('0111,' to Pl'l'SS 
thesC'}ll'opk 011 ill,':"'I' points 1W'',11103e it. 
Yeah" 
II Shortly after the June 17, 1972 break-in, Magruder told Reisner 
to remove the Gemstone files and other politically compromising docu-
ments from the CRP files. (Book I, 236, 239'-!10) 
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it hntts them to, to givr lip that lI('xt illcl]. so I hnc1 to 
piece thin!!,; tOl!dhrr. ~\Jl rigllt. so Strndlfln ",as 
Ull"arf' of I'f'cei\'ill~' informntj()lI, I'(>porting to Doh. At 
one poillt Bob ('n'll gnl'e inst I"IlCtiolls to c-hnng'c tllciT' 
cnpal)iJitirs {rOil I :'Ifw;kir, to :'Ife'Ciol"l'rIl, nnc1 hnd 
pnsscd tJlis bnck rili'ollgh SlnlC'han to :-ra~!TIIUrl' nnd, 
appar011tl.Y to Lidd,l". .\nu Ljdd~' \\'ns stnl"tin,Q: to m:\kc 
ar-rHng(,Ill('nts 10:.:") ill alld bllt!' tilf', lIh. 1111. :-1cGOH'rn 
o[lrl'atioll, Thry ila<1 dOlle jln,Jim-
Thry hnc1 llf'\'C}' i>llggrd :-fllskir, thongh, did they ~ 
Xo, Ilj('\' hnflll't Jnlt. thc\' had a. thel' lind. n11, thcv'c1 
~{Tnint~lligibJeJ . '. " • 
illfiltratrd it b,· a. a. thev had 
.\ secretary, 1/ . 
a. sccwtnT'\, an(l a chnllfTelll'. XothilliY illrgnl abont 
t,hat-. (l'UCT 85) 
On April 14, 1973, Haldeman told the President that Strachan, 
at some time, had stopped reading the wiretap reports; but that they had 
been in the White House. 
E 
H 
He [Magruder] thought they were all junk 
too. "furnish a. junk store". The one CODY 
that Magruder had had pictures of the kinds 
of papers that you'd find around with cam-
paign headquarters. He sent a synopses of 
the pictures to Mitchell. He thought it was 
so bad he picked up the phone and called 
Liddy and chewed him out. He called 'em 
"(expletive deleted) I' "I told Strachan that 
the synopses were here. He may have come 
over and read them." and as I pressed him 
on that he got less and less sure of that. 
He says, "I told him they \vere there. If 
Strachan says, "I stopped reading the syn~' 
opses) and they were -- we had 'em here."2/ 
When, on April 14, 1973, the President asked Haldeman vItat he Hould say 
if Magruder testified that wiretap reports had come to Haldeman's office, 
Haldeman responded, "This doesn't ever have to come ou t." (I,1}lT 520-21) 
1/ In the h'hite House Transcript, Dean first says "a secretary." 
(lffiT 180) 
'!:../ "Submission of Recorded Presidential Conversations to the Conunittee 
on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives by Richard ll. Nixon, 
April 30, 1974," 586. Hereinafter cited as HHT. 
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THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE TO THE ARRESTS 
At 2:00 a.m. on June 17, 1972 five of Liddy's men, in-
eluding CRP Security Director McCord, were found in the DNC offices 
and arrested. Hunt and Liddy were elsewhere in the Watergate Hotel. 
Upon discovering the arrests of the others, they left. (Book II, 72-76) 
Hunt went to the EOB office, placed a briefcase containing electronic 
equipment in his safe and removed from the safe $10,000 in cash which 
Liddy had given him in case of a mishap. (Book II, 76-77) 
On the morning of June 17, 1972 Liddy telephoned Hagruder in 
California and informed him of the arrests. (Book II, 106) Former 
Attorney General and Campaign Director John Hitchell; Robert Hdrdian, 
former Assistant Attorney General, Internai Security Division; Jeb 
Magruder, Deputy Campaign Director and former assistant to Haldeman; 
and Fred LaRue, all top officials in CRP, were in Los Angeles, working 
on the President's re-election campaign. Magruder immediately in-
formed LaRue, who in turn informed Mitchell. (Book II, 106) Mitchell 
learned that HcCord, an employee of the Committee, was one of the five 
persons arrested. His response -- "incredible." He asked LaRue to get 
more information. (Book II, 108) Mitchell also ordered Mardian back 
to Washington to find out what he could about the break-in. (LaRue 
testimony, T 2812-13) After consultation with his aides, Mitchell 
issued a press release on the afternoon of June 17, 1972 stating: 
We have just learned from news reports that a ilian 
identified as employed by our campaign cOI':..",-ittee 
was one of five persons arrested at the Democratic 
National COffit:1i ttee headquarters in h'ashington, D.C. 
early Sa.turday morning. 
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The person involved is the proprietor of a private 
security agency Hho was employed by our Conunittee 
months ago to assist with the installation of our 
security system. 
He has, as vIe unders t-and it, a number of business 
clients and interests and we have .no knowledge of 
thqse relationships. 
We want to emphasize that this roan and the other 
people involved were not operating either in our 
behalf or with our consent. 
I am surprised and dismayed at these reports. 
At this time, we are experiencing our ovm security 
problems at the Cow~ittee for the Re-election of 
the President. Our problems are not as dramatic 
as the events of Saturday morning~- but nonethe-
less of a serious nature to us. We do not know 
as of this moment whether our security problems 
are related to the events of Saturday morning at 
the Democratic headquarters or not. 
There is no place in our campaign or in the elec-
toral process for this type of activity and we 
",ill not permit nor condone it. (LaRue Exhj_bit 
No.2, T 2850) 
LaRue testified that Mitchell directed that Liddy contact 
Attorney General Kleindienst. (LaRue testimony, 7/3/74, T 2796) Later 
that day Liddy met I,lith Kleindienst at the Burning Tree Country Club 
and told him that some of the people arrested \,lere Uhite House or CRP 
employees. Liddy said that Mitchell wanted a report on the break-in. 
Kleindienst refused to discuss the matter and ordered Liddy off the 
premises. (Book II, 111-12) 
At the time of the break-in, the President was in Key 
Biscayne with his Chief of Staff, H. R. Haldeman, and his Press Secre-
tary, Ron Ziegler. (Book II, 118, 127) Chief domestic advisor 
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to the President John Ehrlichman and Haldeman's assistants, Higby 
and Strachan, were in Washington. (Book II, 118, 132) 
A \-'1hite House telephor.e number of Hm."ard Hunt had been found 
in a Watergate Hotel room used by the burglars. (Book II, 494) By 
the afternoon of June 17, 1972 this fact was reported to Ehrlichman. 
(Book II, 118) Ehrlichman was well aware of Hunt's previous covert 
operations for the \mite House. In fact, on July 7,1971, ,."hen Hunt 
was first hired, Ehrlichman called the CIA and said: 
I want to alert you that an old acquaintance, Howard 
Hunt, has been asked by the President to do some 
special consultant work on security problems. He 
may be contacting you sometime in the future for 
some assistance. I wanted you to kno,." that he Ylas 
in fact doing some things for the President. He 
is a long-time acquaintance with the people here. 
He may want some help on computer runs and other 
things. You should consider he has pretty much 
carte blanche. (Book II, 467) 
Upon learning of Hunt's possible association with one of those arrested 
inside the DNC, Ehrlichman immediately called Colson, ",hom he knew to 
be Hunt's sponsor at the Hhite House. (Book II, 118) Colson had recom-
mended Hunt for his hThite House position (Book VII) 706) and kne,." of 
Hunt's covert activities for the hThite House; Ehrlichman had told him 
of Hunt and Liddy's unsuccessful attempt to get Ellsberg's psychiatric 
records by breaking into Fielding's office. Ehrlichman had told Colson 
not to talk about the matter. In this June 17, 1972 conversation 
Ehrlichman raised with Colson questions about Hunt's employment record 
at the White House and hm.J it should be handled. (Book II, 118) 
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In the late afternoon of Saturday, June 17, 1972 Ehrlicf@an 
telephoned Ziegler, who was then with Haldeman and the President 
in Key Biscayne, and told him about the documents linking Hunt to 
the Watergate burglars. (Book II, 118) On the next day, June 18, 
Ehrlichman placed another call to Key Biscayne, this time to 
Haldeman. He discussed McCord's and Hunt's involvement in the 
break-in and the problems posed for CRP and the Hhite House. 
(Book II, 130) The arrests posed difficult problems: an investi-
gation might reveal that Mitchell and Haldeman had authorized a plan 
to place the President's political opponents under electronic sur-
veillance; that funds for the operation \.,rere campaign funds supplied 
by CRP; and that the participants in the Hatergate break-in had 
previously engaged in illegal covert activities for the lfuite House 
under the immediate supervision of Ehrlichman. 
After this telephone conversation with Ehrlichman, Haldeman 
called Magruder in California and discussed the arrests. Haldeman 
directed Magruder to return to \-lashington from California to meet 
Hith Dean, Strachan and Sloan to determine \,'hat had happened and the 
source of the money found on the arrested persons. (Book II, 126) 
Thus Haldeman reversed ~litchell's decision that Mardian should be 
the one to return immediately to \·Jashington. (LaRue testimony, 
T 2812-13) 
Dean returned on Sunday, June 18, 1972. He had been on a trip 
to the Far East and planned to stay in California. He cancelled his 
plans after a conversation ,.,rith his assistant Fred Fielding and returned 
to I-lashington. (Book II) 144) On June 18th) Ehrlichman \,'as plClced in 
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charge of Watergate by the President, and he in turn assigned Dean 
to work on the matter. (House Judiciary Committee, Compilation of 
"Presidential Statements on the Watergate Break-in and its Investi-
gation,1! 8/22/73, 45-46. Hereinafter cited as Presidential Statements, 
HJC Compilation.) Dean met with Liddy who told him that the break-in 
was a CRP operation. Dean reported this conversation to Ehrlichman, 
and on June 19 Ehrlichman, Colson and Dean met. (Book II, 145-46) 
Their discussion of the break-in centered on the fact 
that White House records did not reflect the termination of Hunt's 
consultant status and on the contents of his safe in the EOB building. 
(Book II, 145-46, 190) Ehrlichman ordered that Hunt's safe in the 
Executive Office Building be drilled open. Ehrlicronan and Colson 
directed that Dean take possession of the contents of Hunt's safe. 
(Book II, 190, 201) The safe contained State Department cables Hunt 
had fabricated, materials related to the Plumbers, McCord's briefcase 
filled with electronic equipment which Hunt had placed in the safe 
immedia tely af ter the arres ts, and t,\'O Hermes notebooks. (Book II, 163) 
On June 19, 1972 at about noon, the President called Colson. 
They talked for approximately one hour and discussed the break-in. 
(Book II, 156, 158-59) According to Colson, he told the President that 
Administration officials in Washington were holding a meeting to de-
termine \,hat they could do (Colson testimony, 7/15/74, T 4162); and 
either during this conversation or one with the President the following 
day he told the President that he believed that Hunt was not employed 
by the '~lite House at the time of the break-in. (Colson testimony, 
v 
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7/15/74, T 4174) Later that day Magruder, Xitchell, Mardian and 
LaRue, who had returned to ~'lashington, met in l1itchell' s apartment. 
Dean joined the meeting later. They discussed the break-in and the 
need for a statement from CRP denying any responsibility for the 
burglary. (Book II, 224) Magruder has testified he was directed at 
that meeting to destroy sensitive documents related to the political 
surveillance operation. (Book II, 225-26) This testimony is COTI-
firued by LaRue's testimony before the Co~~ittee. (LaRue testimony, 
7/5/74, T 2817) 
The President and Haldecan returned from Key Biscayne on 
June 19, 1972. At least by June 19, 1972, CRP officials Hitchell, 
Magruder, Hardian and LaRue and ~fuite 20use officials Raldeman, 
Ehrlichman and Dean all knew that the DNC break-in was an operation 
carried out under the direction of Li~dy. Yet Lidcly continued to 
serve as general counsel to the FCR]' until June 28, 1972, "'hen he 
was discharged by Stans for failure to cooperate '\\lith the FBI. 
Early the following morning Haldemen met with 
Ehrlichman and l'litchell at the \\11ite House. Dean and Kleindienst 
joined this meeting about 45 minutes later. (Book II, 240) The 
previous day Kleindienst had requested that Gray arrange for his 
briefing on the FBI investigation because Kleindienst had to brief 
the President th2:1t day or the next. (Book II, 137) They discussed 
the Watergate break-in. (Book II, 241) During this meeting in 
Ehrlichman's office the President remained alone in the Oval Office 
(with the exception of a three-minute meeting with Butterfield). 
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At 10:20 a.m., at the end of the meeting on Hatergate, Ehrlichman met 
with the President. (Book II, 243) Although the President had 
assigned Ehrlichman to handle Hatergate matters for the lfuite Eouse 
he did not discuss Watergate ,-lith Ehrlichrr.an. (In re Grand Jury, 
Misc. 47-73, order, 12/19/73; Book II, 238) Neither did he meet 
with Kleindienst or Mitchell that day. (Book II, 243-44) 
Thereafter and for about an hour and a half, Haldeman 
who by this time had been fully briefed and who, ,according to Strachan, 
had instructed Strachan to get rid of documents related to the Liddy 
Plan and other sensitive documents met with the President. (Book II, 
243, 265) At this meeting they discussed Watergate. A portion of the 
notes taken by Haldeman during the meeting read: 
Be sure EOE office is thoroughly checked regarding 
bugs at all times -- et cetera. v.lhat is our counter 
attack? PR offensive to top this. Hit the opposition 
with their activities. Point out libertarians have 
created public what I believe is callousness. Do they 
justify this less than stealing Pentagon papers, 
Anderson file, et cetera. We should be on the attack 
for diversion.- (Book II, 246-48) 
The tape recording of this June 20, 1972 meeting between the 
President and HaldeDan was subpoenaed by the Special Prosecutor in 
July, 1973. The subpoena was resisted by the President on the grounds 
of exec\ltive privilege (Book II, 258), but the subpoena was upheld by 
the Court of Appeals.- (Book IX, 748, 750-54) On Noveluber 2.6,1973 
"'hen the recording \,as finally produced, it contained an eighteen and 
one-half oiuute erasure that obliterated the portion of the converS3-
tion \\'hich, according to llaldenc3n ' s notes, referreu to \,Yatergate. 
, 
\ 
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(Book II, 249-50) The report of the United States District Court's 
Advisory Panel on the White House tapes concluded that the erasure 
was produced by repeated manual erasures of the tape on the tape re-
corder used by the President's ~ersonal secretary, Rose ~~ry Woods. 
(See Appendi~'A) 
On the morning of June. 20, 1972, Hagruder, as instructed 
by Haldeman, met with Sloan and determined that the source of the 
money found on the persons arrested Ivas FCRP. (Book II, 126) At 
10:30 a.m., Mitchell, who had returned to his office, met with LaRue, 
Magruder and Mardian. (Book II, 239) Also on June 20, 1972 Mitchell's 
prepared statement denying any legal, moral or ethical accountability 
on the part of CRP for the \\Tatergate break-in was issued. (Book II, 
303) That evening the President telephoned Mitchell. They discussed 
the break-in. The tape of that telephone call was subpoenaed by the 
Special Prosecutor. The President responded that the conversation had 
not been recorded. (Eook II, 309) The President did, however, provide 
a dictabelt recording of his recollections of the day that incl~ded an 
interrupted account of his conversation with Mitchell: 
Paragraph. I also talked to John Mitchell in 
-- late in the day and tried to cheer him up a 
bit. He is terribly chagrined that, uh, the 
activities of anybody attached to his con®ittee 
should, ull, have, uh, been handled in such a 
manner, and he. said that he only regretted 
that he had· not policed all the people more 
effectively on a -- in his mm organization 
(42 second silence) 
(unintelligible) 
(Book II, 310) 
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On June 22, 1972 the President -- who had been with Haldeman 
in Key Biscayne when the news of the break-in first appeared, had re-
roained there with him on June 17, 18 and 19, and then had discussed 
Watergate with Haldeman and Mitchell on June 20 -- held a news conference. 
He was asked if he had ordered any sort of investigation to determine 
the truth of the charges "that the people who bugged [Dc-lC] headquarters 
had a direct link to the hl1ite House." The President replied: 
Mr. Ziegler and also Mr. Mitchell, speaking for the 
campaign committee, have responded to quastions on this 
in great detail. They have stated my position and have 
also stated the facts accurately. 
This kind of activity, as Mr. Ziegler has indicated, 
has no place whatever in our electoral process, or in 
our governmental process. And, as Mr. Ziegler has stated, 
the ~lite House has had no involvement whatever in this 
particular incident. 
As far as the matter now is concerned, it is under 
investigation, as it should be, by the proper legal 
authorities, by the District of Columbia police, and 
by the FBI. I \.}ill not comment on those mat ters, 
particularly since possible criminal charges are 
involved. (Book II, 352-53) 
III. 
By June 21, 1972 a decision to limit further Water ga te dis-
closures had been made. Ehrlichman ,-]as in charge. Dean ,,'as assigned 
to cover the FBI investigation. Ehrlichman called Gray and told him 
that Dean was conducting an inquiry into the Watergate matter for the 
h'hite Bouse and to work closely ,,;rith him. (Book II, 314) 
[11979]
-10-
Ine money found on those arrested posed a risk of exposure 
for the President and a danger to his re-election campaign. This 
was what caused Haldeman, on June 18, the day after the break-in, 
to direct Magruder to return from California to Washington and talk 
to Sloan, Dean, and Strachan about the source of the money. (Book 
II, 126) The FBI might be able to trace the $100 bills back to the 
bank that supplied the cash, and that in turn would lead to the bank 
account of Bernard Barker and the five checks, four of which were 
dravlU on a Nexican bank, totaling $114,000. (Book II, 368-69) 
Liddy was well aware of such risk for he had shredded the $100 bills 
in his possession immediately after the break-in. (Book II, 289) The 
persons whose n~~es appeared on the checks producing the cash, Kenneth 
Dahlberg and Manuel Ogarrio, could tell the FBI that they delivered 
them to the President's re-election campaign; in fact Dahlberg had 
handed his check personally to Stans. (Book II, 366-67) Liddy had 
obtained these checks while serving as general counsel to FCRF and had 
given them to Barker to cash. (Book II, 371) 
The risk that the CRP link "muld be uncovered became more 
il1lHlinent on June 21 and 22, 1972 "hen Gray informed Dea.n that the 
$100 bills had already been traced to Barker's bank account in Florida 
and that Dahlberg and Ogarrio had been identified and the Bureau in-
tended to interview them. (Book II, 339, 2 SSC 576-77) On June 23 
Dean reported this inforn~ation to Ealdeman, ,.;rho immediately report2d 
it tot he Presiden t. (Book II. 356)V It is undisputed t ha t on ~ 
1/ The ~ouse Judiciary Committee on May 15, 1974 subpoenaeJ the tape 
recording of this and otiler conversations bet\,-een the Presid2nt and 
Haldeman on June 23, 1972. The President has refused to proJuce these 
recordings. 
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June 23, 1972 the President directed Halderaan and Ehrlichman to meet 
with Helms and Halters and express Hhite House concerns and ask 
Walters to meet Hith Gray and cOlllii1unicate those concerns to him. 
(Book II, 359) 
On that afternoon Ehrlichman and HaldeJj[2.n met Hith Eelms 
and hTalters. (Book II, 357) Helms assured Halder:1Cln that there was 
no CIA involvement in the Watergate break-in, and told him that he 
had given a similar assurance to acting FBI Director Gray. (Book II, 
383-84) Haldeman said that the FBI investigation was leading to 
important people and that it was the President's "ish, because an FBI 
investigation in Mexico might uncover CIA activities or assets, that 
Walters suggest to Gray that it was not advantageous to pursue the 
inquiry, especially into Nexico. (Eook 11, 380, 385-86) Ehrlicnman 
testified that the Hexican checks traced to the Florida bank account 
were discussed as a specific example of the President's concern. 
(Book II, 392) During or shortly after the meeting Dean called Gray 
and told him to expect a call from Walters. (Book II, 400) In@ediately 
after the meeting \>.'ith J-ialdefl1an and Ehrlichman, 1,~2.lters Bet \,lith Gray 
and expressed these concerns. (Book II, 402-04) Gray agreed to hold 
the interview of Ogarrio in abeyance although he indicated the FBI 
would continue to try td locate and interview Dahlberg. (Dook· II, 
400-01) At this tirle Dahlberg \,'2-S ffieeting with Stans at CRP. 
(Book TI, 406-07) 
\';alters checked \vhether any CIA sources \\'ould be jeopardized 
by an FBI investigation in Nexico, and detel:mined that none \\'ould. 
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(Book 11,410-11) On June 26,1972 he so advised Dean vlhom Ehrlichman 
had deisgna ted as the vIhite I-!ouse liaison, (Book II, 411-12). On 
June 27, 1972 Helms notified Gray that the CIA had no interest in 
Ogarrio. (Book II, 447) Helms and Gray set up a meeting the following 
day, and Gray reported this to Dean. (Book II, 447) On the morning 
of June 28, 1972 Ehrlichman telephoned Gray and instructed hLu to cancel 
his meeting with Hel~s. (Dook II, 454) 
On June 28, 1972 Dean asked Halters if the CIA could stop 
the FBI investigations of the Dahlberg and Ogarrio checks. Walters 
refused to do anything. (Book II, 434) Unable to use the CIA to block 
the investigation, Dean acted directly. On the evening of June 28, 
1972 Dean called Gray and insisted that his instructions to intervie,v 
Ogarrio and Dahlberg be withdravtrl. Gray complieci. (Book II, 475) 
Earlier that ciay Dean and Ehrlichman gave the contents of Hunt's 
safe, withheld from FBI agents the previous day, to Gray. (Book II, 
503) In addition, at Helms I request, Gray cancelled interviews of 
two CIA employees who had furnished Hunt with information and with 
disguises and alias identification cards in 1971 in connection "ith 
his earlier covert activities. (Book II, 454, 560-66) Helms also in-
structed Walters that the CIA still adhered to its request that the 
FBI not expand its investigation beyond those already arrested or 
directly under suspicion. (Book II, 459) 
These activi ties of Ehrlichman, Dean, helms, \';alters and 
Gray limited the investigatory efforts of the FBI. But there were 
other problems. The defendants were in jail and needed money for 
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bail and attorneys fees and other support funds. Mitchell te s tified 
he decided CRP could not provide bail. (Book III, 99) Dean first 
asked Halters if the CIA could pay bai l and support money, but \.;ras 
rebuffed. (Book II, 433) On June 28, 1972 Ehrlichroan a nd Haldenan 
ag reed to use Ka l mbach, personal a ttorney for the President a nd a long 
time high-level fundraiser for the President, to handle the r ais ing of 
funds for the Watergate defendants. (Book Ill, 149-53, 277-79, HHT 
494-96) Kalmbach flew to Washington tha t night. (Book Ill, 152-54) He 
met with Dean the follo\ving morning, a nd agreed to undertake the assign-
ment. (Book Ill, 154-55) On June 29, 1972 Kalmbach obtained $75,000 
cash from Stans for this purpose. He delivered it to Ul asewicz the 
following day for clandestine paYlTlents for the bene fi t of those involved 
in Watergate. (Book III, 167-69) 
As of June 30, 1972 the risks of further disclosure con-
necting the lfuite House or CRP with the break-in were contained, at 
least temporar ily. Cash was in hand to be distributed to the persons 
arrested; the cash found on the persons arrested had not yet been 
tr aced to CRP; a nd by June 28 , 1972 Gray had stopped the FBI's efforts 
to trace the mOon ey found on the persons arrested. 
On Jun e 30, 1972 the President met with ~aldeman and Mitchell 
to discuss ;-iitchell' s resignation as Director of th e CRP. (Book II, 
515-16) Mitche ll had approved Liddy's intelligence activities and 
following Lidd y ' s call to Magruder on the morning of June 17, 1972, 
had been kept fully informed of al l the developments. As of this 
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June 30, 1972 meeting, Haldeman knew of the CRP and White House in-
volvement in the formulation of a political intelligence gathering 
capability and in the Watergate break-in itself: (1) Haldeman knew 
since October 7, 1971 that "Operation Sandwedge", which contemplated 
a ':black bag'; capability and electronic surveillance, had been under 
study by Attorney General Mitchell and John Dean (Political ~latters 
Memorandum, 10/7 /71, 20-21); (2) Haldeman kne,-l that on December 2, 
1911 Operation Sandwedge had been sciapped and that instead Liddy had 
been hired by the CRP to handle political intelligence (Political 
Matters Memorandum 12/2/71, 43); (3) Ealdeman kneH that in February 
1972 Liddy had made tHO presentations to Mitchell, Magruder, and Dean 
and that Liddy's proposed plans had contemplated the use of electronic 
surveillance and illegal entries into such targeted facilities as 
the DNC headquarters (Book I, 66); (4) Haldeman knew at the end of 
March 1972 that a sophisticated political intelligence gathering system 
with a budget of $300,000 had been approved by the CRP (Book I, 148); 
(5) Haldeman knew that he had directed Liddy to change his capabilities 
from Huskie to HcGovern (Book II, 265); (6) Haldeman kne,.; shortly after 
the break-in that James HcCord, security consultant to the CRP, and 
Howard Hunt, a ~01ite House consultant, had been linked to CRP's intel-
ligence gathering opera t:ion (Book II, 130); (7) Haldeman knew on June 18, 
1972 of the possibility that the rr:oney found on the five persons arrested 
in the 'DNC offices ,,'as CRP money (Book II, 126-27); (8) HaldeQan kr:.evi 
on June 20, 1972 that he had instructed his assistant Strachan to 
destroy all politically sensitive documents (Book II, 265); (9) Haldeman 
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knew on June 22, 1972 that the FBI had uncovered five checks bearing 
the names of Dahlberg and Ogarrio totaling $114,000 that had passed 
through the bank account of Watergate conspirator Eernard Barker 
(Book II, 339-41); (10) Haldeman knew on June 23, 1972 that he had 
instructed Walters to inform Gray that the FBI investigation should 
not go beyond the five persons already in custody and should not extend 
into Hexico (Book II, 386-87); and (11) Haldeman kne\.J on or about 
June 28 that he and Ehrlichman had approved Dean's use of Kalmbach to 
raise and distribute cash for those involved in Watergate (Book III, 
149-53, 277-79; wnT 494-96) 
One of the subjects of the June 30, 1972 discussion Has 
Mitchell1s resignation and why this Has the appropriate time for 
Mitchell to resign as head of CRP. The portion of the tape recording 
of the conversation made available to the Committee reads: 
HaldelJan: 
Mitchell: 
Haldeman: 
President: 
Haldeman: 
Hell, there maybe is another facet. 
The longer you wait the more risk each 
hour brings. You run the risk of more 
stuff, valid or i~valid, surfacing on 
the Watergate caper -- type of thing 
You couldn't possibly do it if you 
got into a --
-- the potential problem and then you 
are stuck __ 0 
Yes, that's the other~hin;, if sorne~ 
thing does COli1e cut, bu t He 'i,Ton' t .--
He hope nothing will. It may not. 
But there is always the risk. 
As of nOH there is no problem there. 
As, as of any moment in the future 
there is at least a potential problem. 
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Well, I'd cut the loss fast. I'd cut 
it fast. If we're going to do it I'd 
cut it fast. That's my view, generally 
speaking. And I wouldn't -- and I don't 
think, though, as a matter of fact, I 
don't think the story, if we, if you 
put it in hur;can terms -- I think the 
story is, you're positive rather than 
negative, because as I said as I was 
preparing to answer for this press 
conference, I just wrote it out, as I 
usually do, one way -- terribly 
sensitive [unintelligible]. A hell 
of a lot of people will like that 
answer. They would. And it'd make 
anybody else who asked any other question 
on it look like a self ish son-of--a-bitch, 
which I thoroughly intended them to look 
like. 
* * * 
[Unintelligi~ie~ ~2stchester Country 
Club with all the sympathy in the world. 
That's great. 
ligible] you 
won't expect 
That's great. [Unin tel-· 
taking this route -- people 
you to -- be a surprise. 
No, if it is a surprise -- Otherwise, 
you're right -- it will be tied right 
to Oatergate. [Unintelligible]--
if you \ . rait too long, if it sin:mers 
down. 
You can't if other stuff develops on 
Watergate. The problem is, it's always 
potentially the same thing. 
[Unintelligible] 
[Unintelligible] That's right_ In 
other words, it'd be hard to hard-line 
Nitchell's departuL-e under -_. 
You can't do it. 
it in a \.Jay thCi t 
Yeah, okay. 
I guess Bob can handle 
Martha's not hurt. 
(Book II, 514-16) 
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On July I, 1972 Mitchell resigned as director of the Presi-
dent's re-election campaign organization; as the President suggested 
the previous day, the story was put in };human terms. l} (HJCT,5l4) 
However the story was put, all the pr~or circumstances strongly 
suggest that President ~ixon decided, shortly after learning of the 
Watergate break-in, on a plan to cover-up the identities of high 
officials of the \-Jhite Bouse and CRP directly involved in the illegal 
operation and to prevent the disclosure of the prior covert activities 
undertaken on behalf of President Nixon by Hunt, Liddy and other 
participants in the \{atergate break-in. The foregoing is only the 
first portion of the evidence that the Comnittee had before it for 
considerati0TI. Evidence of -the Pre~t~er~ls latpr conduct as QO~ FOY~h 
in the next section, shows that President Nixon acknowledged his 
decision and labeled it one of containment. 
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CONTAIl'f.1ENT -- JULY 1 TO ELECTION 
From the beginning of July 1972 until after the Presiden-
tial election in November, President Nixon's policy of containment 
-- of "cutting the loss" worked. The policy prevented disclosure 
that might have resulted in the indictment of high \-Jhite House and 
·CRP officials and might have jeopardized the outcome of the November 
election. The policy worked because two of the President's assistants, 
John Dean, Counsel to the President, and Herbert Kalmbach, personal 
attorney to the President, assigned to carry out the President's 
policy, did their jobs well -- with the full support of the power and 
authority of the office of President of the United States. 
The> risks to the re-elect::':::.--. :: t;1e P::.-~sident ~vere \.-"co ",-,--6-
closures of the use of illegal means to implement the President's 
plan of obtaining political intelligence and the underlying risk of 
disclosures of the use of similar means in connection with various 
activities during his first term in office such as the burglary of 
Dr. Fielding's office. Beyond that, his closest political associates, 
Haldeman, Mitchell and Ehrlichman, ~"ere directly and deeply involved 
in one or more of the illegal aspects of the President's activities. 
Tape recordings of Presidential conversations in the pos-
session of the Committee establish that the plan of containment prior 
to the election had ftill approval of the President. On June 30, 1972 
the President told Haldeman and [·!itchell that his desj_re 'vas to "cut 
the loss." (Book 11,514) On September 15,1972 the President told 
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Dean and Haldeman, "So you just try to button it up as well as you 
can and hope for the best. And, ••. remember that basically the 
damn thing is just one of those unfortunate things and we're trying 
to cut our losses." (HJCT 13-14) On the morning of March 21, 1973 
the President told Dean, "[Y]oU had the right plan, let me say, I 
~/ 
have no doubts about the right plan before the election. And 
you handled it just right. You contained it. Now after the election 
~/ 
we've got to have another plan, because we' can't have, for four 
years, we can't have this thing -- you're going to be eaten away. 
We can't do it." (HJCT, 129-30) And on March 22, 1973 the President 
told Mitchell, "the whole theory has been containment, as you know, 
3/ 
John." (HJCT, 183) 
As of the beginning of July, 1972 the situation was in fAct 
contained. Haldeman told the President and Mitchell on June 30, 1972, 
"As of now there is no problem there." But, "As, as of any moment in 
the future there is, there is at least a potential problem." (Book II, 
514) The objective was to maintain, to the extent possible, the stability 
of this situation. That is what Dean and Kalmbach were assigned to do. 
-» In the \Vhite House Transcript, the words " ... And then, once you 
decide on the right plan, you say, 'John,' you say, 'No doubts about 
the right plan before the election ... '" appear instead of the above 
quoted rna terial. (\';8T) 248) 
_]j The subject of the conversation was the President's directive 
that Mitchell be urgently called to Washington so that he would be 
included with Haldei:'!an, Ehrlichman and DeRn in the development of a 
ne\" stra tegy. 
_'}j This material does not appear in the Hhite House Transcript. (lmT 310) 
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Dean was assigned by Ehrlichman to monitor the FBI investi-
gation for the White House (Book II, 314-15), by obtaining on an 
ongoing basis its fruit (Hook II, 315) and by enlisting the CIA to 
help narrow the scope of the in~estigation. (Book II, 392-95) Dean 
regularly obtained information from Gray about the progress of the 
investigation. In fact he was on the phone with Gray continually. 
He obtained information froID FBI reports, which he showed to CRP officials. 
(Book II, 558) He sat in on all FBI interviews of ~~ite House personnel 
a system arranged by Ehrlichman with Gray. (Book II, 314-15) Thus 
Dean was able to anticipate the leads ,the FBI would follow and prepare 
those persons v7ho had knowledge of the facts within CRP and the White 
House. (Book II, 484) Instead of having h~ite House staff members Colson, 
Kehrli and Krogh appear before the \..]atergate Grand Jury, Dean arranged 
with Assistant Attorney General Petersen to have their depositions taken 
outside the presence of the Grand Jury. (Book II, 565) 
Kalmbach secured additional sources of funds for the clandestine 
payments to the Hatergate defendants. By the middle of September (when 
he unconditionally \vithdre\v from any further assignment in carrying out 
the President's decision) Kalmbach had delivered more than $187,000 in 
cash to the defendants or their attorneys. (Book III, 378-79, 381) Dean 
and/or LaRue met and consulted with Kalmbach on each of the deliveries. 
(Book III, 229) Dean reported the paYTIents to Haldeman and Ehrlichman. 
(Book III, 150-51, 200-02) Only once, during the latter part of July, was 
there a need for Ehrlichman to step in directly. Kalmbach had been requested 
[11990]
-4-
to seek sources of funds outside CRP, and he was concerned about the secrecy 
and the clandestine or covert nature of the activity. He sought and obtained 
assurances from Ehrlichman that Dean had the authority to pursue the 
project and that the project was one Kalmbach had to take on. 
III, 268~69, 277) 
(Book 
Investigations by federal agencies were successfully re-
buffed. On July 5, 1972, when Hitchell was interviewed by the FBI, 
he denied knowledge of any information related to the break-in. 
Mitchell testified that, at the time of the interview, he had been told 
by Mardian and LaRue of Liddy's involvement in the break-in, 
but that the information had not been checked out; and that he ',vas not 
volunteering information under any circumstances. (Book Ill, 204) 
On July 19 and 20,1972 respectively, Porter and Magruder f81s~ly 
told FBI agents that the funds obtained by Liddy from CRP ~vere for 
legal intelligence gathering activities. (Book III, 242-43, 247-48) 
On August 10, Porter testified falsely before the Watergate Grand Jury 
as to the purpose of the $199,000 in cash paid to Liddy. (Book III, 
293;· 296) On August 18, Hagruder, after discussing his false story 
.about the Liddy money with Dean and Mitchell, testified falsely before 
the Watergate Grand Jury. (Book III, 300) On or about August 28, 
Bud Krogh, on Ehrlichman' s staff, ~vho had been in charge of the 
Plumbers unit, testified falsely before the Watergate Grand Jury as 
to prior activities oE Liddy and Hunt. (Book III, 312-15, 322-23, 
324-25) On September 12 or 13, 1972 Hagruder met ~"ith Hitchell and Dean 
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to plan a false story regarding certain meetings among Hitchell, 
Magruder, Dean and Liddy in early 1972 in which politicial intelli-
gence and electronic surveillance were discussed; Magruder thereafter 
testified falsely about the meetings before the Watergate Grand Jury. 
(Book III, 344, 351-52) 
The President's decision not to have former Commerce 
Secretary Maurice Stans appear personally before the Grand Jury was 
implemented; the President assigned Ehrlichman to see that Stans need 
not appear. (Book II, 567) In July, 1972 Ehrlichman instructed Dean to 
make arrangements with Henry Petersen to take Stans' deposition out-
side of the Grand Jury. Dean and then Ehrliclliuan contacted Petersen, 
but both were unsuccessful. Finally, Ehrlichman telephoned Kleindienst. 
According to Kleindienst, he ,·,arned Ehrlichman that he was lucky 
Petersen had not made an obstruction of justice complaint. (Book II, 
3564-65) Petersen subsequently agreed to take the deposition by Stans 
in his office, in lieu of his scheduled Grand Jury appearance. (Book II, 
565, 567-69, 571) 
One break the investigators had was the cooperation of Alfred 
Baldwin, a CRP employee recruited by McCord who had been monitoring 
the intercepted conversations at the DNC. Since, at the time of the 
break-in, he was across the street from Watergate at the Howard Johnson 
Motel, he was not arrested on June 17. On July 5th, Baldwin stepped 
forward and identified Hunt as one of the Hatergate burglars. (1 SSC 
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Baldwin's disclosure carne on the day before Gray's conversation 
on July 6, 1972 with the President. On the morning of July 6 Gray 
met with Walters. (Book II, 526) The two men discussed what they 
felt were efforts by Wnite House staff to wound the President by con-
fusing the issue of whether the CIA had any interest in the FBI's 
Watergate investigation. They discussed the need to raise the matter 
with the President. (Book II, 526-27, 528-29, 551) Gray has testi-
fied that after Walters left, he decided to call Clark MacGregor, the new chair-
man of the President's re-election campaign. (Book II, 551; 9 SSC 3&62)-
Gray testified he told MacGregor that both he and Walters 
were concerned about the use of the CIA and FBI by llliite House staff 
members. Gray asked MacGregor to inform the President that the FBI 
and CIA had been injured by the conduct of White House staff and that 
1/ 
the same persons Here hurting the President. 
According to Gray's records, thirty-seven minutes after 
Gray's conversation with MacGregor, Gray received a telephone call 
from the President. The President began the conversation with Gray 
not about Watergate and the serious allegations Gray had just made to 
MacGregor. Rather, the President told Gray how pleased he was with 
the way the FBI had handled an attempted skyjacking in San Francisco. 
--1-/ NacGregor has testified that Gray called him on the night of July 5, 1972 
and that Gray did not give him any message to pass to the President or 
discuis interference with the FBIls Watergate investigation. (Book II, 
533~-34) Ehrlichman testifi2d that the President mentioned to 
him that MacGregor had received a telephone call from Gray, had told 
h.im about it and that he immediately called Gray. (Book II, 2784) 
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(Book II, 550) Gray thanked the President. According to Gray, Gray then 
blurted out that both he and General Walters thought people on the President's 
staff were trying to "mortally wound" the President by manipulation of the 
FBI and CIA; Gray told the President . that he had just spoken to 
MacGregor and "asked him to speak to you about this." According to Gray, 
after a perceptible pause, the President said only: "Pat, you just 
1/ 
continue to conduct your aggressive and thorough investigation."-
That was the whole of the phone call. The President asked no questions 
about what facts Gray had to support his serious charges; the President 
asked for no names. (Book II, 552-53) There is no evidence before the 
Committee that the President pursued the matter. 
Two days after the telephone conversation with Gray, 
Ehrlichman and the President discussed clemency for the Watergate de-
fendants, while walking on a beach at San Clemente, California. 
According to Ehrlichman's testimony, he told the President that "presi-
dential pardons or something of that kind would inevitably be a question 
that he would have to confront by reason of the political aspect of 
this. It (Book III, 182-83) The President's response, according to 
Ehrlichman, was no one in the \-fuite House should "get into this \~hole 
area of clemency \~ith anybody involved in this case and surely not make any 
assurances to anyone." (Book III, 189) 
In August 1972, \-lhen the President discussed \I!ith Ehrlichman 
the issuance of public statements on h"'atergate (Book II, 588), 
Ehrlichman knel.J the details of eRP and \·!hite House involvement in the 
break-in (Book II, 152-53) and had secreted certain of the contents of 
1/ The President has stated that Gray warned that the matter of Watergate 
might leCld higher. (Book II, 550) 
I 
f 
\ 
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Hunt's safe outside the normal channels of the law by delivering the!)" 
personally to acting FBI Director Gray (Book II, 503); he had re-
cruited Kalmbach to make the secret payments to the defendants; he 
knew of the actual payments to the defendants (Book III, 150-51, 269); 
and he knew of the use of the CIA to narrow and thwart the FBI investi-
gation. (Book II, 382-84) 
On August 29, 1972 the President held a news conference. He dis-
c~ssed various pending investigative proceedings in connection with 
Watergate, including the FBI and the Department of Justice, the House 
Banking and Currency Committee and the GAO, in suggesting that the 
appointment of a special prosecutor ~.;rould serve no useful purpose. He 
then said: 
In addition to that [other areas of investigation], 
within my o~~ staff, under my direction, Counsel to 
the President, Mr. Dean, has conducted a complete 
investigation of all leads which might involve any 
present member of the \-!hite House Staff or anybody 
in the Government. I can say categorically that 
his investigation indicates that no one in the 
Hhite House Staff, no one in this Administration, 
presently employed, was involved in this very 
bizarre incident. 
With respect to the involvement of CRP, the President said: 
At the same time, the Committee itself is con-
ducting its o",n investigation, independent of the 
rest, because the Committee desires to clear the 
air and to be sure that as far as any people who 
have responsibility for this campaign are con-
cerned, that there is nothing that hangs over 
them. Before Hr. Nitchell left as c3.e1paign 
chairman he had employed a very good law firm 
with investigatory experience to look into this 
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matter. Mr. MacGregor has continued that in-
vestigation and is continuing it now. I will 
say in that respect that anyone on the campaign 
committee, Mr. HacGregor has assured me, who does 
not cooperate with the investigation . will 
be discharged immediately. (Book II, 589) 
These statemehts were untrue; Dean acted to narrow and frustrate the 
FBI investigation. He conducted no independent investigation. He 
reached no conclusion that there \yas no \\Thite House involvement in 
Watergate. (Book II, 590-91) He interviewed no witnesses. He 
examined no documents. He made no report on an investigation. 
MacGregor had received, on matters related to Watergate, only 
one or two briefings, of which the primary concern, MacGregor said, was 
not to report on CRP involvement in the break-in, but rather to determine 
the CRP's status in the pending civil suits initiated by the DNC. The 
President's statement that he had received an assurance from MacGregor 
that anyone not cooperating with the investigation would be discharged 
is untrue. NacGregor has testified that he had not given such an assurance 
to the President. (12 sse 4924) 
III. 
On September 15, 1972, Liddy, Hunt and the five 
persons arrested in the DNe Watergate offices on June 17 were indicted 
for burglary, unlawful entry for the purpose of intercepting oral and 
"lire communications, and conspiracy, all serious felonies. 1'70 other 
CRr or ~·Jhite House officials were charged \Vith having been involved 
in the break-in. (Book III l 361) 
. - .- .--_._-- - _ . - ----------------- ----------
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On that same day John Dean, Counsel to the President, 
counsel to the President's staff in fact, was summoned to see the 
President. (Dean testimony, 7/11/74, T. 3521) This was the first time 
since before June 17, 1972 that Dean had met with the President. (Book 
III, 598-99) 
I . A~ the time of this conversation, it is undlsputed that the 
President knew, and had knm.;rn since a few days af ter the break-in, that 
Howard Hunt had j'surfaced" in connection with Hatergate and that Hunt 
had previously been a member of the White House Special Investigations 
Unit. (Presidential Statements, HJC Compilation, 5/22/73, 24) The President had 
met and discussed Watergate with Haldeman and Mitchell, who were fully 
apprised of the CRP and hTIite House connections to the Watergate 
break-in. He had arranged, authorized and publicly advanced the mis-
leading explanation for Hitchell's resignation from CRP on Juae 30. 
(Book II, 514-15) He had received Gray's \varning of \,TIite House inter-
ference with the FBI's Watergate investigation on July 6. (Book II, 
550-53) He had prevented Stans' personal appearance before the Grand 
Jury. (Book II, 567) On August 29, he had made an untrue public 
statement about Dean's "complete investigation" of the \,)atergate 
matter. (Book II, 589) These facts about the extent of the Presi-
dent 1 S knmvledge at the time of the September 15. 197 2 meeting are undis-
puted. Beyond that, the President has refused to comply with sub-
poenas from this Corunittee requiring tapes of six conversations the 
President had Ivith Haideman and three conversations the President had ,vith 
Colson on June 20 and June 23, 1972. 
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Prior to Dean's arrival at the September.lS, 1972 meeting, 
Haldeman advised the Presiden t of the good job Dean ,vas doing "by 
enabling other people to gain ground while he's making sure that you 
don't fall through the holes." The President told Haldeman that he 
could not meet with the finance group in the morning because it was 
too soon after Watergate. (HJCT 1) Then Dean entered th~ roon, and 
the President asked him about the events of the day: 
PnESIDEXT. 
DEAX. 
HALDDL\"'. 
DEAN .. 
HALDE~[AX. 
DEAX. 
PRESIDEXT. 
DEAX. 
PnESIDEXT. 
H .... LDK.'IL\ N. 
DEAX. 
H .. \LDf:~[ ,\ "'. 
DE.\X. 
H.\LDE)UX. 
PRESIDEXT. 
H."d.DF::.\L\ '\. 
DEAx. 
PRES1DEXT. 
,VeIl, you had quite a day today, didn't you? You 
got, I1h, '\Vatergate, uh, on the »ay, huh? 
Quite a three months. 1/ 
Ho,y did it all end lip? --
Dh, I think we can say ""\Vell" at this point. The, LIh, 
the press is playi ng it just as »6 expect. . 
,VhitEmash? 
::\0, not yet ; the, thestol'Y right now-
Irs a big story. 
Yeah. 
rU nintell i~rible ] 
Five indicted, 
Plus, 
They'rQ bllilding lip the fact that one of-
plus two ,\Yhite HOllse aides. 
Plus, pIllS the ,\Vhite House former guy and all that. 
That's !rood. Thnt. that t3kes the ecb:e olI ,yhitewD.sh 
~'eally~which-that was the thillg :'Ilit<:hell kept say-
mg that, 
Yeah. 
thnt to those 1n the CO\11\t!·y, Liddy alld, and, lIh, HUllt 
are bi,<:?· mCIl. 2 / 
That's ri!2:ht. -
Ye:-:h. Th'ey're \"'il1ite Honse aides.: . (HJCT 2) 
The President 2sked hm." HacGregor handled himself. uean re-
sponded [hat MacGregor had made a good statement about the Grand Jury 
indict~ent, and it is n00 time to realize that some apologies may be 
due. "~ne President rep1ied, "Just remember all the trouble they gave 
us on this. ~eTll have a chance to get back at them one day." (HJCT 2~3) 
1/ In the \vhite House tr3nscript the ,,'ords "\.Je tried" appear instead of 
"Quite a three ElOnths." (HI-iT 55) 
-.1../ The \wrds "Yeah. 
Y-.'bite House transcript. 
They're \\'bite House aides. 11 do not ilppear in the 
(\'r'rlT 55) 
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Then the three men talked about the pending civil litigation 
regarding the Watergate break-in, including Maurice Stans' libel action. 
Dean explained that the federal prosecutor of the Watergate defendants 
said that the civil cases made i't difficult to draw criminal indictments 
because the pposecutors did not Hant to come out with indictments "'lhen 
civil cases tended to approach matters differently. (HJCT 6) 
The President accepted a telephone call from Clark MacGregor. 
The President said he had heard NacGregor was going. to be sued. "[J]ust 
don't let this keep you ur your colleag~c3 from concentrating on the 
big game," the President directed MacGregor. "[T]his thing is just 
one of those side issues and a month later everybody looks back and 
,,,onders ,,,hat the shouting was about." 
DEAN. 
PRESJDE::\T. 
Three months aO"o I would have had troublc predict-
ing where we'd be today. I think that I can say that 
fifty-four days from nc)\\" that, uh, no~, a thing will 
come crashing down to our, our surpnse. 
* * ~'-
,Yell, the "'hole thing is a can of worms. As you 
know, a lot of this stuff \>ellt on. And, ull. alld, uh, 
find the people \\"ho \\"01'1;:c<1 [nnintelJigihle] [l'>Vfnlly 
embal'l'assillg. _\.nd, uh, and, the. nh, but the, but the 
way you, you\'c hanclled it. it se~IlIS to me, lws be~ll 
very ~killf\ll, bcc~llse you-pnttlllg your finge\s I.n 
the dIkes en'!'\" tlnle that lraks ha\"c sprung llele 
and sprung tliere. [T.-ninldligible] ha\"ing l)eop~e 
straigl1trn the [unintelligiolcl The Grand .Tnry IS 
dismjssed now? (HJCT 7) 
Dean begac[ !:o speak of some problems that might lie ahead, 
remarking that some bitterness and internal dissension existed in CRP 
because of this case. The President stated: 
--- - . - . . . . ~. 
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They sholild just, uh, just behave and, and, rcrognizc 
t his, this is, again, this is \yar. 'We're get t ing a few 
shots. It'll be oyer. Don't \yorrv. [rnintclligibleJ. I 
wouldn't W[lnt to be on the o'ther side right now. 
Would you? (HJCT 9) 
The President said, "I .lant the most comprehensive notes on all of those 
that have tried to do us in. Because they didn't have to do it. 
I mean if the thing had been a clo-uh, they had a very close election 
everybody on the other side would understand this game. But now, they 
are doing this quite deliberately and they are asking for it and they 
are going to get it." (HJCT 10) 
After a discussion on ways to get even with those who had 
made an issue of Watergate, Dean turned to the Patman (Banking and 
Currency Committee) hearings. He identified the hearings as another 
potential problem "now that the indictments are down." He was un-
certain of success in "turning that off." He continued: 
DE,-\1". 
PHESlDENT. 
Dr.,\x. 
Prn~IDENT. 
DE.\!\. 
. ,Ve\'e got a plan ~'hereby 
RothblaH and Bittm:1ll. \yho are cOllllsel for the 11yc 
men \yho ~·ere. or actu:dlv a (ot,,) of scyen. that \,ere 
indicted tocla~·. are goin,g. to go up 3nd yisit eyer.'" 
lllclllber alld s".\" , "If you COllllllence hearill~s YOU are 
going to jcopardi?e the ciyil rights of thesc'incliyidll-
als ill the worst way. allli theY'll nen'r O'ct a fair 
trial." and the like, nlld tiT to trilk to members 011 on 
that leyel. un-' , 
'Vh," not ask that the~' requc':t to be heard h~', by the 
COlnmittee and esplain it pl1blicl~'? 
How conld ('hey--·Thc~·\·e plalllwci that ~'hat they're 
going to say is. "If YOlI do COllllllencC' \yith these hear-
ings, \,e phn ~o pllblicl~' come up and say \\'h,lt you're 
d~!11g to the nghisof illdi\'idunl:::." SOlllC'thilIg to that 
efleet. 
,\s a motter of f:let thC'y could eH'1lll1akc a lllotioll in 
court to get the thing cli'srnic'sed. 
That's a11011\('r Ihilll! \\,(,'re cloiH~ is to. is 
TIpC<1 use t hesr hra ril\!!s-- ' 
brillg an injtlllc( i \'(, ',\ction aga i nst, 11h'. t h(' npppfl r-
ance. S:lY-
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-Well, goillg the other way, the dismissal of the, of 
the. of the indictment- 11 
How about tryillg to g-ctthe criminal cascs, criminal 
charges dismissed on the grOlll1c1s that there, "'ell, 
YOU know-
'rho ci\·il rights type stuff. 
(HJCT lF12) 
Dean said that he was working with civil rights groups to put pressure 
on Patman and suggested that Stans go to see Congressman Ford and brief 
him on Stans' difficulties ~~th the law suits. They could also look at the 
campaign spending reports of every member of the Patman Committee. (HJCT 12) 
The three men spoke of how to influence the minority members 
of the Comrni ttee. Both Secretary Connally and Congressman Ford 'Nere 
mentioned as liaison people.' (HJCT 12) The President took charge . 
He said to Haldeman: ;'Pu t it dOvm, uh, Gel-ry should talk to \ndnall 
and, uh, just brace him, tell him I thought it was [unintelligible] 
start behaving. Not let him be the chairman of the Com~ittee in the 
House. That's what you want?" Dean replied, i'That \vould be very 
helpful, to get our mi.nority side at least together on the thing." 
(HJCT 13) 
The President continued to stress the importance of cutting 
off the Patman hearings, uhich Dean said vIas a forum over Vlhich they 
would have the least control. 
PRLSlDEXT. 
H.\LDDUX. 
Pm-:SlllEXT. 
HALUr::H_\::\" • 
Gcrry has rcall~' got to lerid 011 this. He's got (0 be 
l'l'<1 Il y be [ltllilltL·]] igi ble ] 
Gerry shollld. c1;11ll1l it. This is exactly the thin~ he 
\\',IS talkillg abo\~, rlwt the )'cason they ~He sta)"-illg 
in i_s so tlt:l ( th ey en n 
'1'11;1 t's rig-ht. . 
nm Il1Hstigations. 
--.1..1 The passage beginning "Tha t' s ,mother thing ve i re doing ... \I and t?nding 
",. ,of the indictment'! does not appear in the \,hite House Trsnscript. 
(\{l-H 682 
[12001]
PHESlDENT. 
DEAN. 
I-IALDDL\X. 
DEAN. 
PRESIDENT. 
DEAN. 
PRESIDENT. 
DEA:\'. 
PRF:SIDENT. 
DF.AY. 
PRESIDENT. 
DEAN. 
.~';-"';:SIDEN"'T'-
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,Yell, the point is that they ought to raise hell about 
this, uh, this--thcsc bearing:; are jeopardizing the-
1 don't kIlOW that they're. that the. the. the counsel 
calling on the members ~f the Commi'ttee ,,-ill do 
much good. I was, I--it may be all right but-I was 
thinking that they J'cnlly O\lght to blunderbuss in the 
public arena. It ought to be publicized. 
Right. 
Good. 
Right. 
That's \\"hat this is, public relations. 
That's, that's all it is, particularly if Patman pulls 
the strings off, uh-That's the bst forum that, uh, uh, -.1./ 
it. looks like it could be a problem where you just 
have the least control the \\a)" it stands right no\\". 
Kennedy }ws also suggcsted he may call hearings of 
his Administrati\'e Prac:tic:es and Procedure Subcom-
mittee. l~h, as, as this case has been all along, you 
can spin out hOlTibles that, uh, yon, yon can concei\'e 
of, and so we just don't do that: I stopped doing that 
Dbout, uh, t,,-o months ago. 
Yeah. 
lYe just take one at a time and you deal with it based 
011-
And you really can't just sit and "orry yourself 
So. 
about it all the time, thinking, "The worst may hap-
pell," but it may DOt. SO ~'on just try to button it up 
as \\ell as you c:nn and hope for the best. And, 
Well if Dob-
and rel1lemcc.~ ::~~<-..::, b;.:::.::11y t1w damn thing is just 
onp, of those unfortlUlate things unel, we're trying to 
cut Ollr losses. 
"'ell, certninly that's right and certainly it had no 
effect on you, Thafs the, the good thing. 
It really hasn't. 
[Cnintell igible. ] 
So., it hasn~t. It has bern kept away from the 'White 
Honse allllost completely and from the President to-
tally. The only tie to the 'I'hit« HOllse' has been the 
Colson effort they keep trying to haul in. ...1../ 
(HJCT 13-"iLl) 
The President returned to the problem of the Patman COfow1ittee 
and the use of Ford. He rejected Mitchell as the man to contact Ford. 
(HJCT, 15) The President said, " ... maybe Ehrlichman should talk 
to him. Ehrlichman understands the 1m", and the rest, and should say, 
.-1./ 
INo\" God damn it, get the hell over 'idth this. III The President elClborated 
~/ The passage beginning "It ought to be publicized . ... " and ending 
" iJ PatID.3n pulls the strings off, uh ... " does not appear in the 
Hhite House Transcript. (HHT 69) 
The \Vords "almost completely\! do not, appear in the W11ite House Tr::mscript. 
70) 
3/ The 'iwrds "Nov.' God damn it, get the hell over h'it11 this" do not appear 
in the White House Transcript. (h'HT 72) 
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on how the plan must be ·carried out. He explained that the Congressman 
has to kno" that it comes from the top but that he cannot talk to him 
himself . (HJCT 15-16) 
PRF.J)IDENT. 
HALDE!vL\::-;". 
Pm:sIDDiT. 
DEAX. 
Pra:slDE:\"T. 
DE'-\X. 
r think maybe thaCs the thing- to do [Ilnintelligible]. 
This is, this is hig, big play. I'm getting into this 
thing. So t hat he-he's got to know that it comes 
from the top. ~/ 
Yeah. 
That's what he:s got to knOl', 
Right. 
and if he [unintelligible] and we're not going to-
r can't ta lk to him myself-and that he's gl)t to get at 
this and screw t.his thing up while he call, right? 
'''ell, if \,e let tllD.t slide up tbere with tIl(' Patman 
Committee it'd b.- just, you know, just a trilgedy to 2/ 
let Patman ha\"(~ a field day lip there. _1/ 
,rhat's the first mO\'e! 'Yhcll does he call his \\'it-, 
witnesses? 
Dean reported that PatBan had not even gotten the vote of his Committee; 
"IHJe hasn'tConvened his Committee yet on whether he can call hearings." 
Dean also reported that Congressman Browli had written a letter to 
Kleindienst. saying that the COIJ1.,'llittep. r.oqrings were goi.ng to jcc~:}:::-~~::'ze 
the criminal cases against the Watergate defendants. The President 
approved of this. Dean told the P:cesident I!we can keep them ",ell 
briefed on the moves if they'll, if they'll move ",hen vIe provide them 
with the, the strategy. II (HJCT 16) Dean reported that there ,.;ras a 
likelihood thatSta~~' libel suit would be dismissed but that they would 
still have the abuse of process suit pending. 
HALDDIA);. 
DB..-!.x. 
PRE~IDE!oiT. 
H .. \Ult::II.-I. :\. 
PRF.:3lDE:NT. 
D,_"..).". 
\Ve ('an take depositions on both of those? 
_-\.bsol \ltd)". 
Hell Yes. 
c ' LLnughs] 
[l~llilltel ligiblc] depositions . 
}t's ,1, irs :l ilJimnwr down the road allY way, bnt, 
lLh- C-UC:' 18) 
1/ The ~wrds "1'0 getting into this thing." clo not appear in the ,vhite 
House Transcript. (HHT 72) 
_?l The "lords "with the Patman Committee" do not appear in the ""'hite House 
Transcript. (\"lIT 72) 
3/ In the hYhite House Transcript "Them" appears instead of "Patman", 
TiYHT 72) 
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The final step was to carry out the President's decision to 
stop the Patman hearings. After the September 15, 1972 meeting, and a con-
su1tation with Haldeman, Dean began to take the necessary steps. 
(Dean test;Lmony, 3 SSC 960) He contacted Assistant Attorney General 
Henry Petersen and successfully urged that he write a letter to the 
House Committee pointing out that the hearings could prejudice the 
rights of the seven \\'atergate defendants. (3 SSC 961, 1194) On 
October 2, 1972 the same day the Petersen letter Has sent to the Committee, 
the Committee released the names of the persons it expected to call to 
testify during its hearings. The list included the names of Magruder, 
Sloan, Caulfield,Mitchell, Stans, Dean, Mardian, LaRue, Porter and 
MacGregor. (3 sse 961, 1190-93) The next day, the House Committee on 
Banking and Currency voted 20 to 15 to withhold from its Chairman, 
\-lright Patman, the pOlver to issue subpoenas for the purpose of investi-
1 / 
gating the financing of the Watergate break-in. (3 SSC 962) 
1/ The statement of Chairman Patman on October 3, 1972, and his 
letter to Chairman Rodino dated May 11, 1974, are appended hereto, 
as they have not been previously placed in the record. See Appendix B. 
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PAYMENTS 
1. 
Priot to the Watergate operation Gordon Liddy gave Howard 
Hunt $10,000 to use in case there was a mishap. Hunt placed the 
money in the safe in his EOB office. Immediately after the arrests 
at the Watergate, Hunt went to his EOB office and withdrew the money. 
In the early morning hours following the break-in, Hunt delivered 
the money on behalf of those arrested to an attorney. (Book II, 
76-77) 
On June 20 or 21, 1972 Liddy told LaRue and Mardian that 
commitments for bail money, maintenance and legal assistance had 
been made and that Hunt felt it \-las CRP's obligation to provide bail 
money to get the men out of jail. Liddy also told LaRue and Mardian 
of his and Hunt's prior involvement in the Fielding break-in. (Book 
III, 91, 93-95) Thereafter Mardian and LaRue reported to Mitchell OD 
Liddy's request for money. (Book III, 98-99, 104-05) 
Between June 26 and 28, 1972, after discussions with 
Mi tchell, Ehrlichman and Haldeman, Dean met on three occasions ,,1i th 
CIA Deputy Director Walters and suggested, among other things, that 
the CIA provide the baiJ. and salaries of the persons arrested. 
Walters rejected the requests. (Book III, 132-42) 
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On June 28, 1972 Haldeman and Ehrlichman approved Dean's 
contacting Herbert Kalmbach, President Nixon's personal attorney, 
to ask Kalmbach to raise funds for the Watergate defendants. (Book 
III, 144-52 ',' 155, 277-79; WHT, 494-96) Kalmbach fleH to Washington 
that night, and the folloHing morning met Hith Dean (Book III, 152, 
154-55) and LaRue (Book III, 176-77, 179-80) to discuss procedures for 
making payments. Thereafter Kalmbach recej.ved cash from CRP officials 
Stans (Book III, 167, 170-71) and LaRue (Book III, 257-61) and from 
a private contributor Hhom Kalmbacb told he could not reveal the 
purpose of the contribution. (Book III, 282-83, 286-87) 
Between July 7, 1972 and September 19, 1972 (Book III, 
208-17, 259-60, 284-85, 377) Kalmbach directed Anthony Ulase,.;ricz, 
Hho had previously engaged in surveillance and other confidential 
activities for John Ehrlichman (Book III, 166, 172-73, Book VII, 336-
41), to make payments totaling $187,500 for the Watergate defendants. 
(Book III, 378-79) UlaseHicz made the deliveries by sealing cash 
in unmarked envelopes and leaving the envelopes at various drops such 
as airport lockers. (Book III, 222-28) He communicated with Kalmbach, 
LaRue and the recipients of the payments using aliases. (Book III, 
173, 176-77, 225-26, 229) 
In September 1972 Kalmbach told Dean and LaRue that he 
would not continue his role in making the payments. Kalmbach trans-
ferred the remainder of the funds to LaRue and burned his records of 
the transactions. (Book III, 378-82) 
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II. 
Gordon Liddy and Howard Hunt were involved in both the 
Fielding and the Watergate break-ins and knew the identity of the 
superiors ~ho had authorized their activities. Liddy agreed to 
remain silent and did not make many demands. From the outset Hunt 
was a problem because he made demands for himself and the others. 
(Book III, 88-95) During the summer and fall, Hunt received pay-
ments for himself and other defendants amounting to over $200,000. 
(Book III, 218-19, 223, 233, 383, 386-89) 
Shortly after the November 1972 election, Hunt 
contacted his friend Colson. (Book III, 411, 414) Hunt told Colson 
that "commitments that were made to us at the outset have not been 
kept. l1 (Book III, 408) Hunt stated: 
. . . we're protecting the guys ,,,ho are really 
responsible, but nm" that's ... and of course 
that's a continuing requirement, but at the same 
time, this is a two way street and as I said 
before, we think that now is the time when a 
move should be made and surely the cheapest com-
modity available is money. (Book III, 409) 
Colson tape recorded this conversation and gave it to Dean. (Book III, 
417) Dean has testified that he played the recording for Haldeman and 
Ehrlichman,1/ ",ho instructed Dean to play it for Mitchell. Dear, fIe,.; to 
1/ 
The House Judiciary Committee on }lay 30, 1974 subpoenaed the tape 
recording of this conversation. The President has refused to produce 
this recording. 
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New York and played the recording for Mitchell. (Book III, 418-19) 
Mitchell verifies this describing the tape as a lot of self-serving 
statements by Colson. (Mitcheil testimony, 7/10/74, T 3308-10) 
ID'late November 1972, Dean reported to Haldeman of the need 
for additional funds to make payments to the defendants. (Book III, 
430-32) Haldeman then ordered the delivery to LaRue of a portion of 
the $350,000 in cash from a special fund Haldeman personally con-
1/ 
trolled.- (Book 432-35, 440-44, 449) Strachan delivered between 
$40,000 and $70,000 to LaRue, who handled the cash using rubber gloves 
and refused to furnish Strachan Hith a receipt. In January 1973, at 
Haldeman's direction, LaRue received the remainder of the fund. 
(Book l~I, 437-41) Prior to Marcn Ll, l~/3 LaRue disbursed $132,000 
from the fund for the defendants, including $100,000 to Hunt's 
attorney, Hilliam Bittman. (Book III, 436-38, 500, 518-19; LaRue 
testimony, 7/3/74, T 2837) 
On }larch 16, 1973 Hunt met with Colson's laH partner, Dand 
Shapiro. (Book III, 925; Colson Exhibit No. 18, T 4247) Hunt told 
Shapiro that if certain financial commitments Hhich had been made to 
him were broken the Republicans would lose the 1974 elections and 
probably the 1976 one, but if commitments \.Jere kept none of his men 
would "bloH." Shapiro's memorandum of the meeting reads: 
1/ Hitchell has testified before the Committee that it was his 
supposi tion that the \'111i te House approved the use of the $350,000 
fund in order to keep the defendants happy. (Hitchell testimony, 7/10/74, 
T 3307-08) 
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Hunt stated that several persons should be terribly 
concerned were he to testify before the Ervin Com-
mittee (where he said he presently proposed to in-
voke the 5th Amendment). These persons he identi-
fied as John Dean, Bud Krogh, Pat Gray, John Mitchell 
and one or two others whom I can't remember (I did not 
take notes). Hunt said he kne';v he \vas risking the 
possibility of an obstruction of justice charge when 
he convinced those who pleaded guilty to do so, but 
is also convinced that if the commitments made to 
him are kept, no one in his "operation" will "blow. Tt 
In apparent contradiction to his prior state~ent, 
however, Hunt said he was concerned that McCord was 
the one \veak link in his ;'operation" and that HcCord 
could well "open up:! to the detriment of those con-
cerned. (Colson Exhibit No. 19, p. 2, T 4248) 
On March 19, 1973 Shapiro met with Colson and related the 
substance of his conversation with hunt on March 16. Shapiro advised 
Colsull i.1UL to tell' anyone at the wniLe House about Hunt's message be-
cause he might "unwittingly become a party to an obstruction of justice." 
Colson concluded that the only way he could help the President was to 
recommend that the President appoint a Special Counsel of impeccable 
credentials who was not involved in \{atergate. Shapiro suggested J. 
Lee Rankin, a fonner Solicitor General and Shapiro arranged to discuss 
this with Rankin on Harch 21, 1973. On the evening of Harch 19~ 1973 
Colson had a telephone conversation with the President, during which 
they discussed the political impact of Watergate, but according to 
Colson, he did not raise his suggestion for the appointment of a Special 
Counsel, until he spoke with the President at 7:53 p.m. on March 21, 
1973 and suggested Rankin's appointment as Special Counsel. l / (Colson 
1/ 
The House Judiciary Committee on 5/30/7[1 subpoenaed the tape 
recordings of these two conversations. The President has refused to 
produce these recordings. 
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testimony, 7/15/74, T 4256-63) 
On or 8.bout March 16, 1973 Hunt told O'Brien that he had to 
have $120,000 before his sentencing. Hunt said he had done "seamy 
things" for the \olhite House and tha t if he were not paid he· might have 
to reconsider his options. (Book III J 902-04, 906-07, 910-13) O'Brien 
conveyed Hunt's message to Dean. (Book III, 946-49) O'Brien testified 
that Dean told him that he and Dean were being used as conduits in an 
obstruction of justice. (O'Brien testimony, 7/3/74, T 2663) At 3:30 
p.m. on March 20, 1973, Dean and Ehrlichman discussed Hunt's demand 
for money and the possibility that Hunt would reveal the activities 
of the Plumbers r operations if the money ,.Jere not forthcoming. (Book 
III, 952-59, 963) .Ehrlichman left Dean to see the President. Halde-
man joined him on the way. From 4:26 to 5:39 p.m. the President and 
]) 
Ehrlichman !!let. Ehrlichman told Krogh, who formerly co-directed the 
Plumbers, that Hunt was asking for a great deal of money and if it 
were not paid Hunt might bIoI.] the lid off and tell all he knew. (Book 
III, 960-62) On March 20, 1973 Dean also discussed Hunt's demand with 
a t least Krogh and Richard Moore. (Book III, 957-61, 966, 968, 1193-
2/ 
95) 
]) 
The House Judiciary Committee on 5/30/74 subpoenaed the tape 
recording of this conversation. The President has refused to produce 
this recording. 
']) Dean has tesitifed that he also spoke 1.-lith LaRue on Harch 20 or 
March 21 prior to his morning meeting 'vi th the President ot on 
both days. (Dean testimony, 7/11/74, T 3596-3600) LaRue has testified 
that he had a telephone conversation with Dean regarding Hunt's demand 
on the morning of Harch 21,1973. (LaRue testimony, 7/8/74, T 2891) 
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1/ On the evening of March 20, 1973, the President called Dean.-
(WHT 161) Dean told the President he had spoken with Ehrlichman that after-
noon, before Ehrlichman met with the President. Dean said, "I 
think that one thing that we have to continue to do, and particu-
00 
larly right nOH, is to examine the broadest, broadest implication 
of this whole thing, and, you know, maybe about 30 minutes of just 
my recitation to you of facts so that you operate from the saDe 
facts that everybody else has. n (h'HT, 163) The President agreed 
to meet with Dean the following r:lOrr.irlg. (\mT, 164) 
III. 
Dean met with the ~reSlaent ior almost two hours on the 
morning of }larch 21, 1973. (HJCT, 79) Dean opened the meeting by 
briefing the President on the payment activity that had occurred. He 
told the President that there had been payments to Watergate defendants; 
that the payments ,.Jere made to keep things from blmving up; that this 
activity constituted an obstruction of justice; and that in addition 
to Dean, the President's chief of staff Haldema~ domestic advisor 
Ehrlichman, and his campaign director Mitchell were all involved. 
'(HJCT, 90) 
In response to this report the President did not condemn 
the payments or the involvement of his closest aides. He did not 
direct that the activity be stopped. The President did not express 
any surprise or shock. He did not report it to the proper investi-
1/ The House Judiciary COTIl<'l1ittee on April 11, 1974 has subpoenaed 
the tape recording of this conversation. The President has refused to 
produce this recording, but has produced an edited transcript. 
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gatory agencies. He indicated familiarity with the payment scheme, 
and an a\-lareness of some details -- such as the use of a Cuban 
~/ 
Committee: 
Dux, 
PI:FSIDEXT. 
Dc.\);. 
PnF.':; I llF. Xl'. 
DF:.\x. 
P r: F.S WE Xl'. 
DE.\x. 
rh, Liddy said, said that, YOll know, if they all got 
c-ollllsel inst8.))tlv and said that. YOll blO\\" , "'Ye'll. 
\\"e'l1 ride this tliin,!: out.'· "\11 right, then the:' started 
ll1akin<Y clrlTlHllib. "'Y0\'r !rot to 11<1\'e attorne\"s~ fees. 
rh, \\; don't Iifl n~ all\' 11lO'ney 01Ir;';01\"(~s. and 'if-yoll 
are'ashll!! llS to tak(>"thi;.; th'rollgh the elec:tioll.,,'"\l1 
rirrht. so ;;ITall<Y('lllents \\"cre made thrOlI!!h ~[it<:hell. t? _ 1- ,.
tlh, initiatin£ it. ill disCllc:siolls that-·r was present-
that thesl' ";IYS had to hl' tal,en care of. TIl('ir .1UO!·-
I!('YS' frE':; l~lCl to be dOlle. Kalmbach \\"as brought in. 
ch, Kn 11111><1<:11 r:li;:cc1 SOIIH' cnsh. l-II. they \\'("'r(' o}w-, 
llh, YOll I,no\\", 
The\' pllt th:lt Illleler tl)(' ('0\"('1" of a Cuban Committee 
or [ullilltl'lligiblr] . 
Yeah, the.\-, the.\· had a Cuban Committee allc1 they 
IHld-sollle of it \\"as o·i\·cll to Hllllfs ]a \\"\'er, \\"ho in 
turn pas:'ed it e)ilt. This. YOII kno\\·. \\"h01l Irllnt's \\"ife 
\\"118 ft:yin).!." to Chic11g0 ",ith trll tllOllSllllCl. she \\"as 
actualh-. r lllHlrr;;talld nfrcr·thc fnd no\\", \\"llS going 
to pass'thnt IIIO))r:- to. 1I1l. one of the Cub~lls-to llleet 
llilll ill C'hicllO"o :lml nns;:, it to sOlllCbocly tllC're. 
[l-nilltE'l/igihl(']. ~fa~·l)('-I\-('Il. "llether ifs maylll' 
too 1<1tr to do ;lIlyt1Iillg' ahout it. bllt T \\"0111c1 cE'rtaiI11.y 
kl'ep thilt. [1.IUg-lls] thnt co\"(']' for \\'l!;l1e\'('!" Its 
worth, 
1'11-
Krep thr ('Ollllllittee. 
.A f-, nfrer. \\"('11. tll:!L thaI, that's 
Jj There is another detail that the President seemed familiar Hitb 
and that was the use 6f Pappas. There is evidence indicating that 
Ehrlichman suggested to LaRue ti-,at Pappas, a long-·time supporter 
of the PreSident's, be contacted to see if he would be of any 
assistance in connection \vith raising the money. (Book III, 958) 
This was brought up in the March 21 conversation and the President 
indicated that he already kne\" about this: 
PI:l:";lllJ::\T. 
lh:.\:-\. 
Pin:"; IllE:\ T. 
lh:Ax. 
1'11. P(,Op/I' art' ,~Oill~ to ;1,,1; "'h:lt tllp 11101)('\' is for. 
lll"" \\"o!"kiJlg'-1TI"" ;lpparl'lltly t;llkrd to TOlll 
P:lppns. 
1 I'llo\\". 
.\1111 l';IPP:IS 11:1":. 1I11. H~TI;I',l (0 COllIe lip "'ith n sizr-
;11.>11' nllHlllllt. 1 g:lt Ill'l". fr011I, from 
yp;lh. 
~I it,·Il011. 
(HJCT, 94) 
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PHESID};:\T. 
Dr:.\ x. 
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r 1 ~ 11 i n t (> 11 i g-i h 10 j 
Pra:SIDE:\T. 
thl' ll10st trollbksomc post,thing, 1111, /)c(:allsc (1) Boh 
is in\'()h-crl ill \ hat: .Tohn is ill\'oh-ed in that: I am 
in\'oh'e<1 ill that: :\fiuhell is in\"oh'ed in that. And 
that's all oiJstrllction of jl1stice. 
" "In otlwr ,,"ol'(b the fact that. IIh. that vOII·re. vou're. 
YOI1'I'C taking ean' of ,,"itllcsS('·s." v " • • 
Ih:"\:\. 
PJ:,:S]J)f.:\T. 
Jk,\:\. 
Prn·:SlI)}-;:\T. 
lk"\x. 
Pm-5]))E~T. 
])E\ x, 
PnESlDEST. 
DJ:.\x. 
Pm:SIDr::-';T. 
J h:,\x. 
Pm:,.:] )) I"; X '1'. 
]h:"\x. 
PI:I:SI PE:\T. 
(HJCT, 89-91) 
'{'hat's right. Cll, 
Ho\\' \\",IS Boh in\'oh'ed? 
,,'ell. th-, thc,\' ran out. of money o\'et· there. Bob 
had thl'cc hundrcd and fifty thousand dollars in a 
safe O\'CI' herc tklt. \\"as rea"ll\' set aside for pollin.g 
Pll1'po:ocs, rll, and tl)(,]'c was no other somee of 
mOlle \'. so i Itey (':I 111(' 0\"(>1' 1)(>I"l' a lId S,I it!. "YOII all It <l \"e 
got" t; gi\"e us 'some money," 
Hight. , 
I had to (Yo to Doh anc1 sa \'. "Bob. \'011 kno"". VOl1\'C 
got" to lta:c. some-thcy need somc n~oney oye~: there." 
He. said "'Yhat. for?" _-\nd so I had to ten hl111 "hat 
it. was for 'call"e hI' wasn't about to just" ;::enel mOlley 
O\'er thert' \\'ilIY,nilh-" _\nd. lilt .. fohn \\',)5 ill\"oh"ed ill 
those d isellssions. a;lel \Ye dec-ic1cc1. YOII kno\\', that, 
\'011 kllO\\", thnt thel'(> ,,'as no price 'too high to pay 
'to let this thing blo\\" up in front of the eledioll. 
I tltink you sholllc1 handle that. olle pl'ett.y fast. 
Oh. I thillk-
TIt!lt issl\e. I mean. 
1 think \\'(' can. 
So that the thrcp-fifty went !J,)ek to him. An it clid 
\\'as-
Th,ll's ri!2"ltt. 1 tllllll;. \yc can too. 
\\'110 el"0 fllllilli('lligible]! . 
Bllt. lI0\\" , hcl'(" hC'['(>'s ,,"hat's haplwnillg right lIO\\'. 
Ycah. " 
After this initial briefing, Dean turned to the crisis 
precipitated by Hunt's demands. Dean explained that these demands 
by Hunt, and possibly others, could, over the next two years, 
amount to a million dollars. The President said that one million 
dollars was available. The troublesome issue was exactly how it 
could be raised and used to avoid disclosure of the cover·-up. The 
President considered various alternatives. 
Dux. 
Pnt:.-:'lDJ;:\T, 
nL\ x. 
, , , :;0\\". \\"hcrt'. ",ht'r(' <11'0 tlt(' ~oft 
spots on this! "\\'('11. first. of ;111. 11H'],c'" tIll', titcn"s 
till' problclll or tIl(' l'l)]]tillllC'll hl:tl·klllati 
Hidlt. 
\';Iiil'h ,,"ill 1Illt ollh" ~o 011 no\\". il 'IJ r:(1 OIl \Y]ll'11 t!tP:"l' 
jlcopll' :Hl' ill pri"·I)li. :1I1l1 ii "i il ('(lllll'Olllld (he ot" 
stl'llct iOIl of ill:,ticl' ",il'I;)tioll. 11 '11 l'O,::t 1I10111'Y. It's 
d:lll~I'l"OII';. SoIHhh.norhill!2"-I'('ol,k ,ll'lllllltllll'I'l' ;11'\' 
:IOt '1)!'os :It tlti:, soi'i Ill' tl,"IIl·!2". This j" rll(' :'llrt of thill~ 
~Ltli:1 jlt'('pll' l':111 dl': \\";ISl"lillg millll':", gC(tjl'~ (·k:I·1I 
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P 1:I';:'1IH: ST. 
VE,\ X. 
Pm:SlJ)EXT. 
] k.-\ X. 
Pnr:SJI)E"T. 
])E,\ X. 
Pm:,; 1111-:"'1'. 
] )L\ X. 
1 )HEq Dr:"T. 
lh;,\ x. 
1 )1:f:SlllEXT. 
Dr:" x. 
:Flir,,,IIJEXT. 
Df>\X. 
PI:I>I))}:XT. 
Dr:..\ x. 
Pm':"lllFXT. 
1 )1:,-\ x. 
] )l:E~lIlEXT. 
}l1:E"WEXT. 
DE,\ X. 
l)I~E':;I))EXT, 
J)).: .. \x. 
PI:ES)))EXT, 
1 k,\ x', 
Pla:,.;wl':"T, 
1 h:,\,,·. 
PI: 1'>1111-:,,''1', 
])E..I X. 
]'];1'::-: WE"T, 
1 h:,\ x, 
1 )In:':;lIn:''T. 
Jh:,\x, 
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mOlley, alld thing's like thnL nh-\\"c're-"'e jllst 
don't. kllo\\"abollt those thillf!S, breallse \\"r're 1I0t used 
to. YOIl 1\IIO\\"-\\"e arr not c:riminn ls and not. nsed 
to dea linf! in tllat bllsinrss. Ifs, uh, it's, 1111-
Tltat";; right, 
] t.'S:l tOllgh thin;.!' to kllo\\" !JO\\' to do. 
:\fa I"ll(' \\'r ("HIl't (>\'PJl do that. 
Th;;t',.; rigiit. 1 t\ a rral ]>l'o1>lrll1 as to \\"h<>ther \\"e 
("ollld C\'rll do it. Pllh·th('r(''s;1 r(,;lll'rolJlrlll ill raising 
mOllry. l-h. ~[it("hrl1 lills b(>('11 \\'orkin!! 011 rilisill,!l' 
somr·IllOllcy. 1-b. frelillg he's ~:()t. YOll k'no\1", he's got 
ollr.llC',"s Oil(' of tlJ(' (1)(>S witll tll(' 1Il0st to 10,*, 1-11. unt, 
tl\('r(",; 110 drllyillif til(> file! that tIl(' ,'-II itl' }Jom;r. 
and. lIh. Ehl'licllll1'lIl. Hal(lemal)' ])l'all are iJ\\'ohl'1:1 
in SOIl\(' of tli(' rarh' IIIOIW\' drc:isiolls. 
1 To\\" IIl1l1'h 1I10Ilr\'"(lo \·Oll·l)(·rd) 
J \,"onld Sily tl)(':·;(- ])('(;p1r. ;tn' goillg to cost. Illl, a lllil-
lion dollnrs oI"Pr the next. lib. t\\'O wars. 
" • (> (' () I II d ~'r I t 11 il t. . 
1-h hllh. ' 
You. 011 tl)(' Inon('\", if \"011 Iw('d tllC' 1I1001E'Y, I 1l1E'all, 
1111, \"011 cOllld ~pt thr Inollr\'. Lrt'ss:)\'- " 
,\'(,il. 1 thilll, th,lt\\"\,'rr go'illg- " 
l\,iJ;1f I 1l1rallt ie; .. \'(lll c:01I1(1. YOtt ('olde) g'pt il millioll 
doIhr", ,\.1I(1 \'011 ('()lllcl ~'l'l it ill ('nsh, 1. r kllOi\' \\']wre 
it, (:0111<1 br g'o·ttrll.' ' 
1-1I hllh. 
1 Illcnu it's Ilot r. .. , ... l.;'.;~ :: ('olllc! \:-2 dOllr. Hilt, lib, th" 
qllP;:;tiol1 is \rho the hrll \\"oilld ]1;111<11(' it! 
Thnt's rig'ht. l-iI--
.\ 11 \' idr;I'" 011 that i 
"'(:11, I \\'olllr1 thillk tli;lt \\'olJ1cl 1)(' ':;Ollll'thillg tililt 
:\fitc]lrll ()ll~hr to 1)(' ("lI;lI"~'('d \\'irb. 
1 ,,'ollld t hill!.:: ~o 1'00, ' 
.\111] !2'('! "01l1C'. grt ~Olll(' pro~ to hrlp him. 
Lrt IIlr :"il.\·, 11)('1"(' sllollldll'r U,' ,I lor of pr01'lr 1'IIII1Iing 
;lrollll<1 !!l'llill'" mOI)(,\'. '\'(' siloilld set IIJl;1 lirth,-
.""('11. II("'" gO(~lllr ]wi'soll lloillg ir \\'i1o r i11l1 Ilot S\1\'\' 
IS-
'\"110 h tllnt? 
11("" g'ot Frrd LIl~II('. 1111, doillg it. '\"0'" Frrc/ stnrtrd 
ont gOillg-Ollt tryiuf!lo 
'\" o. 
soli('it 1ll0l\(,~' tr011l i1111,illd;: of l)('()pk. -:\o\\". r lE'HIWd 
nllollt I h:lI. ;IlHl1 8;1 id, 
'\"0. 
":\h' C;ud.'· 
'\"0.' 
"II'" jll,;( ,ndli1. J)Oll't do it." 
Y r;liI. 
l·b. llC'OP)p ;11'(' g'Oill,'-!' (0 ;l~k "hill thr IllOIW\' i::: 1'01'. 
1 Yr'" \\'orkill).:'-IT(",; ;\jlp:1 n'lI! I.'" ti1Ik<,cl to Tnlll 
P;qJp,IS, 
1 k 1l0\\', 
.\ lid P;1111';I':; Il;I~, 11lI. ,lgT(,pd to <"(llll!' Ill' "ith :\ Slzr-
;lb1r ;1I1l01lIlt. I ~',JtIl\'L fl'OlI\. frl)lll 
Y(';llI, ' 
~likl\('ll. 
[12014]
PrU:'SII>E)'"T, 
DJ::A:\, 
PrU:SITJt;:'\T, 
J)BA,,', 
PnJ-:UDE)'"T, 
PRE:; mE),"')", 
DEY:" 
J..>HFS] I))':.'\T. 
(HJCT, 93-95) 
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YC'HlJ. \\'ell. \\'hat do YOII lll'c(L tlH'JI! You need, u1l, 
you don'\, nerc] H ,llIi Ilioll right a \\"HY, but you Jleed a 
million, 1;-; that right! ' 
1'hnt's light. 
YOll 11('('<1 a million in ('asi!. don't you? If you \\'nllt to 
Pllt tllnt tltlOUgh. \\"()llld YOll llllt tlwt through, 111l--
this j" thill~illi! Ollt IOlld hl'r(~ for;l JnOJlWllt-\\"ollld 
YOll put th;lt through tIle Cllban COlllmittel''! 
YOll l1<.>ed it in (,<lsh, dOI\'t YO\l! I f you '\\"[Int to pnt 
11111. no. 
Or ;\'oIIlc1 YOli ,iust do this thl'Ollglt n [linilltC'lligiblC' ] 
ihnt it's going to be. ult. \\"C'l!. it's c;lsll money, ':l\d so 
fm'th. I Io\\", if tl};lt P\'VI' cC)Ilt(,,; Ollt. are ,,"on gOIng to 
\l;ll1dle it! Is tIl(' ClllHlIl COITllllitte(';t1l obstruction of 
jllstil·(·. if they \\'nnt to help? 
\\'ell, they'n gal a Pl'-, t1ley\'e got priests, C111cl 
thC'\"-
\VoHld ,YOli lih [0 put, I lllP,l!1, would thaL wouh1 
that gil"(' a litill' bjt of a co\'er, for C'xnmplc! , 
Tl!;\t \\"oltl(l gi\'C' some for the ('llballs and pos:::Jbly 
Hl111t. 
Yeah, 
Fil. then you'le got Liddy, all(1 :\1c('01'(1 is not, l1Ot. 
acc('ptillg nllY money. So, hc's, he is 110t a bO\lght mall 
right llO\\" , 
Ok,IY· 
The discussion had been addressed primarily to a general 
consideration of the necessity for payments over the long term. There 
still remained the immediate demand by Hunt for approximately $120,000. 
The President said that Hunt's demands should be met. At the very 
least, he reasoned, the payment would buy time. 
PRESIDE::,\,T. 
DLls. 
Pm:~TDJ:::\T. 
DL\:\,. 
Pru:;:Wr.:,T. 
DL\X, 
n~:,\X, 
"Tell, YOUI'. yom' major, yoU!' majol' glly to keep under 
control is Hnnt. 
That.'s ris::ht. 
I think, Hl'Call:3r h(' kno\\"s 
Hp kno\\"3 so lllllCh. 
aboltt a h)t of Nber thin!:!:s, 
Hc knO\\"5 so mlll'h, Ei~hr. rho he ('mild sillk Chllck 
CobOl\' ,\pp,lrl>lltl:,', np'parclltly hE' is (plite di:3tl'r:'o~ed 
\\"itl! COI:::OIl. He thinks Cnl;:on has aballdollcd 1\\1\\. 
"'Cll. Colsoll \\",15 to lIH'ct with him \\"hC'll he \\",15 alit 
there. ai'Ll'!". l\OIY Ill' h:l!l Jl'ft till' "'hitl' 1I01lS(,. He 
Illet \I'ith hilll thrOll!2'h his !a\\'\'t'\'. Hunt j',li:::cll thl\ 
ljnl's(iOll: hl.O \,",llltpel ;llOl\l'Y' COISOll'" 1:1 \I'.'"('\" raid Jlilll 
that, Col;-,nn \\'<l:3l\'t doil1!! '11\\,tltin0: with lllOll\'1", nnd 
Hnul took OIt'l'llS<..' lI'ifh" th:ll illlllll'di;\Il'ly. th:;t. nil, 
ltiJ. tll:1t Col:,oll h:H1 ,tballdolH'd lliln, l'h,":'" 
J)O!l'[ \'l)J!. ill"t loohn!! :If t IJl' illlllll'di;ltl' problem, 
dOll't ~'O\l Ila\"(' to !t:l"H'-handle. Hllllt.'S tillallcial 
sit! IiI ti~)!l 
1. T think that's, 
[12015]
PJ:};SIDE);T. 
DE.\~. 
PnF:S!I)E);T. 
J)r:A:". 
PHl:SIDE~T. 
DE.\:". 
PHy'SIf)E:"T. 
DEA:". 
Pln;SIDE~"T • 
DEA:\. 
PHESI J)E:"T. 
(HJCT, 96) 
DElL". 
PRESIDENT. 
DEAN. 
PRESIDE:"T. 
DEAN. 
PPJ;SIDE:\T. 
(HJCT, 105) 
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damn soon? 
that is, \lh, I talked to :.\ritcl!ell about that last night, 
,\fitchell. 
and. and, uh, I told-
'fight as \Yell. :\Iay han the rule you\'e got to keep 
thecap on the bottle that Jlluch, 
That's right; that's right. 
ill ol'llrr to h:1 ye any opt ions. 
That.'s right. 
Either that or let it all blow rjght no\\·. 
"'ell that, you know, that's the, that's the question. 
Uh-
~ow, go ahead. ~he others. You\'e got Hunt; 
* * * 
But ",bat I am coming to you today with is: I don't 
have a plan of how to sohe it right now, but I think 
it's at. the juncture that \n~ should begin to think in 
tBrms of, of ho" to cnt the losses; how to minimize 
t.he further gro\',th of this thing, rather than flll'ther 
compound it by, you J...110W, ultimatdy paying these 
guys forever. 
Yeah. 
I think we've got. to look-
But at the moment, don't you agree that you'd better 
get t.he Hunt thing? I mean, that's worth it, at the 
moment. 
Tha t, tha t's worth buying t.ime on, right. 
And that's buying time on, I agre~. 
The President and Dean continued to discuss the 
payments. They discussed Haldeman's transfer of the $350,000 to 
the CRP in December and January for the purpose of meeting the 
demands made by Hunt and the other defendants. They considered the 
pros and cons of adopting a new strategy and calling a halt to the 
payments. At the conc~usion of that discussion on Harch 21, the 
President stated that they could not let things blow. 
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PRESIDE:S-T. 
DEAN. 
PRESIDE).'",},. 
DEAN. 
PRF-SIDE).'"T. 
(HJCT> 106) 
PRESIDE)."T. 
DEAN". 
PRESlDE!\T, 
(HJCT, 108) 
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-
Suppose the worst~that JJol) is Illdicted and Ehrlich-
man is indicted, And I r(lust say, maybe we just bet-
ter thcn try to lough it lhrough. You get my point. 
That;s right.. That~ 
If, if, if, for example, our, uh, our~say, well, let's 
cut our losscs and you say we're going to go down the 
road, sec if we can cut our losses, and no more black-
mail ancl all the rest, and the thing blo\\"s and they 
indict Bob and the rest. Jesus, you'd llever recoyer 
from that, J olm. 
That's right. 
It's better to fight it out instead. You see, that's the 
other thing, the other thing. It's better just to fight 
it out, and not let people testify, so forth and so on. 
Ko,,", on the other hand, \ye realize that wc have these 
weaknesses-that, uh, \ve, ,,'e\re got this wealmess 
in terms of~blackmail. 
* * * 
LRt me say. though that Hunt [llllintelligible,] hard 
line, and that. a convict~d felon is going to go out and 
squeal [llnintelligible] as ,,'e about this [unintelligi-
hIe] clccision [uuinteUigiblc 1 turns 011 that, 
,Yell, \\'C' can ah\'ays, you kno\\', on the other sic1e, we 
can al\\'a)"s CllUl'fCc thell! ,,-ith blackmailing us, and 
it's, YOll kno\y, this is Rbsnrcl stuff they're saying, 
and-
Tlwt's right. Yon see, eyen the way you put it out 
here, of course if it all came' out, it mil)' ne\'er, it may 
not-never, never get there. 
After about an hour of discussion between the President an 
and Dean, Haldeman entered the meeting. In Haldeman's presence, the 
issue of the immediate payment to Hunt was again discussed. The 
President stated that they had better well get it done fast: 
PnESillEXT, 
DEA~. 
Pm:sIDExT, 
DEAx. 
HA 1.D£:\1.-\X, 
DEA).", 
PHJ;;::;lDEXT, 
HALDF.;-U"', 
Pm:sIDExT. 
Xeah, I.Yhatdothey gain ontof it~ 
:\" ot hill~, 
To helrwith them. 
ThE'v, they're (Yoinf: to s(one\,'all it, nlt. as it 110\\ 
stands, Except"'iol' Hllnt. That's \\hy, thnrs the lev-
E'l"f1[re· in his thn';lt. 
Th;s is H unl 's opportunity. 
This is Hunt's opportunity. 
That's \\'111', that's "ill'. 
God. if he'cim ]a\' this~ 
that's ,,'l1y your: for your iJ1ll1lC'ctiate thing you'\'e got 
110 cltoicn \\"itlt Hunt but t.ll,< hUIHlJ'l'd and t\yent)" or 
\y]wtpye'1' it is. Hight! 
That's right. 
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PRESJD};:->T. 
DEAN. 
PnESmF::->T. 
DEA:->. 
PRESIDEXT. 
(HJCT, 121) 
PRESIDENT. 
DBAN. 
PIlESlDEXT. 
DE.\N. 
PRF:SIDF.~T. 
DE"\:->. 
PRESIDEXT. 
(HJCT, 125) 
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\VonJd you agree thrrt thrrt's a buy time thing, you 
be tter damn \I" pI 1 get that done, but fflst? 
I think he ought (0 be given somc signal, any\\"ay, to, 
to---
Yes 
Yeah-Yon know. 
'Well for Christ's sakes gf't it in a, in a way that, llh-
\Vilo's, \\"ho~s going to talk to hilll? Colson? 
He's'the one who's supposed to know him. 
* * 
'I< 
That's right, Try to look around the track. ,Ye havc 
no choice on Hunt but to try to keep him-
Right no", \ye ha \'c no choice, 
But, but my poillt is~ do you cyer 11[\.\'e any choice on 
Hunt? That's the point. 
[Sighs] 
X 0 matter what we do here 1!0~,-, J Ohll, 
'VeIl. if wc- . 
Hunt el"('ntuully, if he isn't going to get commuted 
and so forth, he's going to blow the whistle. 
The President also instructed Dean and Haldeman to lie about the 
arrangements for payments to the defendants. 
PRESlDE:->T. 
PRESIDE:'fT. 
(HJCT, 119) 
As far us whrrt happened lip to this time our cOlCr 
there is just going to be the. Cuban Com'mittee dicl 
this for them lip tl~rough the election. 
"~ell, yeah. ,Yc can put. that together. That isn\, of 
course, quite the \yay it happened, but, uh-
I kno\\', bnt it's the \"ar it's going to have to haPl?.cn. 
On the afternoon of March 21, 1973 the President met Hith 
Dean, Haldeman and Ehrlichman. (HJCT, 131) During this meeting, the 
President asked what was being done about Hunt's demand. Dean said 
Mitchell and LaRue knev of Hunt's feeling <'md would be able to do 
something. (HJeT, 133) Late that evening, March 21, 1973, LaRue, 
after talking to Mitchell, delivered $75,000 to Bittman. (Book III, 
1187-1237) On the next day, March 22, Hitchell told Haldeman, Ehrlic.hman 
and Dean that Hunt was not a "problem any longer." (Book III, 1255-59, 1269, 
1271) Later that day Ehrlichman told Krogh that Hunt was stable and 
[12018]
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would not disclose all. (Book III, 1278-79) A few days later, on 
March 27, 1973 Haldeman talked to the President about payments to Hunt 
though it is unclear to ,vhich ~pecific payment he referred. "Hunt is 
at the Grand Jury today," Haldeman said. "We don't know how far he's 
going to go. The danger area for him is on the money, that he was given 
money. He is reported by O'Brien, who has been talking to his lawyer, 
Bittman, not to be as desperate today as he '''as yesterday but to still 
be on the brink, or at least shaky. 'fuat's made him shaky is that he's 
seen HcCord bouncing out there and probably walking out scot free." 
(~~T, 326-27) On April 16, 1973 Dean had a conversation with the President 
during which they discussed settlement of the Hunt demand. Dean said 
to the President that Hitchell had told him, Haldeman and Ehrlichman 
on March 22, that the problem with Hunt had been solved. The President 
expressed his satisfaction that the Hunt problem had been solved "at 
the Mitchell level. 11 The President also said he '.Jas "planning to assume 
some culpability on that. [Unintelligible]" (HJCT, 194-95) 
On April 8, 1973 Dean, and on April 13, 1973 Magruder, began 
talking to the prosecutors. (Book IV, 538, 610) The problem was, as 
Haldeman later pointed out to the President on the afternoon of April 17, 
1/ 1973,- people would say the President should have told Dean on March 21 
that the blackmail '.Jas 'Hong, not that it ,,'as too costly. (WHT, 1034) 
1/ 
The House Judiciary COlTUhlttee on April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the 
tape recording of this conversation. The President has refused to 
produce this recording, but has produced an edited transcript. 
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In the middle of April, the President tried to diminish the 
significance of his March 21 conversation with Dean. He tried to 
ascribe to the payments a purpose that he believed would make them 
appear innQc;en t and vli thin the law. On April 14,1/ the Pres iden t 
instructed Haldeman and Ehrlichman to agree on the story that payments 
were made, not "to obstruct justice," but to pay the legal fees and 
family support of the defendants. 
P 
E 
P 
The bad part of it is that the Attorney 
General, and the obstruction of justice 
thing which it appears to be. And yet, 
they ought to go on fighting, in my view, 
a fighting position on that. I think they 
all ought to fight. That this was not an 
obstruction of justice, we were simply 
trying to 11Glp tnese defendants. Don't 
you agree with that or do you think that's 
my -- is that --
I agree. I think it's all the defendants, 
obviously. 
I know if they could get together on the 
strategy. It would be pretty good for 
them. (v.1-1T, 628) 
That. night, the President told Haldeman: 
I just don't knOlv how it is going to come 
out. That is the whole point, and I just 
don It knOlv. And I \,'a.'O serious \vhen I said 
to John at the end there, damn it all, 
1/ The House Judiciary Committee on April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the tape 
recording of this conversation. The President has refused to produce 
this recording, but has produced an edited transcript. 
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these guys that participated in raising 
money, etc. have got to stick to their 
line that they did not raise this money 
to obstruct justice.l/ (~~T, 639-40) 
On the morning of April 15; 1973, the President and Ehrlichman 
discussed possible explanations that could be given regarding the motives 
in making payments to the defendants. (HHT, 676-79)J:...I Later that 
morning the President and Kleindienst discussed the effect of motivation 
for payments on criminal liability. 
3/ (WET, 704-08)- On the night of 
April 15, according to Dean's testimony, the President told Dean he had 
only been joking when he told Dean on March 21, 1973 that it would be 
easy to raise a million dollars to silence the defendants. (Book IV, 
1041-43) (The President many mon::::--.::: ~::~2r st:::::2d that this ~.::,;-.-.--=-:.-::.::::~on 
with Dean had not been recorded.) (Book IV, 1057) On April 16, 1973 
the President initiated a conversation with Dean in which he tried to 
suggest that,on March 21 Dean told him not about Hunt's threat, but 
only about Hunt's need for money. (HJCT, 194) Both of these sugges-
tions regarding the March 21 meetings are refuted by the transcripts, 
which, under compulsory process, were obtained much later. 
1/ The House Judiciary Committee on April 11, 197LI subpoenaed the 
tape recording of this conversation. The President has refused to 
produce this recording, but has produced an edited transcript. 
2) The House Judiciary Committee on April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the 
tape recording of this conversation. The President has refused to 
produce this recording, but has produced an edited transcript. 
3/ The House Judiciary Committee on April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the 
tape recording of this conversation. The President has refused to 
produce this recording, but produced a portion of the edited tran-
script recorded before the tape ran out in the rOB office. 
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At a time when the tapes and the transcripts were not 
available to investigatory agencies, the President counted on Haldeman 
to handle his accollllt of the Harch 21 conversation. On April 25 and 
26, 1973 the President permitted Haldeman to listen to tapes of several 
conversations, including the March 21 conversation with Dean. On the 
afternoon of April 25, 1973, they talked for about an hour; on April 26, 
1/ 
1973 Haldeman and the President met for five hours.- (Book IV, 1557-
1609) On June 4, 1973 the President told Ziegler that he did not have 
to listen to the March 21 tape and that that was the tough one but 
2/ 
Haldeman could handle it.- (Book IX, 216) In August 1973 Haldeman 
testified before the Senate Select Committee that on March 21 the 
Preside"t 6did that the payment of IUVr",-) 'would 'oe\Hong. 
Immediately thereafter, the President affirmed in public statements 
that he had a similar recollection. (Presidential Statements, HJC 
Compilation, 8/15/73, 49) Later, in the spring of 1974 upon making public 
the lfuite House edited transcripts, the President told the American 
people that ,,,hat had really been important about the March 21 conver-
sation was not what he actually said, but what he meant. (Presidential 
Statements, HJC Compilation, 4/29/74, 86-87) 
1/ The House Judiciary Committee on May 30, 1974 subpoenaed the tape 
recordings of these conversations of April 25 and 26, 1973. The President 
has refused to produce these recordings. 
']j The House Judiciary Committee on }lay 30, 1974 subpoenaed the tape 
recordings of tHO conversations I"ith Haldeman on June 4,1973. The 
President has refused to produce these recordings. 
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CLEMENCY 
1. 
On October 11, 1972 Hunt filed a motion for the return of 
the documents recovered from his Eon ~afe (U.S. v. Liddy, motion, 
October 11, 1972), which included two notebooks. (Book II, 425) On 
December 22, 1972 Petersen questioned Dean about the notebooks which 
Hunt claimed had been taken from his safe but had not been inventoried 
by the FBI. (Petersen testimony, 7 /12/7 Lf, T 3837-38; Book II, 422-23) 
The notebooks ,,}ere among the docllments contained in Hunt's safe which 
~vere not given to FBI agents investigating the Watergate break-in but 
remained in Dean's office. (Book II, 425) Petersen told Dean that 
he woul~ ho ~plled as a witness in nnnnci~ion rn Hunt's motinn 
(Petersen testimony, 7/12/74, T 3839) Colson was also a potential 
Hitness. (Book III, 472-73) 
On December 31, 1972 Hunt ,Hate to Colson complaining about 
his liabandonment by friends on ",hom I had in good faith relied" and 
suggesting that he ,vas close to breaking down. (Book III, 458) Hunt's 
trial was scheduled to begin on January 8, 1973. 
On January 3, 1973 Colson, Dean and Ehrlichman discussed the 
need to reassure Hunt about the amount of time he "lOuld have to spend 
in jail. (Book III, 460) Later, on April 14, 1973, Ehrlichman reported 
to the President about his conversation Hith Colson: "[Colson] said, 
'What can I tell [Hunt] about clemency.' And I said 'Under no circum-
1/ 
stances should this ever be raised Ivith the President. ,,,-- (h'BT 421) 
_1./ The House Judiciary Cmunit tee on April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the tape 
recording of this conversation. The President I1<'1S refused to produce 
this recording, but produced an edited trRl1script. 
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Later t~at day, and again on the following day, Colson met 
with Bittman, Hunt's attorney. Bittoan discussed Hunt's family 
problems since December 8, 1972 when his wife had died. Bittman 
told Colson that Eunt \-7aS "te,rrified '(.7ith the prospect of receiving a 
substantial jail sentence" because of his children, but that he thought 
Hunt might' be able to survive the prospect of a reasonable term, perhaps 
a year. (Bittman testimony, 7/9/74, T 3048) According to Colson, 
Bittman also mentioned that he understood that Dean and Mitchell 
developed plans for electronic surveillance prior to I-Jatergate. 
(Colson Exhibit No. 17, 5) Colson assured Bittman of his friendship 
for Hunt, of the need for Hunt to be out of jail, and of Colson's 
willingness to do whatever he could to assist Hunt. Colson has stated: 
In addition, I may well have told Bittman that I had 
made "people" aHare that, if it \,7ere necessary, I Fas 
going to come back to the \·!hite l:ouse to speak for 
Hunt. Indeed, since I wanted to do all I could to 
comfort Hunt, it is most probable that I did say this. 
I do not knm'i hm-, BittI:,an evaluatec1 D'y position and 
influence at the Fbite [ouse, but despite my insistence 
tha t I could do no pore thaD try to help l:un t as a 
friend, Bittman ~ight have inferred that if Runt received 
an unreasonably long sentence, my willingness to go to 
bat for Hunt would result in Punt's sentence being reduced 
by executive action of SOffie sort. (Colson Exhibit ~o. 17,7) 
Colson reported on January 5, 1973 to Ehrlichrnan and Dean 
(Book III, 459) about his conversation with Bittman and stated his 
desire to speak to the President regarding Hunt. Thereafter Colson 
--.-l/ 
spoke to the President regarding Hunt's plight. (Book III, 461) 
1/ The House Judiciary Committee on Nay 30, 1974 has subpoenaed the 
two conversations Charles Colson had Hith the President on January 5, 
1973. The President has refused to produce these recordings. 
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On January 9, 1973 Hunt's motion for return of documents 
'.'as vlithdrawn. (~ v. Lidd~> ~otion, January 9, 1973) On January 11, 
Hunt pleaded guilty to charges against 11i8 arising out of l;!atergate. 
(Book III, 484-85) 
In the transcripts of the conversations of February 28, ~arch 
21 and P_~r-il 14, 1973 the President spoke of his understanding of the 
question of clemency for Hunt. On February 28, 1973 the discussion was 
general. The President spoke to Dean about the Watergate defendants' 
expec tations of clerr.ency. The President asked, "W'wt the hell do 
they expect, though? Do they expect that they uill get cleTI:ency v;ithin 
a reasonable time?" Dean told hif.l that he thought they did. The 
President asked \~he ther clecency could be gran ted "v!i th in six months. II 
Dean replied that it could not because, "This thing may become so 
political." (1-:JCT, ~O) There ',7as no specific men tion of Colson's 
assurances to Eunt, but tlle President did express familiarity ,-!ith Eunt's 
personal situation, the death of his wife. (HJCT, 40) 
On Narch 21, 1973 £0110,,,ing Eunt I s increased demancs for !"!loney, 
(Book III, 968) it '.'as not Dean but the President 1<1ho first L~entioned 
Colson's assurance of cleTI'ency to Funt: "You knovI Colson has gone 
around on this clemency thin8 '.Jitil Eunt 8n(l the res t." Dean 
added the apparent expectation concerning tirr,e. "Hunt is nov talking 
in terms of being out by Christ2as." The President seemed surprised 
by the time corrunitruent. 
JL~Lm~)[AX. 
DL\:-\. 
H.\L\)DL\X. 
Pm;;;rm:XT. 
}L\ L1n::-'f.\ ~. 
D"EAX. 
The transcript reads: 
By Christmas of this YC(ll"( 
Y~:dl. . 
Sce th(lt, th(lt 1'c(llly. tlHlfs Y('l~- bclic\'('(Iblc ~cause 
Colson, " , 
no yon tilink Colso\1 C0111<1 hn\'(' told hllll--
Colson is :111. is <\n--tll,\t'". th(lf'" yonI' fatal fbw. 
rcallY, in Chnck. is he is (In OjWr;ltol' ill l':<:l'e\licllcy, 
nnd ilC ",-in pa~' (It thl' ti:m :\nd \\'h('\'c hc is 
Yeah. 
\\'hate\'('r l1C hns to, tp accolllpli:-;It \\,11:\[ hl"S thcrl' to 
do. 
Right. (FJC'Y, 115-1_6) 
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On March 21, 1973 the President acknowledged his role in the 
assurance to Runt: 
GrrRt sfldllPSS, Thr hfiSis, flS fl lllflttpr of faet [elefil'S 
th1'Oflt] 111('l'c WfiS some disClissioll ol'er tll(:'rp with 
sornrlJody flhollt. uh, lIuut's problems after his \\'ife 
died and I said. of (,Ol\r,~r. C'Ollllllntntioll ('onld IJ(' COI\-
siflrred on Ow IJllsis of his I\'ifr. Hnd thflt is thr onl\-
dfs'{:ussioll 1('1'('" hacl ill that l1glit. (HJCT, 93) " 
In the April 14, 1973 transcript, the President further 
explained his role. The President acknm\7ledged that, contrary to 
Ehrlichman's direction, Colson had in fact raised with him the question 
of clemency in a tangential \Vay. The President said: liAs I rer,:ember 
a conversation this day was about five thirty or six o'clock that 
Colson only dropped it in sort of parenthetically, said I had a little 
problell! LV"':",)', taILing about Hunt- . <>nrl",::>i,d I sought to reassure him, 
you knmv) and so forth. And I said, Hell. Told me about Hunt's wife. 
I said it was a terrible thing and I said obviously we will do just, 
we will take that into consideration. That \Vas the total of the 
1/ 
conversation." (v..THT, 418-19) Hhile in these conversations the 
President suggests that his discussion of clemency for Hunt was limited, 
he acknm.,7ledges an assurance that Hunt "muld be considered for clemency 
2/ 
based on his wife's death. 
1/ The House Judiciary Committee On April 11, 1972 subpoenaed the tape 
recording of this conversation. The President has refused to produce 
this recording, but produced an edited transcript. 
2/ Colson has testified that he recalls his conversation with the 
President as follo\"s: "I ,,'as going to say someday I may \Vant to come 
talk to you about Hunt. Half way through that sentence the President 
interrupted and he said, he said oh, I just can't believe, Chuck, in 
the circumstances you have just described, I"ith his ,"'ife in that shape 
and his kids, he said, I just can't believe that he \'-ill to to jail. 
He said I just can't believe any judge \Vould do that. I just am sure 
he Iwn't, and don't you I,'orry about it, ane! relax and don't let it get 
you dmm." (T 4234) 
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In the conversations of March 21 and April 14, 1973 the 
President acknowledged his predicament on the issue of clemency for 
Hunt: the President feared that any action that seemed to Hunt a 
repudiation of the assurance of c:lenency would lead Hunt to "blovl the 
whistle, II On the other hand, the Pr.esident vlas aware that the public 
attention to Hatergate had grmm so much since January, \vhen the as sur-
ance was made, that clemency to Hunt by Christmas 1973 would be politically 
impossible because it would require direct and public action by the 
President. 
In their conversation on the morning of March 21st, the 
President told Dean, "You have the problem of Hunt and , , , his 
clemency," (HJCT) 103) 
PnF-SIDE~T. 
D£,\l\'. 
PRES IDF,C\ T. 
D£.,\y. 
PP.ESIDE~T. 
DE\X. 
PR1~SlDF,c\T. 
DE'\~. 
Pnr~':;IDEc\T. 
Dr..\x. 
Pr:~~SIDF.c\T. 
DE.n .. 
Pm::.smE~T. 
DL.\X. 
PRf.SIDE~T. 
Dc,\x, 
PR1~SIDEXT. 
DI:.~ ~, 
PHE.sIIlE~T, 
That's right, Alld. you're goillg to ha\'e the clemency 
problem for the others. They all \yol.dcl e~pect to be 
Ollt fwd tlwt may Pllt YOII ill a position that's just 
R itrht. 
IIlltrnaule at some point. YOIl kno", the "Watergate 
Heal'ill~-rs just o\'er, Hunt. llO\\' drmallclillg clemency 
or he is going to blo\\', Alld politicall}, it'd ue illl-
possiule for, you kllO\\', YOII to do it. You know, after 
cyerybody-
That's rj~ht. 
I urn not'slll'e that YOU \\"ill C\'E'!' be able to dcli \-e1' on 
the clemellcy, Jt m.l)' be just too hot. 
You call't do it till after the- '7-1 elections, that's for 
Sllre, Bllt en'11 then 
[Clears throat] 
YOllr point is th,lt r\'en thell YOll cOllldn't do it. 
That's ri£!"ht. It llla\" £111't1l('(' ill\'o)yc \'011 in a way 
yOIl shollidn't be iJ1\'olnd in this, .. 
\"0 it's \\TOlli.!.·: thfll's for sm!'. 
Yrcll. \\'l!:ltl;-\'rr'-YOII kIlO\\' 1-thc1'c\'c beell some 
u.1cl jllclglllcnts m.idl', ThL'rc\'c bl'cll SOlllC lIecl'ssnry 
jlldglllE'Jlts Jll:lllc: l~h-
Before the cll'('llOll, 
Beforc the cll'dioll find, ill a \Oy, thc IICCCSSflry oncs, 
.1'011 kno\\', u(' fore till' cicctiOIl·. ThcJ'L'--Y01I' kIlO\\', 
WE"\"L', t 11 is WflS 
Yeah." 
-to JllC tlwre \\·.If' no \\,<1 \' 
Yenh, 
Ill:! t, IIh--
Yl':dl. 
Hut to bUl'rlCI1 tltis ;;(,COll.1 c\dmillist1'atioTl 
Y\'(,'I'C nIl ill Oll iLI/ C::JCT, J.O~:.) 
1/ The i:'resident I s co;."~:C'nt "h\? 1 re ell jn on it" doC'~.~ not 2ppeC:.r ir: 
the II/hi to ::ouse Tran"c;~ i~) t. (j,TET 207) 
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On the afternoon of March 21, 1973 when the President met 
with Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean, he continued to assess the dangers 
Hunt posed to the cover-up. The President asked what should be done 
about Hunt. He agreed with Ehrlichman's ansV.'er that "Hunt's interests 
lie in getting a pardon if he can." The President said that"he's got 
to get that by Christmas time," and Ehrlichman suggested that hunt's 
"direct contacts Hith lohn" about it "contemplate that, that, that's 
already understood." (HJCT, 133) 
In the President's March 27, 1973 meeting with Haldeman, 
Ehrlichman and Ziegler, the issue of clemency for all the \\Ta tergate 
defendants after the 1974 elections Has once again raised. The President 
wanted to implement the strategy he had adopted in a meeting on March 22, 
1973. He considered the possibility of appointing a "supe.r panel" of 
distinguished citizens to study the Watergate case. Haldeman suggested 
that the idea had merit since it would drag out the investigation until 
after the 1974 elections, when the President could pardon everyone, 
and the "potential ultimate penalty anybody uould get hit in this 
1/ 
process could be tHO years." (lmT, 340-41) 
The President concerned himself with clemency not only for 
the Watergate defendants who were in jail for the break-in itself~ 
but also for three of his associates involved in the cove.r-up, Mitchell, 
Magruder, and Dean. The President's purpose was to induce them to hold 
the line and not implicate others. 
By the middle of April, 1973 the cover-up had already begun 
to fall apart. The President kne\\7 that :'lagruder and Dean \\'ere talking 
to the prosecutors. In an early morning meeting on April 14, 1973 the 
Presiden t d in~c ted H:?ldel~\an and Ehrlich:.\an to convey to :·fflgruder, and 
1/ The House Judiciary Co~nitlee on April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the tape 
recording of this conversation. The President has refused to produce 
this recording, but produced an edited transcript. 
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also to Hitchell, Vlho had been ioplicated by Magruder, assurances of 
leniency. The President carefully explained how he wanted Haldeman 
1/ 
and Ehrlichman to handle these assurances. O'ffiT, 408-514) 
The President instru.cted Ehrlichman to tell ~1itchell and 
Nagruder, first, that the President did not vie"\-l it in his intere s t s 
for the~ to remain silent; and second, that the President held gre2t 
affection for them and their families. The President set the language 
for Ehrlichnan to use to get the cle,r.ency message across to ~.-1.agrl!.c1er. 
Love l y wife and all the rest, it just breaks 
your heart. And. say this, thi s is a very pai!1ful 
message for me to bring -- I've been asked to 
give you, but I ~ust do it and it is that: Put 
it right out that way. Also, I would first put 
that in so that he knows I have personal affection. 
That's the way the so-called clemency's got to 
be handled. Do you see. John? (FHT, 503) 
Ehrlichoan said he un d. erstood the formula. Ealde;:-,an told 
Ehrlichman to "[d]o the Sar:i2 t hing ,.,! ith }[itchell", although at that tiro. e 
the President said that l':itchell ~-JOuld put on "the damnest defen s e" a nd 
never go to prison. OJlrr, 503) At this same r.leeting the President also 
asked Ehrlichman 11 m·; to handle the "problem of clemency!! for ueople like 
Hunt. Ha ldeman replied, "\\'ell, you don't handle it at all. That's 
Colson's cause there's hThere it came fror:l." (PHT, 485) 
For the rest of the day, Ehrlichman carried out the President's 
instructions in this matter. 
1:/ The House Judiciary Comr.littee on April 11, 1974, subpoen aed the 
tape recording of this conversation. The President has refused to 
produce this recording, but produced an edited transcript. 
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Ehrlichman first met '.-lith Mitchell at a 1:40 p.m. meeting. 
(Book IV, 718) He reported to the President that he had spoken to 
Mitchell and that Pcitchell "appreciated the message of the good feeling 
1/ 
bet,veen you and him." The President responded "He got that ,huh?" 
nr~T, 524) The President later added that there could be clemency 
in the case at the proper tiL~e but that they all knew that, for the 
moment, it was ridiculous to talk about it. (FHT, 544) 
As Ehrlidnnan le.ft the Oval Office for his meeting \"i th 
I'~agruder, the Presi(',ent rer.J.inded hie. about Hagruder: 
P 
E 
P 
E 
Just trying to get the facts and 
that's ~ll there is to it. 
I III get bc:.cl~ to you \'7he-o 
Be sure to convey my HarTl sentiments. 
Right. (!'JI"~T', 578) 
On the evening of April 14, 1973 the President telephoned 
Ehrlichman. They discussed hop Ehrlichr.J.an might divert Dean from i8-
plicating Laldec2n and Ehr 1 i Cf-u-:; an . Ehrlichman said he \,'ould se.e Dean the 
next day and the President asked '.,'hat he \Vas going to say to hi,n: 
E 
? 
I am going to try to get him around a bit. 
It is going to be delicate. 
Get him around in ~hat way? 
_j The r~ouse Judicia,."\' COi~"j~::'ttee 011 /\pril 11, 1974 subpoenaed the 
tape recording of this conversation. The President has refused to produce 
this recording, but produced au edited transcript. 
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Well to get off the passing the buck 
business. 
John that's 
It is a little touchy and I don't knoH how 
far I can go. 
John, that is not going to help you. Look he 
has to look dmm the road to one point that 
there is only one man who could restore him to 
the ability to practice 1 a,·; in case things go 
wrong. Ee's got to have that in the back of 
his mind . .. He's got to know that will 
happen. You don't tell him, but you knoT,; and 
I know that with him and Mitchell there isn't 
going to be any damn question, because they got 
a bad rap. 17 n,lIT, 663-64) 
Later in the con.versation the President directed Ehrlichr.1an to tell 
De'an that the President thought Dean !lhas carried a tremendous load;; 
and that the President's affection and loyalty remained undiminished. 
IV. 
On April 16, 1973 Dean and the President discussed potential charges 
of obstruction of justice against members of the President's ~fuite House 
staff. The President tried to din:. inish his ovm responsibility as ir:!plied 
by Colson's assurance. The President tried to make the Hunt clernen.cy 
assurance the responsibility solely of Mitchell. Dean, however, corrected 
him. 
1/ The I-louse Judiciary Committee on April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the tape 
recording of this conversation. The President has refused to produce 
this recording, but produced an edited transcript. 
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DEAN. 
Pru;SIDENT. 
DEAN. 
PRESIDENT. 
DEAN. 
PRESIDENT. 
DS\N. 
PRESIDENT. 
DEAN. 
Pru:SIDENT. 
DEAN. 
PRESIDENT. 
DEAN. 
PRf;SIDENT. 
!JEAN. 
P"ESIDENT. 
DS\N. 
PRESIDENT. 
- DJ:A:\". 
Pr:ESmEXT. 
DL\X. 
Pr.F.SlllEXT. 
1)1';'\X, 
1)p.~:SJl)F.XT. 
DF:\:-- . 
Pm:SIDr.X1'. 
Dux_ 
Pm>l1H:XT. 
DE'-\X. 
PIl.J;SII)EXT. 
DL\X. 
PI(]-;"IOEXT. 
D~:.\x. 
Pm:SIIH:XT. 
Th:.\ X. 
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It's, ull , it's, uh, all the obstruction is technical stufI 
that mounts up. 
Yeah: \Vell, you. take, for example, the clemency stuff. 
That~ solely .\lltchclL apparently, and Colson's talk 
with, uh. Bittman where he says, "I'll do evervthino-
I can b€causc as a, as a friend-'1) . "b 
No, that was \\"ith Ehrlichman, 
Huh? 
That was Ehrlichman. 
Ehrlic:lllnan wit.h who~ 
Ehrlichman and Col son and I sat up there, and Col-
son presC' ntC'j1 his story to Ehrjic:hman 
I lrnow . ..L 
regarding it and, and then John gaxe Chuck ,-cry 
clear instructions on going hack and tcllil1g him that 
it, you kIlO\\", ':Give him the inference he's got clem-
ency but cl()ll't gi\"e him any commitment." 
Xo commitment? 
Right. 
~ow that's all right. But first, if an individual, if 
it's llO commitillent-I\-e got a right to sit here-
Take n. fcllo\\" like Hunt. or. nh. or, or a Cuban whose 
\"ife lS sick and something-that's "hat clemency's 
about. 
Thafs right. 
Correct? 
Thafs right. 
BnL ub. but J Ohll spccifica lly sa id, " No cornm itment," 
did he? He-
Yeah, 
1\' 0 com Illitment. Then, t hen Colson t hell \\"ent on to, 
apparently-
I don't kno\\-jlow Colson deliyerecl jt, uh-
Apparently to Bittman-
for-
Rittman. Is that. ~;Olll" understanding? 
Yes. ont I don't kIlO'\- WI1i1t. his, yon kl1oll', specific-
\\l1ere did this business of the Christmas thing get 
out, John? "'hat the hell ,Y<lS that? 
'''-1'11. that~s. a. that's a-
Thatmll:;:t han> oN'n ;\ritZ'hclI. huh? 
Xo. that \\',IS Chuck, '!!:!<lill. I think tlwr. u1l-
That they all. that tlwY'cl ;111 be out by Chri stmas? 
Xo, I tliill];: lw said sOI11('rhi!1~ t.o uic eifeet. that 
Chrlst.m;ls is the time that clcme;lcy gt'llera lly ocellI's. 
011, yeah. 
Uh-
,Yell, that doesn't-I, I, I don't think thut is going t.o 
hurt him. 
No. 
Do YOll? 
No.' 
1/ The President I s III !enol.;" does not appear in the \'~hitc :couse Transcript. 
(\·:1::T, 811) 
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"Qlcmen8Y," he says-One [unint.elligible] he's a 
inc:nd of PUIlt'S. I'm just trying t.o put the best face 
OT~ It. If Its the wrollg-:-if it is--:-I've got to know. 
"ell, one, olle of the thmgs I Hunk vou ha\'e to be 
very careful, and this is why PdcfSe"n will be verv 
good, is, if you take a set of facts and let the prosecu'-
~ors who hU\'e no--they'll be making, making no PH, 
1 ude-men is. 
Yeah. 
But they'll g1\'e yon the raw fads as they relate to 
the law, ,uh, and ,it's later you'\'('. got to decide, you 
know, wnat pubbc iuci) wlli be. put on it. In other 
words, they'll-If their-
Dean suggested that Petersen might be able to advise whether the atter~t 
to silence Hunt by offering clemency was la~ful. (HJCT, 20!{-06) 
In a meeting with Petersen, just three hours after this 
meeting with Dean, the President asked whether the prosecutors had 
anything on Colson. Petersen said there were allegations, but nothing 
l/ 
specific. (\TET 872-·75) The President neither posed a hypothetical 
question, as Dean had suggestecl, nor informed Petersen of Colson's COl1-
versation with Bitt~an. 
Thereafter, the Presiclent cade repeated untrue statements on 
the clemency issue to the public. 
5/22/73 At no tiDe did I authorize any offer of 
executive cle2ency for the Watergate 
defendants, nor did I know of any such 
offer. (Presidential Stateoents, EJC 
Compilation, 5/22/73, 21) 
1/ The Eouse Judiciary Co'~.:1itt2e on J..pril 11, J974 subpoenClec1 the 
tape recording of this converse.tior:. The ?resiclent !las refused to rroduce 
this recording, but produced an edited transcript. 
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. under no circumstances could execu-
tive clemency be considered for those who 
participated in the ~atergate break-in. 
I maintained that position throughout. 
(Presidential Statelilcnts, HJC Compilation, 
8/15/73, 42) 
Two, that I never authorized the offer of 
clemency be considered and; as a matter of 
fact, turned it dmm whenever it \.]as sug-
gested. It was not recommended by any 
member of my staff but it ,·!as, on occasion, 
sugEjcsted as a result of ne,os reports that 
clemency might become a factor. (Presi-
dential Statements, JHC C08pilation, 
8/15/73, 64) 
These statements are contradicted by the President I s mill \oJords . 
... - . _. ---------
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1. 
In order for the cover-up to be successful, those who 
·y.Jere responsible for the Hatergate burglary and other activities 
of a similar nature had to remain silen t. This \\1a5 the purpose 
of the payments and assurances of clemency. At the same time, 
those seeking to ascertain the facts, and to determine Vlhether 
there was any truth to charges alleging 'Villi te House responsibility 
for Watergate, had to be either discouraged or deceived. 
II. 
In order to achieve the second obj ective, President >;ixon 
himself chose, upon occasion, to assure the public that his aides 
were not involved \-lith paymerrts or assurances of clemency. The 
Presiderrt made public statements on these matters y,'hich ',Jere 
false and misleading. The President also assured the public, upon 
occasion, that he had ordered 1 and even personally undertaken, 
thorough investigations into Watergate, that those investigations 
found no Hhite House involvement, and that further investigation 
~"ould therefore be unnecessary. 111e President asserted iti public 
statements that thorough investigations were reflected in three 
separate reports by his il',mcdiate staff -- the August 1972 Dean 
report; the post:-~13rch 197.3 Dean report; and the Ehrlichman report 
of April 19-/3 -- and that such reports concluded that the nlite House 
[12035]
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staff had been in no way involved in Watergate. 
A. The August 1972 Dean Report 
On August 29, 1972 , at a ne,,,s conference, President Nixon 
noted that 
Department 
Committee. 
investigations into Watergate were being conducted by 
of Justice and FBI, GAO and the Banking and Currency 
He ~7ent on to say: 
In addition to that, Hithin our o,m staff, 
under my direction, Counsel to the President, Mr. 
Dean, has conducted a complete investigation of 
all leads which might involve any present members 
of · the \,'hite House Staff or anybody in the Govern-
ment. I can say categorically that his investi-
gation indicates that no one in the 'mite House 
Staff,no one in tti= ~~~i~!~traticn, presently 
employed, was involved in this very bizarre 
incident. (Presidential Statements, HJC Compila-
tion, 8/29/72, 3) 
1/ 
This assurance was repeated on other occasions. 
~/ In a Harch 2, 1973 news conference, the President said: 
I will simply say with regard to the Water-
gate case what I have said previously that the 
investigation conducted by Hr. Dean, the \,)hite 
House Counsel, in whiah, incidentally, he had 
access to the FBI records on t11is particular Qatter 
because I directed him to conduct this investigation, 
indicate s that no one on the h':'1i'::e. Hc~:,se Staff, at 
the time he conducted the investigation -- that ,,;'as 
last July and Au gust -- "Tas involved in or had knm·,r-
ledge of the Wat e r gate matt er. (Presidential State-
ments, HJC Compilation, 3/2/73, 5) 
[Footnote continued on page 3] 
the 
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At the time of President Nixon's August 29, 1972 press 
conference, Dean had not made a report directly to the President. 
According to the President's m:ffi logs, throughout the entire surraner 
Dean and the President never met prior to September 15, 1972; Dean 
has testified that he first heard of this "report" in the President's 
press conference, and no independent evidence exists that such a 
report was ever completed or undertaken. (Book II, 590-92) 
The first meeting between the President and Dean occurred 
about two and a half weeks after the August 29, 1972 press conference, 
on September 15, 1972. (Book III, 731) The conversation at that 
meeting discloses that the President kne.\.J of Dean's role in imple-
mentin:r thE". President '_s .policy of. containment. Before Dean entered 
the room, Haldeman told the President it had been "a good move .•. 
bringing Dean in," that De.an, while he does not gain for you himself, 
he enables other people to gain ground '\'"hile he's making sure that 
you don't fall through the holes.': ([wCT, 1) Af ter Dean joined the 
meeting, the President referred to the H&tergate matter as a "can of 
worms," said that "a lot of this stuff ,vent on,1I and congratulated 
Dean for "putting your fingers in the dikes every tirr;e that leaks 
sprung here and sprung there." (HJCT) 7) I.ater in the conversatioa, 
Additionally, on May 22, 1973 the President publicly stated: 
In the "reeks and months that follm,'ed 1~atergat2, 
I asked for, and received, repeated assurances that 
Nr. Dean's 01,'11 investigation (I.;o:i.ch includeci reviel\'i;lg 
files and sitting in on FBI interviews with ~~ite 
Eouse IJerSonnel) had cleared everyone tilen e!::plo)'eC: 
by tile 11'hi te rouse of invol V28en t . (Presiden tial 
Statements, lilC Compildtion, 5/22/73, 24) 
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the President said, "So you just try to button it up as well as you 
can and hope for the best. And, • 
. remember that basically the 
damn thj_ng is just one of those unfortunate things, and He're trying 
to cut our losses.;' (HJCT 13-14) 
The transcript of the March 21, 1973 morning meeting be-
tHeen the President and Dean also indicates that, in the summer of 
1972, Dean was helping with the cover-up, not conducting a "coDplete 
investigation. I; 
Prn:~ID!-;XT, 
Dr._\x, 
PnEslllExT, 
(tiJCT 88) 
Now [sl'o-hsJ-
• • • '"- ~ "'- t'" 
\"hat. what hns hapjJrllNl post,Julle 17? ,\Yrll. it wns. 
T \\'ns ullr1rl' pretty cleal' illstU1CtiO!lS [laughsJ !lot to 
l'rnll,\' to im-rstig<ltC' tlli", that this \\'ns sOlllC'thing 
thnt just ('ould hn\'C' berlt disastrOllS 01\ t1le <:Iectioll if 
it hncl-nll 11('11 hnd hrokC'1l 100sC'. nnd I \\'orked on n 
thC'on' of ('ontalllll1('llL 
Snr<:: 
to try to hold it l'i[[ht \\'I1('l'e it \\'ns. 
RigIlL ~ 
At the end of the ~larch 21, 1973 raorning meeting the President told Dean 
that there ,vas no doubt aboutii;'the right plan before the election," that 
Dean "handled it just right," and t~at Dean had "containe<.1 it." (EJCT 129) 
On April 17, 1973 the President denied, in the course of a dis-
1/ 
cuss ion ,'lith Halde,nan and Ehrlichr.,a!1 that Dear. during the sUI~cer of 
1972 did not report to the President directly. \,11en Ehrlichnan said 
Dean would say that he reported primarily to the President and to 
Ehrlichman only incidentaJly, the President said: 
1/ The l;ouse Judicii-1l')' COl;'Jnittee on 4/11/7 /1 subpoenaed the tape re-
cording of this conversation. The Prt:sic1ent has refused to rroduce 
this recording, but has produced an edited transcript. 
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You see the problem you'v~ got there is 
that Dean does have a point there which you've 
got to realize. He didn't see me when he came 
out to California. He didn't see me until the 
day you said, "I think you ought to talk to 
John Dean." 1 think that was in March. (\·.'11T 
1009) 
The President continued, "One of the reasons this staff is so dann 
good. Of course he didn't report to me. I was a little busy, and 
all of you said, 'let's let Dean handle that and keep him out of the 
President's office. ,I' (wtlT 1010) Later in the same conversation, 
the subject came up again. 
H 
E 
P 
z 
p 
E 
p 
Didn't you at some point get a report from 
Dean that nobody 5.n the I-mite House was 
involved. 
Didn't we put that out way back in August? 
I mean, I just said "\<7ell, that 1 saIl 1 know 
no~.,." It ,·;as never in ",riting. He never 
came in orally and told me Dean--John Dean I 
never sa,., about this matter. You better check, 
but I don't think John Dean was ever seen 
about this matter until I sm., him, Hhen Jo1m 
Ehr1ichnan suggested that I'd better see John 
Dean. 
You better check Bob, back in that period 
of time July - ,,,hen ,'.'e Here in San Clemente 
- my recollection is that he did come and 
see you at that time - but ",e can clleck 
that. 
Oh - by hi~Gelf? No. 
Well, by himself or with one of us. I don't 
kno\,T. 
He may have come in, but it "Ta.S a pretty--I 
hope he did, hope he did. But he might have 
come in sort of the ecd, and someone said, 
"Look h2re's John D2an from \'ashington," .'1(1d 
I may ha.ve said, "thanks for all your hard 
,.;ark. II (\{liT 1014) 
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B. The March 1973 Dean Report 
On August 15, 1973 the President said: liOn March 23) I 
sent Mr. Dean to Camp David, where he was instructed to write a com-
plete report on all he knew of the entire \~atergate matter." (Presi-
dential Statements, HJC Compilation, 8/15/73, 41-42) 
The "report" that the Presicent had in fact requested Dean 
to make in March 1973 was one that was deSigned to mislead investiga-
tors and insulate the President from charges of concealment in the 
event the cover-up began to COrile apart. Hhen the President and Dean 
1/ 
discussed a report in a March 20, 1973 telephone conversation, the 
President told Dean to "make it very i!!co!l1plete.'; 
p 
D 
p 
D 
p 
D 
Right. Fine. The other thing I "Tas 
going to say just is this -- just for 
your ovm thinking -- I still Hant to 
see, though I guess you and Dick are 
still working on your letter and all 
that sort of thing? 
We are and we are coming to -- the more 
we Hark on it the more questions we see 
That you don't \-]ant to ans~ver, huh? 
that bring problems by answering. 
And so you are coming up, then, with the 
idea of just a stonewall then? Is that --
That's right. 
1/ The House Judiciary COl,'..!"ittee on 4/11(74 subpoe~aed the tape re-
cording of this conversation. The President has refused to oroduce 
this recording, but has produced an edited transcript. 
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Is that what you come down "lith? 
Stonewall, with lots of noises that we are 
always willing to cooperate, but no one is 
asking us for anything. 
And they never t·rill, huh? 
that you cou16 make even a 
ment that I could put out? 
what I --
I think we could. 
There is no way 
general state-
You understand 
See, for example, I Has even thinking if you 
could even talk to Cabinet, the leaders, you 
knot." jus t orally and say, "I have looked in to 
this, and this is that," so that people get 
sort of a feeling that your own people have 
got to be reassured. 
* * * 
But you could say, "I have this and this is 
thaLli Fine. See Hhat I am getting at is 
that, if apart from a statement to toe I.Uu.:1!L..Ll..L.ee. 
or anything else, if you could just make a 
statement to me that we can use. You know, 
for internal purposes and to answer questions, 
etc. 
As we did when you, back in August, made the 
statement that 
That's right. 
And all the things 
You've got to have something ,,'here it 
doesn't appear that I am.doing this in, 
you know, just in a -- saying to hell with 
the Congress and to hell with the people, 
we are not going to tell you anythin g because 
of Executive Privilege. That, they don't 
understand. But if you say, "No, \,'e are 
willing to cooperate," and you've made a 
complete statement, but make it very in-
complete. See, that is what I mean. I 
don't want a, too much in chapter and verse 
as you did in your letter, I jus t want just 
a gen<~ r a l --
[12041]
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An all around statement. 
That's right. Try just so~ething general. 
Like "I have checked into this matter; I 
can categorically, based on my investiga-
tion, the following: Haldeman is not in-
volved in this, that and the other thing. 
Nr. Colson did not do this; rlr. so and so 
did not do this. Mr. Blank did not do this.: 
Right down the line, taking the Clost glarir..g 
things. If there are any further questions, 
please let me know. See? 
Uh, huh. I think we can do that. 
On the afternoon of March 21, 1973, after Dean had discussed with the 
President I·mite Eouse involvement in the cover-up, the President re-
peated his instructions to Dean: 
lTI1. if YO\l 
~s tl\e ,"hite JT;ll\"'~ COllllsef, ,Jolin. uh. Oil directioll-
11h, I risk for ;to a \\Tittrn report. \yhich I think, ull. 
th;tt-\,hich is \'l'l',\' g:cller;d, 1111dors(;\Ild, 1~IIc1or:"r:1nc1. 
[lallghs] I don't \\allt to got :dl that Goel dal1111ed 
specific. 1'111 thinking 110\\' ill fnr llIOJ"e ,[.tt'I1E'ral terms, 
ha\'ing in mind tIl(> fact tl1<\t the problrm \,ith ;t 
sjwciflc report is th,lt, 1111. this Pl'O\'OS this OlIO :1nd 
that one that, onc. ;t11(1 yO\\ just, [1l'O\'(' 5o!llrthillg th;tt 
YOll c1ic1ll~t do;tt ill1. But if YOll Ill;ti;:c it l'al"h(,1" g('ll('r;ll 
III terms of illY-YOur ilI\'cstig:!t ion ill(licntes th;lt this 
nWll diclno! (10 it. this 1ll;11l did not do it. this man did 
do that. ~ ... (UCT·136) 
During this conversati,on, Ehrlichman pointed out to the Fresi-
dent the advantage of having a conclusory reoort. 
Well, but doesn't it give, doesn't it pGrcit the 
President to clean it out at such tirle [~S it ooes 
come I.:p? ~)y saying, "Indeed., I relie,j 0;1 it. And 
no\, this, this later thing turns up, ~"-n,i I uon I t 
condone that. And if I'd :mm·m ahout th2t before, 
obviously: I ,,'oulcn' ~ have clone it. And 1'm going 
to move on it nm"," (1-:JCT 11,0) 
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On March 22, 1973, Ehrlichman repeated the point at a meeting attended 
by the President, Haldeman, Dean and Mitchell: 
[A]ssuming that some corner of this thing comes 
unstuck at some time, you're then in a position 
t'o say, "Look) that document I published [Dean 
Report] is the document I relied on- (HJCT 159) 
On March 22, 1973, there was also a discussion about using the report 
if Hhite House aides 'W'ere called to testify: 
PRESIDEXT. 
DL\X. 
Pl\I:SIDE~T. 
:'~lTCHELL. 
DL\K. 
Pm:SIDExl. 
EURLICIDL\ ~. 
PRr:SlDEXT. 
EHIO,IC1DL-\X. 
HALI)E)UX. 
Pm:SIDEXT. 
DE.-\x. 
EU!?LICIDUX. 
PRESWYXT, 
EIInLIC'IDux. 
Suppose the Judge tomorrow, uh, oreIE"f's the Com-
mittee to sho\\', sh()\\ its e\'iclence to the Grand Jurv 
[uninh?lIigibJI?] tltf>n the Grancl ,Jury reopells th-e 
caSE", and CjllPS( ions e\'erybocly. Does that change the 
game plan? 
[l~llintelligible] senc1 them all clown. 
What) Beforl? the. COliimi(tee? 
The Presi(;t·jIL.',; ash.eti Lunilttt'lligible] this. 
?:{O\\ are YOII saying-
SlIppose-thr .Jlld!2,e 0pl?ns-teJ1s the GraneI Jurv and 
Sc1\S, ;;1. I don't," says, "1 \\'ill1t thl?ll1 to ca 11 IL1lcle-
milll, Ehrlidllll~lll anc11?\'enboch I?lsc they didn't cal1 
before." ,\Yllilt (10 YOII say to th~t? Thl?n'(lo YOll sti1J 
go on this ]l.'lttf>nl \\'illl 'the En'in C'onllllitt'ce? The 
point, is, if, if a p!Tancl jury. uh, decides to go into this 
thing, 11h. \\hat do YOll think on that point.? 
I think ,'oll'd sa\', ;;Dnsecl 011 \\'lwt I know about this 
case, uh', I call see llO rC:lson \\h~' I shollld be ('on-
(,f>fIled n bOHt \\ ha t. the granl1 jury pro('ess-" 
.\,11 right. 
TJwfs all. 
Alld thnt "oulcl ('h.'lng:e--
1\.I?J1. they go in-clo'both: .-\.ppenr bl?fore the Gralld 
Jilt'\" nncl the C'oullnit(ce ( 
Sure. 
You 11:1\'e to bottom your defensl?, your positioll on 
t 110 report. 
That's right. 
~\.ll(l the rt'port says, I;X obody was il1\'01\"ec1," O:JCT 172) 
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C. The Ehrlichman Report 
At a press conference on September 5, 1973, the President 
said that when he realized that John Dean would not be abl~ to com-
plete his report at Camp David, he assigned John Ehrlichman to 
conduct a "thorough investigation" to get all the facts out: 
The investigation, up to that time, had been 
conducted by Nr. Dean. Hhen he Has un-
able to '",rite a report, I turned to Hr. Ehrlich-
man. Mr. Ehrlichman did talk to the Attorney 
General. . on . . . I think it ,.;ras the 27th 
of Harch. The Attorney General was quite aHare 
of that and Hr. Ehrlichman, in addition, ques-
tioned all of the major figures involved and 
reported to me on the 14th of April, and then, 
at my suggestion -- direction, turned over his 
report to the Attorney General on the 15th of 
April. An investigation V.ras conducted in the most 
thorough ,.Jay. (Preside::ltial Stateme!1ts, HJC 
Compilation, 9/5/73, 52) 
The President's statement about a Hhite House repo:rt on 
\Vatergate ~.las, in this case, too, misleading. The "report" Ehrlichman 
had been asked to prepare in ApriJ. 1973 was one designed to mislead 
the investigators, insulate the President from the appearance of 
complicity and e}..'Plain the President's failure to take action on 
Dean's disclosure of ~arch 21, 1973. The President also intended 
to use the "report" to get public personal credit for the disclosures 
tha't "ere on the verge 0 f being made through 0 ther agencies, in 
spi te of h'hi te House at tempts to cover them up. 
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. In mid-April, 1973 the President had reason to fear these 
disclosures. Magruder and Dean were meeting with the prosecutors. 
(Book IV, 538, 610) The President met with Haldeman and Ehrliclullan at 
1/ 
8:55 a.m. on April 14, 1973. Ehrlichman told the President that 
Colson had reported that Hunt \voulcl testify because there was no 
longer any point in remaining silent and that Hunt's testimony would 
lead to the indictment of Hitchell and Magruder. (hTHT 409-10) The 
President decided that, as Colson had advised, their best course 
would be to pressure John }litchell into accepting the blame for 
Watergate. If }litchell could not be persuaded voluntarily to accept 
the blame, then the \.]hite House could "make a record" of its efforts 
for the purpose of 5hO\.,ing that the \"Ihite House had been activeiy 
engaged in trying to get out the truth about Hatergate. Ehrlichman 
suggested that the President could put pressure on Hitchell by 
telling him that the Ehrlichman report showed Mitchell's guilt. 
E 
P 
E 
p 
Let's take it just as far as you call 
Mitchell to the oval office as, a 
No. 
I'm essentially convinced that Mitchell 
will understand this thing. 
Right. 
1:/ The Eouse Judiciary COI'-:lllittee on 4/11/74 subpoen<led the tape 
recording of this conversation. The President has l:e[used to pro--
duce. this recorJing, but has proJuced 3n edited transcript. 
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And that if he goes in it redounds to the 
Administration's advantage. If he doesn't 
then \.,e' re --
How does it redound to our advantage? 
That you have a report from me based on 
three weeks' work; that when you got it, 
you immediately acted to call Hitchell in 
as the provable vlrong-doer, and you say, 
liMy God, live got a report here. And it' s 
clear from this report that you are guilty 
as hell. No\." John, for (expletive deleted) 
sake go on in there and do \vhat you should. 
And let's get this thing cleared up and 
get it off the country's back and move on." 
And 
Plus the other side of this is that that's 
the only way to beat it now. (WHT 439-40) 
1 / 
At 2: 2 4 p.T:l.- that same ciay the President met vliL~L :ia:;'L~2Elan 
and Ehrlich~Jan \·:here they again discussed what the Ehrlichman report 
should be 
E 
P 
E 
You say (unintelligible) I have investigated. 
(Unintelligible) up the \,1hole. 
Hhat -- what I, basically, is having an 
Ehrlichrnan report. We've got some of the 
Dean report. That \"ould be simply \,'e 
have an Ehrlichman report that he I!1ake s 
and here is the situation with regard to 
the hThite House involvement. I haven't 
gone into the Coo@ittee thing. 
Nmv the current (unintelligible) the current 
(unintelli gi b le) on \~hite House involvelilellt 
primarily are Haldeman's (unintelligible) 
-.1.../ The HO 'J.se .Judiciary Committee on 4/11/7 /1 subpoenaed the tape 
recording of thi s convers ation. The President has refus e d to pro-
du ce this recorCiing, Dut has produced an edited tl"anscript. 
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That's right. 
Well, I didn't go into White House involve-
ment. I assumed that --
No. I (unintelligible). 
That what you needed to know from me, and 
this would be I,]"ha t I would say, "1tTha t the 
President needed to know was the truth or 
falsity of charges that \,]"ere leaking out 
with regard to -- Cow~ittee for the Re-
election personnel and any connections to the 
White House that might exist. That \.;as the 
area of inquiry rather than whether anybody 
in the \';hi te House was involved." 
(Unintelligible) trying to get you out there 
in a way that you didn't have to go into all 
that stuff, you see. (mn 564-65) 
1/ 
Two days later, on the morning of April 16, 197 J ,-- and 
after th e President had learned the substance of Dean's disclosure to 
the prosecutors, the President directed Ehrlichman to create "a scenario 
\,]"ith regard to the President's role .... " "OtheD-li.se," Ehrlichman 
said, "the Justice Department Hill, of course, crack this \·,hole thing." 
(vll:1T 782-83) 
Ehrlichman returned for another meeting with the Presi.dent 
and Haldeman at 10:50 
2/ 
a.m.- During the meeting the President asked, 
"HOI" has the scenario vwrked out? 1-1ay I ask you?" This conversation 
follm"ed: 
1/ 
The House Judiciary Committee on 4/11/74 subpoenaed the tape 
recording of this conversation. The President has refused to pro-
duce this recording, hut has produced an edited transcript. 
2/ The House Judicic1:CY Committee on 4/11/7 1; subpoenaed the tap e 
recordin g of this conversation. The President has refused to pro-
duce this recording, but has produced an edited tycll1script. 
[12047]
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\.Jell, it works out very good. You became 
aware sometime ago that this thing did not 
parse out the way it was supposed to and 
that there were some discrepancies between 
what you had been told by Dean in the report 
that there was nobody in the Hhite House 
involved, which may still be true. 
Incidentally, I don't think it will gain us 
anything by dumping on the Dean Report as 
such. 
No. 
~fuat I mean is I would say I was not satis-
fied that the Dean Report vas complete and 
also I thought it was my obligation to go 
beyond that to people other than the \·.'11i te 
Rouse. 
Ron has an interesting point. Remember you 
had John Dean go to Camp David to write it 
up. He carne dO\,'n and said, "I can't." 
Right. 
That is the tip off and right then you started 
to move. 
That's right. He said he could not write it. 
Then you realized that there was more to this 
than you had been led to believe. (unin-
telligible) 
How do I get credit for getting Magruder to 
the stand? 
Well it is very simple. You took Dean off of 
the case right then. 
~~o weeks ago, the end of March. 
That's right. 
The end of Narch. Remer.1Der that Ie tter you 
signed to me? 
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illl, . huh. 
30th of March. 
I signed it. 
Yes sir, and 
~"ant you to 
facts are. 
Yes. 
it says Dean is off of it. I 
get into it. Find out what the 
Be prepared to --
\.Jhy did I take Dean off? Because he was 
involved? I did it, really, because he was 
involved with Gray. 
Well there was a lot of stuff breaking in the 
papers, but at the same time 
The scenario is that he told you he couldn't 
write a report so obviously you had to take 
him off. 
Right, right. 
And so then \·7e started digging into it and we 
went to San Clemente. tnlile I was out there 
I talked to a lot of people on the telephone, 
talked to several witnesses in person, kept 
feeding information to you and as soon as you 
saw the dimensions in this thing from the 
reports you were getting from the staff -- who 
\·:ere getting into it .- .. Hoore, me, Garment 
and others. 
You brought Len Garment in. 
~ou began to move. 
1 \-Jan t the da tes of all those --
I've got those. 
Go ahead. And then 
ru1d then it culminated last week. 
Right 
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In your decision that }litchell should be 
brought dOvJD here; Magruder should be brought 
in; Strachan should be brought in. 
Shall I say that we brought them all in? 
I don't think you can. I don't think you can. 
I wouldn't name them by nalile. Just say I 
brought a group of people in. 
Personally come to the ~'!hi te House. 
I will not tell you who because I don't want 
to prejudice their rights before (unintelligible) 
But you should say, "I heard enough that I 
was satisfied that it was time to precipitously 
move. I called the Attorney General over, in 
turn Petersen," 
The Attorney Gener~l. Actually you made the 
call to him on SaLurday. 
Yes. 
But this was after you heard about the Magruder 
strategy. 
No, before. 
Oh. 
We didn't hear about that until about three 
o'clock that afternoon. 
J,.,lhy didn't you do it before? This is very good 
nm,r, how does that h2_ppen? 
Well 
\fuy I,'asn 1 t he called in to tell him you had 
made a report, John? 
That's right. John's report carne out of the 
same plac.e l!agruder' s report did --
No. 11y point is 
I called him to tell him that I had this infor-
matio". 
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Yeah but, why was that? That was because we 
had heard Magruder was going to talk? 
No. Oh, I '\vill have to check my notes again. 
We didn't know whether Magruder was going to 
talk. 
That's right. 
Magruder was still agonizing on what he was 
going to do. 
Dean -- but you remember you came in and said 
you have to tell him about it politely. Well, 
an)'\vay 
I will t~ll you the reason for the hurry up in 
the timing was that we learned that Hunt \vas 
going to testify on Monday afternoon. 
The President is right. I didn't talk to 
Kleindiens"!:. P.::::-:-:?li!ber, I couldn't ge~ h";~ 
Yeah. 
I didn't talk to him until he got home from 
Burning Tree, \ .... hich \Vas the end of the day, 
and I had already talked to Magruder. 
Right. But my point is when did we decide to 
talk to Kleindienst? Before Magruder? 
Oh, yes. Remember, early in the r.1orning I 
said I will see these DW fello\vs but I've 
got to turn this over to the At tOTI1ey General. 
I-.Thich t\VO fellmvs '("ere you going to see? 
}1i tchell and Hagruder. 
With what your conclusions were? 
I had this report and I tried all day long to 
get the At torney General vho '(,'as at the golf 
course and got hi.m as soon tiS he got hor::e 
for --
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Do we want to put this report out sometime? 
I am not sure you do, as such. 
I would say it was just a written report. 
The thing tha~ I have --
The thing they will ask is what have you got 
here? 
It was not a formal report. It was a set 
of notes. 
Handwritten notes? 
Yeah. There are seven pages, or eight pages. 
Plus all my notes of my interviews. nmT 820-25) 
Ehrlichman later denied that he had conducteJ an investigation. 
He said he had made an inquiry consisting of an interview with ¥3ul u'urien 
on April 5, 1973 (Book IV, S09); with Kalmbach on April 6, 1973, with 
Dean on April 8, 1973 (Book IV, 540); with Strachan on April 12, 1973 
(Book IV, 550); with Colson on April 13, 1973 (Book IV, 595); with 
Hitchell and ~lagrllder on April lLf, 1973 (Book IV, 718, 801); and Hith 
Strachan on April 14,1973 (Book IV, 897). The meeting "'ithO'Brien 
was requested by O'Brien (Book IV, 512); the meeting with KaLnbach took 
place in a parking lot (Book IV, 532); the edited transcript of the 
Ehr1ichman April 8, 1973 report to the Presiclent about his meeting 
with Dean shows that the meeting involved a discussion of strategy 
(h'11:T 401-07); the !ueeting ,\'ith Strachan concerning his grand jur:; testi-
many of the GCiy before and Strachan's concern that he had cO[uli.itted 
perjury (Dook IV, 551); the edited transcript of Ehrlichrnan's April 14, 
[12052]
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]j 
1973 report to the President about his meeting with Colson shows that 
the meeting involved a discussion of strategy (viET 409-1!1); the tran-
script of Ehrlichman's conversation with ~litchell on April 14, 1973 
shows that Ehrlic~lan did not seek to-elicit facts (Book IV, 725-68); 
]j 
the President instructed Ehrlichman on April 14, 1973 to meet with 
HagruGer just "for making a record" after he lVas informed that Magruder 
was about to meet ~dth the prosecutors (h'HT, 537); and Ehrlichman met 
with Strachan April 15, 1973 in response to the President's directions 
to tell Strachan what Magruder had told the prosecutors. (Book IV, 896) 
III. 
made false and misleading statements under oath. These statements took 
various forms. In some instances witnesses told untrue stories. In 
others, witnesses untruthfully said they could not recall facts. The 
President told Dean on ~Jarch 21, 1973, "Just be damned sure you say 
I don't . rer:1ember; I can't recall, I can f t t;ive any honest) an ansl.;rer 
11 
to that that I can recall. But that's it. I' (llJCT 120) 
l/ The House Judiciary Committee on 4/11/74 subpoenaed the tape re--
cording of this conversation. The President has refused to produce 
this recording, but has produced an edited transcript. 
1/ The Hot:se Jlhiiciary C01~s'\ittee on 4/11/74 suuroenaed the tare re.-
cording of this conversation. The President has refused to produce 
this recording, but bas produced 211 <:c:iteci transcript. 
1/ In the ~~ite House Transcript, 
say I clon' t reii:enber. You can S2)' 
a.nslVer to tlwt that I can recall." 
the President says, :'But you can 
I can't recall. I can't give any 
(\\1-:T 235). 
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There is no evidence that when the President learned of such 
conduct he condeoned it, instructed that it be stopped, dismissed the 
person 'vho made the false statement, or reported his discoveries to 
the appropriate authority (the Attorney General or the Director of the 
FEI). On the contrary, the evidence before the Comwittee is that the 
President condoned this conduct, approved it, directed it, rewarded 
it, and in SODe instances advised witnesses on how to impede the in-
vestigators. 
\\TJ1ite House and eRP officials made false and misleading 
statements in two distinct time periods. The first tirfle period covered 
from June 1972 to March 1973. During this period the cover-up was 
rel~~~~~ly =uccess~ul -- in part bec?usO of perjured testimony hv 
Magruder and Porter and false statements of Strachan. The purpose 
of Magruder's untruthful test~uony was to provide innocent explanations 
for the comnitlC'.ent of $250,000 of eRP money to the Liddy Plal). (Book 
III, 246-51, 298-99) The purpose of Porter's untruthful testimony was 
to corroborate Hagruder's story. (Book III, 236-41, 292-93) The 
purpose of Strachan)s faJse statements was to hide the involvement of 
the Hhite House in the Liddy Plan. The second time period began at the 
time of the reconvening. of the \,Jat.ergate Grand Jury near the end of 
?-larch 1973. 
First Tim2 Period: State!'Ients to Further the Cover-up 
~------------------------------
1. Strachan 
Strachan \,'.'15 llalder.un f s liaison \·!ith the Presiuent' s re-
election campaign organizations. (Butterfield testiJl1ony, 7/2/74, 
[12054]
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T 2400) He could link Haldeman, even before public disclosures about 
the break-in, with the approval and implementation of the Liddy Plan. 
(Book I, 164-66) As early as March 13, 1973, Dean informed the 
President that Strachan's denial ~,as false and that Strachan planned 
to stonewall again in the future. 
DE-\x. 
PnESlfH:XT. 
1h:,\x, 
Pru:i-'lll}:XT. 
Jk\x. 
Pm:SlIlExT. 
Th:,\ x, 
PI~ESlDE;\T. 
J)u x. 
PHI,:~[l)t:;\T. 
Th:,\;\. 
P l\J':S![)J;;\ T. 
]);.;,\x. 
P In:-" lIn:;\ T . 
DL-I.Y. 
PHI::SIDEXT. 
DL\;\. 
"-rl1. ChflpiJl (]i(lll't blo\\' Hnythillg flhollt thr "-nter, 
gatC'. fllld--
YaH (]r)j}'t thillk 50! 
::\0, .\l)sollltC'h }lot. 
1 )id :St rn<:llflll '! 
\"rs. 
He kllc\\'? 
\"rs. 
.\bOllt thr "-fltergntr! 
~;~~\l, thrll. Bob I;:l1r\\', Hc prounldy told Bob. then.l/ 
He Illn" 1I0t ltn \·r. He Illay not han'. 2/ -" 
Hr \\";I'S, he \\'as jllllic:OIIS ill \\"lInt Fr. ill \\'lInt hC' 
l"(>];)\'('l1. <llld, HI', tJlll ,';tl'a("h~,,; is ns tOHgh flS ll~!l" 
1-' 
"-hnt"lllw :Oil." I .lll"t ;::0 ill fllld ~n\' hr d,i<lll't 1~1I0\\" I 
He'll !.l'O ill ;llId stollr\\";tll it ;11l(] ~il.\"' "1 dOll I kilO\\" 
nlld!t\n!.!' ni>ollt \\"hilt \"Inl ;Irr t.Ilkin!.!' n!;ollt.·' TTl' lJas 
fl]l:endy'done it t\\'in'.· as \ Oil kIIO\\". in intrni('\\"s. 3/ 
Yenl!.·1 O"lIess hr ,;]lOlIld, ShOltldll't 11(>. ill the interestS 
of-'\"h~1 1 sUpjlo:"f' \\"r l'i1!l't c,lll that jl1StiCl'. Cflll 
we! "'e'(";uI't cnll it Illllintl'lligibll'J 
'Yell. it. it-
The poi'nt is, ho\\' do -,Oll jl1stif,\,t!I~lt! " 
It's n. it's ,I ))l'1';:011,1] ]oY;lll\, \\".Itll hllll. He (lo(':ont 
\\'Hllt it nll\' other \\":I\" lTl: didn't h:,I'l' to be toh1.Ilc 
didn't h;l\.'l' to ll(' ilsk','d. If jlls! is '::(lJlll'thill!! tllil~ lH' 
found is thr way h(' \\'nntrc! to h,\lldlr tlll' SltWltlOl1. 
1./ The ,,7ords "Bob lilleH If do not appear in the Iv11ite House ?ranscript. 
2/ The \vorcls "He may not have" do not appear in the mlite Eo\.1SC 
Transcript. 
]j The ,vord "as" does not appear in the I';,"hite lIo\.1se Transcript. 
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But he kllC'\,? He knr\\' "bout ,"atC'rgatr? Strachall 
did? 
ell hllh. 
1'111)(' (1:lIll])CU. ".(>]1, that's the problem in Bob's case, 
isn't it. It's IlO~ CI1:tpill thell, I.lllt StracllHll. 'Cause 
Straehal\ work(>C] for Ililll. 
rh huh. TIl('Y \,olllcl ha \r aile lwll of a tilllr proying 
that Stl·aclnu', lwd ·knowledge of it, thOllgl!. .. 
,Yllo klle\\ [)('( tel' ~ .\fagrllr]rr i 
\\YeIL :\Lll-!.Tlldcr alld Licldy. . 
.\1111-1 s('(>. TIll' other \\(>ak lillk for Bob lS :\1a-
grud(>l", too. JIe h<1\·illg llirc'cl him ;111cl so forth. 
2. Magruder and Porter 
An explanation \.,ras required for CRP' s paywent of money to 
Liddy as part of Haloe8an I sand 11itchell l s commitment of $250,000 for 
a CRP intelligence plan. Magruder fabricated a story that the Liddy 
Plan contemplated only legitimate intelligence activities. (Book III 
298-99) Magruderls untruthful testimony was supported by that of his 
assistant, Porter, both before the Grand Jury in September and at the 
trial of the ~atergate defendants in January. (Book III, 293-94, 506) 
Hhether the President kne\V of ?-lagrude;:- I s perj ury before Barch 21, 1973, 
there is no doubt that the President \Vas informed on that date, during 
his morning meeting with Dean, of perjury by both Magruder and Forter. 
DI-:.\:-'-. 
I'm,:slln::-,"'r. 
DLIX. 
Pr.ESTrH::,\T. 
DE.IX. 
PI;I·:,<;mE .'\1'. 
DF.lx. 
Liddy told you hr \\·as Jlhllllill~'-\\"h(,l'("(l ]](' ]r;Hn 
thrl'r \\'110" such a plnn-frol)) ,,·holll? 
Br£:: your pardon'? 
,Yhrl'l' dill 11(> lp;ll'l1 of th(' p1:1ns to bll,!! Lflrry 
O'Ihi(>n's S\1 i tl'? 
Frolll :\f:I~l'lIdrr. f1ftrr thr. l(ln~' nftrr th> fact. 
011, :\L1!2T'1Il1rJ'. hl' ].:;1I0\\"S. ' 
Yrnll. :\[;1;2"1'1\(1('1' is tOia'lly ldlO\\']l'(lp,>;Il)]r 011 thr 
\\'holr thill~·. 
Yrilh. ' 
.\ 11 ri!!hL IlO\\·. \\·p'\·r ~·()lir tlil'OIWll thr iTi:ll. \\~r'\·r­
I dOll't l'll(l"· if :\fitl'll('ll h:1S Pl';·jllrl'd hilllSl'lf ill til(> 
Grnnd .T\1I'~' 01' 110t. rYr lh'\'('r-
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Pm:.~ I DEl\"'T. 
DL\:S--. 
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Who? 
:.\litc·he ll. r don't know ho\\- !llllch kno\\'l edge he ac-
tll[lll\' had. J kJlf)\\' tlint :.\fn)!l'llrl pr has IWT·jlll'<·d hilll-
self 'jn the Gnlli,l .Tun'. 1 kJlo\\' that Po Iter }ws 
pc-rjm'cd hilllsc·1 f. 1111. in·tJ\(· (;rancl ,Jury. 
Pol'tel' [llnilltclli .!! ib1e] 
He is one of :'\la~\'Ildcr's deputies. 
Yeah, 
'r"'h, th[lt thcy sC't. up this sCl' llario \\'hich they ran by 
mC'. They said. " lTo\\, ai>ollt thi s;" I said. "1 don't 
kno\1'. r: YOl1 kno\\', if, if thi" is wbat you are going 
to han~ on, nne'-' {·h. tltn.t t]WY--
,Yhflt<lid the\' Sfl\' hefore th e Grand -Tun' ? 
They said. th'(·\· <l id. n.s thpy o:.lid before"the tri ,) \ and 
tJl(' Grnnd ,T1lI\' . t11nt. that.' uh. Li(l(h had come O\'C'r 
fl5, flS a cOllllsC'f . ' -
Yea1!. 
[lnd \\'r 1;:nC'\\' he Iln(l thesp C:l pacities to, 
YC'al1. 
YOll ];:110\\'. 
'Yeah, 
to do ]C'gitinwtC' illtP11igPIl(,p, ,"c had llO ldC'a \rJtat, h e 
\\"as (10ing. 
Ycah, 
Hc \\-[lS giHIl Ull ,)nthol'izntioll of S:2CiO,OOO 
Hight. 
to eo11C'('t inf()l'l'~:~ti,,~, l)(:'c[I)).';C' O\lt SllrrO£!atps \\'(,1'0. 
ont Oll tl)(' 1'0,1[1. TllP~; had ])0 proh'cti01t. -n~C' hncl in-
f(Jl'lllntioll 11l<1t (1~('1'(' \\'PI'P g-oin~ to 1)(' r1C'1ll01lstratiollS 
agaillst thcll\. tll'll. nh. ll11. \1(' 'JwtJ to ha\'p ;\ phn to 
gd illfol'lll,)tioll a:" tc \I·hat li:\\)ili!iC's tl\ry \\p),p goillg 
to br c'0\J{r011tNl I,in, 
Hight. 
and Lic1,JY \\'as dl:tr~('d \\'itll (loil10,' this. I\-P 11:1(1 no 
kllo\\I('(1i!'p that hI' \I:,)S going' to hll·!.2: thC' ]):\"(', 1'h-
I\"C'II. tlw point is. tll,'t'S not tllI,P. 
Tlwt':" rirrht. 
\h!!rll,1(:r did kll()\\' th,1t-
:\rngTlItJc'l' spr'('ili"ilily in ::; irw'll,d him to 1:'0 h,lCk III 
tli(> D);"('. 
PE f> 11)];:\,[. IT C' c1 i (1 ~ 
Dr..\x, YP5, 
Pm>IIn:1\T. Yon I, llo\\' that) Yl'nh. r "C'C'. Okny. 
C-:.JCl' SG-(7) 
According to ~i2~~rude.r , before t es tif yin.g a.t the. trial in 
Jc1nuary, 1973, he i :1forr::2G }-iald e:::an tha t he lvo:.l.ld cor-l1I:it perjury. 
(Book Ill, 515) After t!le trial ,. ~[2S;Yl\der met hTith Ea lci e!!12 [l to dis-.. 
(Book Ill, 566-67, 
579) On February 19, 1973 Dean p~epared a talking paper for a rleeting 
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at which Haldeman would discuss with the President Magruder's possible 
appointment to a new Administration job. (Book III, 570-71) In this 
talking paper, Dean noted that.Hugh Sloan, whom Magruder had importuned 
to commit perjury, \-!Quld testify against Magruder before the Senate if 
Magruder wer~ appointed to any position for which Senate confirmation 
is required. The talking paper reads: 
(3) ~\'hat to do with ~'ragruder 
--Jeb wants to return to ~vnnite House (Dicen-
tenn ial proj ec t) 
--May be vulnerable (Sloan) until Senate 
hearings are co~plete 
-~Jeb personally is prepared to withstand 
confirmation hearings 
(Book III, 574-75) 
In spite of a (voite House policy against e:-nploying any person implicated 
11 
in the '~atergate matter, lialdeman, after the l:leeting with the President, 
offered ~~gruder the highest paying available position which did not 
require Senate confirmation: a $36,000 per year job in the Departsent 
of Commerce. (Book III, 566-73) ?·rClgruder retained that position for a 
month after Dean discussed with the President, on ~~rch 21, 1973 the 
21 
fact that Magruder had committed perjury. (HJCT, 87; Book IV, 1625-26) 
11 The liouse judiciary Corru"Jittee on l\pril 11, 1974 subpoenaed. the tElpe 
recording of this conversation. The President stated that no such re-
corded conversation could be located. 
,{I The transcript of the meeting of ,-\iJril ll. sl1ol,'s that on that date 
the President could not re~ember Magruder's precise position. 
[12058]
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l3. Second Time Period: Statements to Cover TJn thp. CI)'ITer-up. 
Starting in late March, 1973 the President received reports 
from his assistants that the cover-up was threatened from four dif-
ferent sour·ces. First and forer:lOst ,vas Hunt, ,vhose threats were dis-
cussed with the President on l'-larch 21, 1973. Hunt IS i.m..r,lediate demand 
for money could be taken care of and money for the long term could be 
obtained. But there was also Hunt's expectation of clemency which 
the President realized was politically impossible. Second, there was 
McCord1s letter to Ju~ge Sirica and the decision to reconvene the 
Grand Jury. Third, there were the dangers posed by threatened dis-
closures by key subordinates in the Watergate cover-up. The President 
showed concern when Dean and Magruder started to talk to the prose-
cutors in mid-April. Fourth, on April 14, 1973 there was a fear 
discussed by the President, Haldenan and Ehrlichp.lan that EU:1t had 
changed his mind, and that he would talk to the prosecutors about 
the payments and the clemency offers. 
There is clear and convincing evidence that the President took 
over in late March the active management of the cover-up. He not only 
knew of the untruthful testimony of his aides -- knowledge that he did 
not disclose to the investigators -- but he issued direct instructions 
for his agents to give false and 1"is12ading testimony. Tl1e President 
understood that his agents h3d been and continued to coach ,,'itnesses 
1/ 
on how to testify so as to protect the cover-·uPi and the President 
himself began to coach witnesses. 
1/ On April 15, 1973 the l'resident le31'11ed frOTn EhrU.clmdn that }!ardian 
had coached witnesses for their appearances before the Grand Jury. 
[Footnote continued on page 26J 
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1. Magruder 
McCord's accusations suggested that higher CRP officials 
were involved in the break-in. (Book IV, 220-24) The President, 
Haldeman, arid Ehrlichman developed a strategy to have Magruder admit that 
his previous testimony was perjured and that he, in fact, knew that 
the Liddy plan included illegal surveillance. This testimony vJOuld 
implicate Mitchell as well as Magruder but would insulate the other 
aides of the Presicient. It would in effect force Mitchell to come 
forward and adreit responsibility for Watergate. The President and his 
advisors reasoned that Magruder might be willing to make these dis-
closures in exchange for a promise of irnm'lnity from the prosecutors. 
At the March 27, 1973 meeting between the President, Haldeman and 
Ehrlichman the follO\,1ing discussion took place: 
1-] 
P 
E 
P 
E 
Let's go another one. So you persuade 
1'Iagruder that his present approach is (3) 
not true; I think you can probably per-
suade him of that; and (b) not desirable 
to take. So he then says, in despair, 
';Heck, ,]hat do I cio? Here's ;'1cCord out 
here accusing me." }1cCord has flatly 
accused me of perj ury - t:e' s flatly 
accused Dean of complicity.;' Dean is gOLlg 
to go, and ~ragrucier knoh-s of tIle fact that 
Dean wasn't involved, so he knows that 
,.;rben Dean goes clO\m l Dean can tes t ify as 
an honest r'ai1. 
\-.Jell, is there anything h'YOng "'ith that? 
Hell, there's something ,,':cor,g ",iLh --
He was not their attorney, was that the 
problem? 
\\'ell, not the problem -- the probler.\ is he 
asked then to say things that aren't true. 
(The House Juuiciary COi,J.;:littce on ).pril 11, 1974 subpoen3ed the t2.pe re-
cording of this conversi'ition. The Presicient \1,,5 refused to ?rCdClCe this 
recording l but has produced em eciited tr.::lflscri;.)t.) 
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Is Dean going to finger Magruder? 
>" • ,~o, slr. 
There's the other point. 
Dean will not finger Magruder but Dean can't 
either -- likewise he can't defend Magruder. 
Well 
Dean won't consider (unintelligible) Magruder. 
But Hagrucler therr says, "Look, if Dean goes 
dmm to the Grand Jury and clears hi;:-,self, 
with no evidence against him except McCord's 
statement, which won'~ hold up, and it isn't 
true. Now) I go dmm to the Grand Jury, 
because obvio~sly they are going to call 8e 
back, and I go to defend nyself against IkCord' s 
stateme"t which I knoH is true. ;'10,-, I have a 
little tougher problem than Dean has. You're 
saying to me, 'Don't make up a new lie to 
cover the 01::: 1:::..' \vnat \.Jou-±d you recc;:-"-:-. ..::r.':: 
that I do? Stay with the old lie and hope I 
would come out, or clearr myself up and go 
to jail?" 
'~lat Hould you advise him to do? 
I would ac1visfl hila to go cimm and clean it up. 
And say I lied? 
I ,-lOuld advise him to seek immunity m~d do it. 
Do you think he can get inm:uni ty? 
Absolutely. 
Then what would he say? 
He ,-!QuId say, "I thought I \,'as helping. It is 
obvious that there is no profit in this l"Oute. 
I did it or. f:1)' m-.'11 r.:otive. :':obody a s ked r.:e to 
do it. I just did it beca use I thought it \o.'a s 
the best thing to do. everybody stands on it. 
I was "Tong to do it." That's ba sic o. lly it. 
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Magruder's vievrpoint that to be ruined that 
way which isn't really being ruined is in-
finitely preferable to going to jail. 
Going to jail for Jeb will be a very, very, 
very difficult job. 
(unintelligible) .he says he is a very ~nusual 
person. The question now is whether the U.S. 
Attorney ,-7ill grant iinmunity under the cir-
cumstances. 
Well he would if he thought he was going to 
get Mitchell. 
Yeah, that' s right. 
The interesting thing would be to watch 
Mitchell's face at the time I recommend to 
Hagruder that .· he go in and ask for iru::unity 
and confess. 1/ (\.JET 350-52) 
!~ mid-A~Til, 1973 Magruder be?Rn speaking to the prosecutors~ 
(Book IV, 610-11) On March 21, 1973 the President had expressed uncertainty 
about vhether he could count on ~!ag,ruder. (Book IV, 1246) He voiced a 
similar uncertainty on April 14 \-,Then Ebrliclunan described Hagruder as an 
'1:../ 
"emotional fellow" Hho ,.;as ready to break. (\{HT 417) On April 13, 
1973 lialdeman 1 s ;nincitJal assistant, Larry Higby, called Hagruder aLld 
confronted him ,dth reports that J'fagrucier had implicated HalGe~:an and 
the President in the Watergate break-in. (Book IV, 614) Bigby recorded 
1/ The House Judiciary Comn1 ittee on A?ril 11, 1973 subpoen<~2d the tape 
recording of this conversation. The President has refused to produce 
this r.ecording, but has produced an edi led transcript. 
'1:../ The nouse Judiciary COI;lIliittee on April 11, 1973 subpoenaed the tape 
recording of this conversation. The ?resider.t has refused to produce 
this recording, but has produced an edited transcrIpt. 
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the conversation. He told Magruder that it was not in his long or 
short range interest to blame the Hhite House and said that he could 
not believe Hagruder vlOuld do this to Bob, who "has brought you here. II 
(Book IV, 619) During the conversation, Magruder agreed that Strachan 
had not specifica1ly told him that l;alc1.eman Hanted the Liddy Plan 
approved. (Book IV, 625-27) On the ~orning of A?~il 14, 1973 Haldeman 
reported this conversation to the President. Haldeman said that Higby 
had hanuled it skillfully and that the recording made by Higby "beats 
the socks off" :~ragrL;der if he ever "gets off the reservation." (l,v'ET 
415-16) The President instructed Ehrlichman to meet with Magruder. 
Later that day, Haldeman said Magruder should be asked to repeat what 
1/ 
hE: LV).,: ~:':"6'uy and that Ehrlichman shc;..;:!.::: 3ay, "Good ./1- (I·.'lIT ::7) 
2. Strachan 
If Magruder confessed, Strachan's previous untruthful testi-
mony, ,·;hic h insula ted EaldeEldn, \vould be in· jeopardy. At an af ternoon 
meeting between the President and Ual~eman on April 14, 1973 they dis-
cussed what Strachan's strategy before the Grand Jury should be. 
E 
p 
H 
I don't think Hagruder knOI.iS about the 
aftermath. 
h'here does he [NagruderJ get to Gordon 
Strachan? 
He says he gets Gordon on -~ 
1) The house Judiciary COlfc':ittee Oi1 April 11, 1973 subpoenaed the 
tape recording of this conve,-·sation. The President has refused to 
produce this recording, but has produced an edited transcript. 
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Sending material to him --
H~ still implies at least that Gordon know 
about it before you know - he knew everything 
they diq. Larry tells me he did not. 
He will testify that he sent materials to the 
Hhite House? 
If he is asked, he will, yes. 
He'll be asked - is that something he will 
say he sent to the \\!hite House. w'hat \-.'Quld 
Strachan say? 
Strachan has no problem with that. He will 
say that after the fact there are illaterials 
that I can now surmise were what he is re-
ferring to but they were not at the time iden-
tified in any way as being the result of wire-
taps and I did not know they were. They were 
amongst tons of stuff. Jeb makes the point. 
He said, I am sure Gordon never sent them to 
Bob because they were all trash. There was 
nothing in ther.l. lie said the tragedy of this 
whole thing is that it produced nothing. 
\fuo else did he send reports to - Hi!:.chell? 
I don't knO\\T. The thing I got before was 
that he sent theiC1 either to _. that one \\Tent 
to him and one went to Strachan. 
I\'hat our problem there is if they claim that 
the reports ca~e to the \~l1ite House -- basically 
to your office - what will you say then? 
They can. This doesn't ever have to co~e 
out. 1/ 
(~'HT 520-21; see also 1-,1n 537, h~tlT 592) 
On the night of April 14, 1973 the President had a telephone 
conversation \\Tith Ealdeman during ,·"hicb he told Haldeman that J.:brlich::lan 
1/ The House Judiciary Con~ittee on April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the tape 
recording of this conver-sation. The President 113s refused to produce 
this reconiing, but has produced .em edited tl.Jl1sc.ript. 
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1/ 
should speak to Strachan and "put him through a little wringer."-
(vlET 646-47) On the afternoon of April 16, 1973 the President was 
told by Ehrlic~an that Strachan had acted as Dean suggested he would. 
Ehrlichman told the President that the prosecutors I'really \-lorked him 
over" but :rdespite considerable fencing, he refused to discuss the 
2) 
mat ter and was excused by the prosecu tors. II (WHT 933) 
3. Haldeu,an 
On April 25 and 26, 1973, the President and Haldeman jointly 
reviewed, analyzed and discussed the contents of various taped Pres i-
dential conversations in February, March, and April of that year, with 
... -speciflc au:ention focused on the cape or the ~farch 21 morning f:ieecing 
between the President and Dean. (Book IV, 1558, 1567, 1570-71, 1573-74) 
On April 25 and 26) 1973, Haldeman, at the President's request, listened 
to the taped conversation of that meeting and made notes from the tape. 
(Book IV) 1567, 1572) From 4:40 to 5:35 p.m. on April 25, 1973, 
Halde~an met with the President and reported to him on the contents of 
the tape. (Book IV, 1558) The President decided Haldeman should listen 
to the tape again to determine answers to certain questions raised by 
the conversation. (Book IV, 1562) On April 26, 1973 Haldeman listened 
!/ The House Judiciary COTI@ittee on April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the tnpe 
recording of this conversation. The President has refused to produce 
this recording, but has produced an edited transcript. 
2/ The. House Judiciary COmDittee on April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the tape 
recording of this converSi1tion. The President has refused to produce 
this recording, but has produced an edited transcript. 
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to the tapes again and then met with the President for approximately 
1/ 
five hours, commencing at 3:59 p.m. and concluding at 9:03 p.m. 
(Book IV, 1558, 1563) 
Haldeman subsequently testified ext~nsively before the Senate 
, . 
Select CO!l:mittee of the substance of the President's morning meeting 
with Dean. (Book IX, 436-37, 439-42) The President later said that 
Haldeman's testimony was correct. (Presidential Statements, HJC CO:lpi-
lation, 8/22/73, 49) The Watergate Grand Jury has indicted Halde~an 
on two counts of perjury for his testimony about the substance of the 
meeting of March 21, 1973 specifically citing the following statement: 
(a) That the President Sa.i0, "[T]here is no problem 
in r a'ising a milL_vlL C:vl:uL:;. I';E; can do that, 
bu tit would be v!rong. Ii 
(Criminal Cases, HJC Compilation, 105) 
(b) That "There was a reference to his [Dean t s] 
feeling that ~lagruder had knm.nl about the I~ater­
gate planning and break-in ahead of it, in other 
words, that he ~vas aware of \.vhat had g,one on at 
Hatergate. I don 1 t believe that there \.Jas any 
reference to Ha-sruder cOl'mitting perjury." 
(Criminal Cases, HJC Compilation, 108) 
4. Ehrlichman 
On April 17, 1973 the President met with haldeman and 
Ehrlichman and forner Secretary of State Rogers. (Book IV, 1423) 
After a brief discussion of Halder,lan t sand Ehrlichman I s future, t11e 
President evinced concern for his former personal attorney. Herbert 
Kalmbach, stat inb that it was "terribly ililpor tan t tha t poor KalL"lbach 
1/ J-~he ~-~.J1Jse .Jul.lic.i<-~l-y COl'.::1,:i::t2t::: .st.~b?Oe":.l':'1 __ :-_-. the t2.~\e r:-ccor\.ij,~~.~-::~:; of Ll~e,sQ 
conversations on ,\pril 25 ,'L" ,\pril. 2(~ 1973 bL-'n';een tho F'Cl2si:l'::>,lt and 
r.(·~l(~ei\:a.r:_) b:lt th;~ 2resi(l0.:-: 11.:.-:.':; r::~=use~: to ~"LO,·>jCc. !:.~12 ta.'J0.S. 
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get through this thing. H (vJHT 1201) The discussion then focused on 
Kalmbach's major area of vulnerability -- his possible kno,vledge of 
how the money he raised was to - be used. The President asked if Dean 
had called Kalmbach about fundraising. Haldeman replied that Dean had. 
Ehrlichman said that Dean had told him that Dean told Kalmbach what 
the money VIas to be used for. The President suggested that Ehrlich.!Tlan 
testify otherwise: 
p 
H 
p 
H 
P 
E 
P 
E 
p 
E 
p 
... Incidentally, it is terribly important 
that poor Kalmbach get through this thing. 
I think he is alright. 
How could he learn? Did you talk to him 
there? Did Dean call hir'l about the money? 
Yes, Sir. 
Does he say what said? 
Dean told me that he told him what it was 
for. I don't believe him. Herb said that 
he just followed instructions, that he just 
went ahead and did it and sent the money 
back and "--
They said they need it for? 
I don't even kno,v if they told him ,d,at for. 
It was an emergency and they needed this money 
and I don't knmv Hhether he can get a\-Jay ,-, ith 
that or if it's more specific than that. 
You can corroborate then Eerb on that one 
I can if Dean is the accuser. I can. 
If Dean is tile accuser, YOll can say that he 
told you on such and such a date that he did 
not tell Eerb Kalmbach ,\'hat the GlOney vas for. 
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That he has told me -- that he has told 
me --
That's right - that's right 
(HET 
1/ 
1201-02) 
On April 14, 1973 Ehrlichman reported to the President on a 
conversation \.Jith Hagruder during which Nagruder had described \·,hat he 
,{I 
was telling the prosecutors. (HET 582-87) At this time, the Presi-
dent was concerned that Colson would be called before the Grand Jury. 
(\<'THT 602) He also expressed interest in Colson's avoiding the COD--
}j 
mission of perjury. (rn~T 641) One way that this could have been 
done was to iastruct Colson to tell all '--Ut knew and to testify truth-
fully. But rather than instruct Colson to testify truthfully, the Pres i-
dent instructed Ehrlichman to \-larn Colson about what Hagruder h.s.d told 
the prosecutors. 
P 
E 
We'll see. We'll see. Do your other business, 
etc. John, too, I wonder if we shouldn't re-
consider, if you shouldn't, I mean you have 
to consider this - rather than having Colson 
go in there completely blind, give hi~ at 
least a touch up - or do you think that is 
too dangerous. 
Say that again - I didn't quite hear it. 
11 The House Judiciary Co~nittee on April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the tape 
recording of this conversation. The President has refused to produce 
this recording, but has produced an edited transcript. 
21 The House Judiciary Cor.'.nittee on April 11) 1974 subpoen2.ec: the tape 
recording of this conversation. The President has refused to produce 
this recording, but has produced an edited transcript. 
31 The Rouse Judiciary Committee on April 11, 1974 sub0oenae~ the tape 
recording of this conversation. The President has ref\:s~ci to produce 
this recorciing, but has [)roducecl .::;n edited tumscript. 
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Colson - rather than just saying nothing to 
him, if it isn't just as well to say - look 
you should know that Magruder is going to 
testify, etc., or is that dangerous according 
to Kleindienst? 
I'm not so sure. I have to call him anyway 
tomorrow. He has an urgent call in for me. 
Ah, I don't think I want to say anything at 
all to him about John. John, incidentally, 
I understand, was on CBS News and just hard-
lined them. 
Oh, I agree on John. 
Yeah 
On Magruder that is what I meant. 
Well, I can say something very brief. I don't 
need to indicate that he said anything to me. 
Yeah, that you uncierstanci ~hat he has talke~. 
I me2n, not to the Grand Jury but to 
Yeah, I think I could safely go that far. 
And say that he should know that before he 
goes, and be prepared. 
Friday I will call him in the morning. 
Let me put it this way: I do think we owe 
it to Chuck to at least 
Sure 
So that he doesn't, I mean, go in there and 
well frankly on a perjury rap --
I understand. I don't think he is in any 
danger on that but 
Why wouldn't he be in any danger, because he's 
got his s tory 2nd knO\,'s pret ty \"ell \,';-13 t he 
is going to say? 
[12069]
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Yeah, I think he is pretty pat, but I will 
_ talk to him in the Qorning and give him a 
cautionary note anY',my. (HHT 650-51) ---.l../ 
]) The r:ouse Judiciary COl~c!ittee on April 11, 197~ S~:b~'0e,.ci2C: the tape 
recording of tilis conversation. The President has refused to produce this 
recording, but has produced an edited trAnscript. 
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THE PRESIDENT'S CONTACTS \-lITH THE DEPARTMENT 
OF JUSTICE: HARCH 21 - APRIL 30 , 1973 
During the meeting '"ith Haldeman and Dean on the morning 
of March 21, 1973, the President decided that a ne,,, plan had to be 
developed, and asked Haldeman to get Mitchell down and meet \vith 
Ehrlichman and Dean to discuss a plan. (HJCT 129-30) The President 
said to Dean: 
PRESIDEXT. All right. -Fine. And, nIl, my point is that, nh, wc 
can. ull. YOU may well come-l think it is good, 
fral,kly; t'~ consider these vari01ls options. And then, 
once yon, oncc 1'011 decide on the plan-John-and 
you had the right plan, let me say. I have no (10ubts 1) 
about the right plan before the.cledi.on. ~\nd'y01l han-
dled it j1lst right. You contalJ1cd It. ?-:ow after the 
elcction wc\'c got to ha ve another plan, b~cau?e we 
can't have for four ycars, we can't have th1.3 thmg-
you'rc gOi;l~ to be eaten away. \\TC can't do it. 
(HJCT 129-30) 
On the night of March 21, 1973 the President dictated his 
recollection of the events of the day. The President said that Dean felt 
he \Vas criminally liable for his action in "taking care of the defen-
dants;" that Magruder would bring Haldeman down if he felt he himself 
was to go down; that if Hunt wasn't paid he \-lOuld say things "that 
~ould be very detrimental to Colson and Ehrlichman;" that Mitchell had 
been present Hhen Liddy presented his political intelligence proposal; 
that Colson, '"ith Hunt and Liddy in his office, had called up Magruder 
and told him to "get off his ass and start doing something about, uh, 
setting up some kind of operation;" that Colson "pushed so hard that, 
uh, Liddy et al, following their natural inclinations, uh, went, uh, 
the extra step '"hich got them j.nto serious trouble;" that Ehrlichman 
sent "Hunt and his crew" out to check into Ellsberg's psychiatric 
problem; that Krogh vas in "a straight position of perjury;" that 
l/ The words "and you hud the right plan, let me say, I have no 
doubts .. . " in the HJC Transcript are "you say,'No doubts •. 
in Lhe. _~!hi te House Tr<1nscript. (HIlT 248) 
---_.---_. ". -"---. - - -. 
, " 
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Strachan "has been a real, uh, courageous fellow through all this" 
and that Strachan "certainly had knowledge of the informa-- of the 
matter." 
The President noted that there would be a meeting with 
Mitchell in the morning, and that he hoped out of it all would come 
"some sort of course of action we can follow." The President said 
it was too dangerous to "hunker do,,'Tl" wi thou t making any kind 0 f a 
statement. (Book III, 1245-49) 
The following day Mitchell came to Washington. The President, 
Mitchell, Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean met and discussed the various 
problems with regard to the complicity of White House and CRP officials 
in the Watergate and cover-up, including Mitchell. The President told 
Mitchell : 
PRF.SIDEXT. 
]\f ITGH ELL. 
PHF.SmEXT. 
l\f ITCm·:LL. 
ThC'1l he can go ovcr tlIrt'e us SOOll runint elligibleJ 
th is. But, ull. t 11(', nil. titc OIlC t 11 illg I don 't wa nt to do 
is to- N"ow ll't Illt' 111 a 1,(· this elt'lll' . 1, 1. I thonght 
it was, \lh, V('I'\', llh, "ct'v crllel thing as it turned 
out-although ;It, the time I kid to te'}} [unintelligi-
bleJ-\l'hat Itlll)IH'nrd to .\ct;W1S. I don:t. want it to 
happrll with \\':ltC'J'gnh'-tlH' ,Yatergate mutter. I 
t.hink hr, mad0 n, made :t l1listakr, but he shouldn't, 
have brC'll saC'bod, he shouldn't have been-And. lIh. 
fol' that. rcasoll, I am prl'frctly willjng to- I don't 
giv<> a shit ",kIt, l!,lppell s, 1 ,\'ant, yon all to stonewall 
it, let t.hl'l11 pll'ad t11r Fifth .\mcllQm enL covcr-up or 
anythill~' ebl', i r it ' ll S;l\O it-s<tYe thr plan , That's the 
whol(l point. 011 i Ill' othpl' hand. nit, llll. I '\onld pre-
fcl', as I said to "011. that \'()\l do it thr other way. And 
I \\'ould pa rtjn;Llrh prri'rl ' to do it that other "wav if 
it's goiJlg to COlllt' oilt that \\' (tv all}'\\'ll.Y. And that"IllV 
vi('\\' ~ th a t. nh, \\'jtll tllr 1I11nlOCl" of 'jaC'];-ass propf{' 
t,hat tllt,y ' \"(,- got that. th('y ('nil call, thry '\,c going to--
Th(' story thc) gd , out throngh l('aks. rharges, and so 
forth. alld illlll11'lIdos. will h(' lL h('ll of a lot. worsc, thall 
the story thcy'l'(, goillp,' to g<>t out by just letting it out 
thcr('. 
"'\\'('11-
T <}OI1't blO\\'. Bllt thnf>: . 11h, Y011 know , 111' to this 
POl11t, th(' whole th('ol'Y !Ins bern containment, as yon 
know, John. 
Yeah. 
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And now, now we're shifting. As far as I'm con-· 
CCI'l1C'(l, netHally from H. ()('rsonnl stnndroint. jf you 
werC'n't. making n, personal sacrifice-it's unfnir-
Halc1(>lllnll nnd DC'nn. 'flint's whnt Eisenhower-
thut.'s a 11 he ca 1'('(1 about. He only cared abont-
Chl'lst, "Be Slll'P hC' ,,"as clean." Doth in the fund 
thing and the :\clnllls thillg. Dut I don't look at it that 
way. A11(~ I jllst:-Th~fs the thing I nm really con-
cel'llC'd WIth. ,Ve rc·golllg to protect our people, if we 
can. 1:./ 
(HJCT 183) 
During the course of that meeting the President telephoned 
Attorney General Kleindienst. (HJCT, 152-54) He called, not to 
disclose the information he had received as to the complicity of his 
associates in the Watergate and its cover-up, but to implement a 
decision to get Kleindienst working for the President's position with 
y 
the SSC through Senator Baker. He asked Kleindienst to be "our 
Baker handho1der," to IIbabysit him, starting in like, like in about 
ten minutes." (HJCT 154) 
On March 23, 1973 the President telephoned Acting FBI 
Director Gray (Book IV 242) and told him that he knew the beating Gray 
was taking during his confirmation hearings and he believed it to be 
unfair. He reminded Gray that he had told him to conduct a "thorough 
and aggressive investigation." He did not tell Gray of the information 
he had received from Dean on March 21, 1973. (Book III, 245) 
On March 26, 1973 the Watergate Grand Jury was reconvened; 
the seven original Watergate defendants were scheduled to be recalled 
to testify under grants of immunity. (Book IV, 336) 
11 This does not appear in the White House Transcript. 
~I The President also spoke to Kleindienst on March 23 and March 25, 
1973. There is no evidence that the President made disclosure to the 
Attorney General during the course of those conversations. 
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II 
On March 27,1973 the day after the Grand Jury was re-
convened, the President met with Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Ziegler 
for two hours. The President directed Ehrlichman to tell Kleindienst 
that no White House personnel had prior knowledge of the break-in and 
that Mitchell wanted Kleindienst to report information from the Grand 
Jury to the \Vhf te House. .. 
E 
P 
E 
P 
H 
P 
11 
P 
I will see Kleindienst. That's settled --
YOU'll see Kleindienst? When? 
This afternoon at three o'clock. 
Three o'clock, and then I think, when --
huh? . 
Should I also see Kleindienst? Should I, 
or should John be the only one? 
John, you do it. 
That's what Mitchell was asking. Mitchell 
is very distressed that Kleindienst isn't 
stepping up to his job as the contact 
with the Committee, getting Baker programmed 
and all tha t (A), and (B) that he isn ' .t 
getting -- see Dean got turned off by the 
Grand Jury. Dean is not getting the informa-
tion from Silbert on those things said at the 
Grand Jury. And Mitchell finds that abso-
lutely incompetent and says it is Kleindienst's 
responsibility. He is supposed to be sending 
us --
Ask Kleindienst, John, put it on the basis 
that you're not asking nor in effect is the 
~fuite House asking; that John Mitchell says 
you've got to have this information from the 
Grand Jury at this time and you owe it to 
him. Put it right on that basis, now, so 
that everybody can't then say the ~mite House 
raised hell about this, becaus e we are not 
raising hell. Kleindienst shouldn't 
where are you going to see him 
~I The House Judiciary Conmlittee on April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the 
tape recording of this conversation. The President has refused to 
produce this recording, but produced an edited transcript. 
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there or here? 
In my office 
Have a session with him about how much you 
want to tell him about everything. 
Ah --
I think you've got to say, "Look, Dick, let 
me tell you, Dean was not involved -- had no 
prior knowledge -- Haldeman had no prior 
knowledge; you Ehrlichman, had none; and Colson 
had none. Now unless -- all the papers writing 
about the President's men and if you have any 
information to the contrary you want to know. 
You've got to know it but you've go to say 
too that there is serious question here being 
raised about Mitchell. Right? That's about 
it isn't it? (WHT 366-67) 
Later in the meeting, the President said that Kleindienst 
was worried about furnishing "Grand Jury things" to the White House. 
(WHT 370-.71) The President suggested as an additional justification 
for such a request that Ehrlichman tell Kleindienst that Ehrlichman 
must receive Grand Jury information because the President wanted to 
know, in order to determine whether any W1ite House people were 
involved: 
"Not to protect anybody, but to find out what the hell 
they are saying." (HHT 371) The President then suggested that 
Ehrlichman request a daily flow of information: "Hhat have you 
today? Get every day so that we can move one step ahead here. He 
want to move." (WHT 371) 
On the next day, Ehr1ichman telephoned Kleindienst and 
executed the President's instructions. He relayed the President's 
assurance that there was no White House involvement in the break-in, 
but said that serious questions were being raised with regard to 
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Mitchell. (Book IV, 413-15) Ehrlichman then told Kleindienst that 
the President wanted any evidence or inference from evidence about 
Mitchell's involvement passed on. (Book IV, 414) When Ehrlichman 
relayed to Kleindienst what he termed the IIbest information that the 
President had, and has •.• " (Book IV, 413). he "did not disclose 
any of the information the President had received on March 21 from 
Dean, nor was he instructed by the President to do so. (WHT 366-67) 
II. 
1/ 
In the late afternoon on April 14 .. 1973 Ehrlichman reported 
to the President on the substance of Magruder's interview that day 
with the prosecutors. (\mT" 582-628) That evening, the President 
told Haldeman by telephon~/ that prior to Strachan's appearance 
before the Grand Jury, Strachan should be informed of Magruder's 
revelations; the President also asked if Strachan were smart enough 
so as to testify" in a way that did not indicate that he knew ,vhat 
Magruder had said. (WHT 646-47) After his conversation 'vi th 
3/ 
Haldeman, the President called Ehrlichman - (Book IV, 854) and 
1 / The House Judiciary Committee on Apri'l 11, 1974 subpoenaed the 
tape recording of this conversation. The President has refused to 
produce this recording, but produced an edited transcript. 
2 / Ibid. 
3 / Ibid. 
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suggested that before Colson spoke with the prosecutors, Colson should 
at least be aware that the prosecutors had already intervie\ved 
Magruder so that he could avoid making statements that might result 
in perjury charges. (mlT 650-51) 
At the time of this telephone conversation on April 14, 
1973, the President, aware of the fact that Dean, like Magruder, was 
talking \vith the prosecutors OlliT 401) told Ehrlichman to attempt to , 
persuade Dean to continue to play an active role in the formulation 
of White House strategy Tegarding Watergate. The President directed 
Ehrlichman to approach Dean in the following manner: 
Well, you start with the proposition, Dean, the 
President thinks you have carried a tremendous load, 
and his affection and loyalty to you is just undim-
inished. . And now, let's see where the hell 
we go .... We can't get the President involved in 
this. His people, that is one thing. We don't \Van t 
to cover-up, but there are 'vays. And then he I s got to 
say, for example? You start \Vith him certainly on 
the business of obstruction of justice. Look, 
John - we need a plan here. And so that LaRue, Mardian, 
and the others -- I mean, (WI1T, 667) 
Ehrlichman said that he \Vas not sure that he could go that far \Vith 
Dean, but the President responded, "No. He can make the plan up." 
Ehrlichman indicated that he \Vould "sound it out." (WHT 667) On the 
1/ 
follo\Ving afternoon, \Vhen Kleindienst reported to the President on 
the disclosures made by Dean and Magruder to the prosecutors, the 
President told Kleindienst that he had previously taken Dean off the 
matter. (Hl-n 698) 
l/ The President has stated that the tape on the recorder in his EOB 
office ran out during this meeting. He has produced an edited trans-
cript of a portion of that conversation. (Presidential Statements, 
HJC Compilation, 11/12/73, 60) 
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III. 
A. 
On April 15, 1973, the President met with Attorney General 
Kleindienst in the President's EOB office from 1:12 to 2:22 p.m. 
(Book IV, 931) Kleindienst reported to the President on the evidence 
then in the possession of the prosecutors against Mitchell, Dean, 
Haldeman, Ehr1ichman, Magruder, Colson and others. (WHT 696-746) 
Kleindienst has testified that the President appeared dumbfounded 
and upset when he \"as told about the Watergate involvement of 
Administration officials. (Book IV, 926) The President did not tell 
Kleindienst that he had previously been given this information by 
John Dean. (Book IV, 928) 
The President asked about the evidence against Haldeman 
and Ehr1ichman and made notes on Kleindienst's reply. (WET 720-23; 
Book IV, 929) The President's notes on Kleindienst's reply include 
the folloving: 
E - (Conditional Statements) 
Dean -
Deep Six documents 
Get Hunt out of country 
Haldeman 
Strachan -
\"il1 give testimony - H. had 
papers indicating Liddy was in 
eavesdropping. 
($350,000 - to LaRue.) 
'* 
'I< 
(tfhat \"ill LaRue say he 
got the 350 for? 
Gray - documents 
(Book IV, 929) 
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There was also a discussion of payments to the defendants and what 
motive had to be proved to establish criminal liability. (HHT 704-08) 
On April 15, 1973 Petersen and Kleindienst met with the 
President in the President's EOB office from 4:00 to 5:15 p.m. (Book 
1/ 
IV, 976)- Petersen has testified that he reported on the information 
the prosecutors had received from Dean and Magruder and that his 
report included the following items (Book IV, 979-80): that Mitchell 
had approved the $300,000 budget for the Liddy "Gemstone" operation; 
that budget information for "Gemstone" and summaries of intercepted 
conversations were given to Strachan and that information given to 
Strachan was for delivery to Haldeman (Book IV, 993); that if the 
prosecutors could develop Strachan as a witness, "school was going 
to be out as far as Haldeman was concerned" (Book IV, 982); that 
Ehrlichman, through Dean, had told Liddy that Hunt should leave the 
country; and that Ehrlichman had told Dean to "deep six" certain 
information recovered by Dean from Hunt's office. (Book IV, 992) 
Petersen has testified that at this meet~ng the President I 
did not disclose to him any of the factual information that Dea~ had I 
discussed with the President on March 21. 1973. (Petersen testlIDony, 
7/12/74. T 3887, 4805) 
B. 
After receiving this information on April 15, 1973 the President 
2/ 
met twice with Haldeman and Ehrlichman in his EOB office that evening. 
!I The House Judiciary Committee on 4/11/74 subpoenaed the tape recording 
of this conversation. The President has stated that the conversation was 
not recorded. 
2/ The House Judiciary Committee on April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the tape 
recording of these conversat'ions. The President has stated that these 
conversations were not recorded. 
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(Book IV, 1062) At the later meeting, the President discussed with 
his closest associates at least one piece of information he had 
received from the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General 
Petersen that afternoon. Ehrlichman testified that during their 
meeting the President requested that he telephone Patrick Gray and 
discuss with him the issue of documents taken from Hunt's White House 
safe and given by Dean to Gray in Ehrlichman's presence in June 1972. 
During the course of this meeting, Ehrlichman did so. (Book IV, 1063-
M, 1078) 
IV. 
A. 
On April 16, 1973 from 1:39 to 3:25 p.m. the President met 
1:./ 
with Henry Petersen. (Book IV, 1230) At this meeting, the President 
primised to treat as confidential any information disclosed by Petersen 
to the President.· The President emphasized to Petersen that " ••• 
you're talking only to me ... and there's not going to be anybody 
else on the \fuite House staff. In other words, I am ac ting counsel 
and everything else." The President suggested that the only exception. 
might be Dick Moore. (HHT 847) When Petersen expressed some reservation 
about information being disclosed to Moore, (~~T 847-48) the President 
said, " ... let's just ..• better keep it with me then."· (HBT 849) 
1/ 
The House Judiciary Committee on April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the 
tape recording of this conversation. The President has refused to 
produce this recording, but produced an edited transcript. 
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At the meeting Petersen supplied the President with a 
memorandum which he had requested on April 15, 1973, surrunarizing 
the existing evidence that implicated Haldeman, Ehrlichman and 
Strachan. The memorandum included the following: 
Ehrlichman 
(1) Ehrlichman in the period following the 
break-in told Dean to !!deep-six" certain 
information recovered by Dean from Hunt's 
office. 
- (2) Ehrlichman through Dean informed Liddy that 
Hunt should leave the country, and this was 
corroborated by Hunt. 
(3) Dean had indicated that he had given certain 
non-Watergate information from Hunt's office 
to Gray personally. 
Haldeman 
(4) Hagruder had said that "Gemstone!! budget infor-
mation had been given to Strachan for delivery 
to Haldeman. 
(5) Dean informed Haldeman of the Liddy Plan, but 
no instructions were issued that this surveillance 
program was to be discontinued. 
(6) Magruder said he caused to be delivered to 
Strachan, for delivery to Haldeman, a surrunary of 
the intercepted conversations. 
Strachan 
(7) Strachan had been questioned about the allega-
tions concerning Haldeman and had refused to 
discuss the matter. (Book IV, 1225-26) 
[12081]
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The White House edited transcript shows that, in the same 
. conversation, Petersen informed the President about the Grand Jury 
not believing Magruder's testimony in the summer of 1972 (villT 869-70); 
Gray's denial of receiving documents from Hunt's safe; the implication 
of Ehrlichman by his "deep- six" statement, (WHT 862); Strachan's pre-
appearance interview (WHT 866) and the nature of his prior Grand Jury 
testimony (WdT 867); and Ehrlichman's request to the CIA for assistance 
to Hunt. (WHT 883-84) 
At this meeting, the President provided Petersen with 
information respecting Watergate. Early in the meeting~ the President 
described to Petersen what actions he had taken almost a month earlier 
on the Watergate matter. In so reporting the President gave Petersen 
the following characterization of the report he had assigned Dean to 
write in the days after March 21, 1973: 
-- a month ago I got Dean in and said (inaudible) 
a report (inaudible) Camp David and write a report. 
The report was not frankly accurate. Well it was 
accurate but it was not full. And he tells me the 
reason it Hasn't full, was that he didn't know. 
Whether that is true or not I don't know. Although 
it wasn't I'm told. But I am satisfied with it and I 
think I've read enough in the (inaudible) (inaudible) 
papers up here. So then I put Ehrlichman to work on 
it. ,,(WHT 860) 
The House Judiciary Committee transcripts of the White House meetings 
on March 20, 21 and 22, 1973 show that Dean was assigned to draft a 
partial report as a part of the White House strategy to limit the 
investigations. (WHT 168; HJCT 132, 136, 157-59) The President did 
not tell Petersen that one reason Dean did not complete a full report 
was that his assignment was to write a partial report -- one that would 
minimize the involvement of'\\~ite House personnel in the Watergate 
matter. (HJCT 172) 
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Second, later in the April 16, 1973 meeting the President 
and Petersen discussed the possibility that if Strachan's and Dean's 
testimony established that Haldeman \-]as informed of the Liddy Plan 
after the second planning meeting, Haldeman might be considered res-
ponsible for the break-in for his alleged failure to issue an order 
to stop the surveillance operation. (~mT 920-21) When Petersen 
told the President that the question of Haldeman's liability depended 
on who had authority to act with respect to budget proposals for the 
Liddy Plan, (HHT 921) the President said: 
P Haldeman (inaudible) 
HP He did not have any authority? 
P No sir . none, none -- all Mitchell 
campaign funds. He had no authority 
whatever. I wouldn't let him (inaudible). 
(HHT 922) 
The White House Political Matters Nemoranda establishes that Haldeman 
did possess and exercise authority over the use of campaign funds. 
(Political Matters Memoranda, 10/7/71, 18; 2/1/72, 69-70; 2/16/72, 75-76; 
5/16/72, 87-88; 9/18/72, 129, 691) 
The President ended the meeting by asking that Petersen keep 
him fully informed. (WHT 927) 
B. 
At the opening of a meeting with Ehrlichman and Ziegler 
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11 
which began two minutes after Petersen's departure,- (Book IV, 1254) 
the President informed Ehr1ichman that Petersen had told him that 
Gray had denied ever personally receiving documents from Hunt's safe. 
The President and Ehr1ichman then discussed Ehr1ichman's recollections 
of the facts related to this incident. (vlliT 929-30) He also told 
Ehr1ichman that he had discussed with Petersen the June 19, 1972 
incidents in which Ehr1ichman was alleged to have issued instructions 
to Hunt to leave the country and.to Dean to "deep-six" certain materials. 
(WHT 935) 
The President next reported to Ehr1ichman that Petersen had 
told him that Magruder had not yet gotten a deal; and that Dean and 
his lawyers \\Tere threatening to try the Administration and the 
President if Dean did not get immunity. (WilT 938) Finally, the 
President relayed to Ehr1ichman Petersen's views about Haldeman's 
vulnerability with respect to criminal liability. n-mT 938-41) 
On the following day, Ehr1ichman took steps to gather infor-
mation about the events the President had informed him Dean had been 
discussing with the prosecutors. He telephoned Ken Clawson and ques-
tioned him about the events of the meeting on June 19, 1972 (Book IV, 
1321-22); Clawson responded that "If you want me to be forthwith and 
straightforward with you, I'll recollect anything that you want". 
11 The House Judiciary Committee on April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the 
tape recording of this conversation. The President has refused to 
produce this recording but has produced an edited transcript. 
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Ehrlichman then recited Dean's allegations. (Book IV, 1322) Clawson 
told Ehrlichman that he did not recall the deep-six instruction or 
the instruction for Hunt to leave the country. (Book IV, 1322-23) 
Also on April 17, 1973, Ehrlichman telephoned Colson. He 
relayed to him the information that Dean had not been given immunity 
(Book IV, 1326); that the "grapevine" had it that Colson would be 
summoned to the Grand Jury that day and he would be asked about the 
meeting of June 19, 1972. Ehrlichrnan then gave Colson Dean's version 
of the events of that day. Colson said that he would deny Dean's 
allegation. (Book IV, 1327-29) As the call ended, Colson told 
Ehrlichrnan that, "There are a couple of things that you and I need 
to do to protect each other's flank here. . . . But -- Listen, we'll 
talk about that." Ehrlichman responded, "fair enough." (Book IV, 
1329-30) 
V. 
A. 
On April 16, 1973 from 8:58 to 9:14 a.m. the President spoke 
1/ 
by telephone with Petersen.- (Book IV, 1306) He asked Petersen if 
there were any developments he "should know about," and he reassured 
Petersen that ". . . of course, as you knmv, anything you tell me, as 
I think I told you earlier, will not be passed on ... [b]ecause I 
]J The House Judiciary Committee on April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the 
tape recording of this conversation. The President has refused to 
produce this recording, but has produced an edited transcript. 
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know the rules of the Grand Jury." (WHT 966) Petersen then recounted 
to the President the developments of that day in the Watergate investi-
gation. 
Petersen disclosed to the President that Fred LaRue had con-
fessed to participating in the crime of obstruction of justice; that 
he had attended a third planning meeting regarding the Liddy Plan with 
Mitchell (~mT 967); and that LaRue had told Mitchell it was allover. 
(WHT 968) Petersen also described LaRue as "rather pitiful." (WHT 
966) 
Petersen then reported additional details regarding Ehrlichman's 
involvement: that Liddy had confessed to Dean on June 19, 1972 and 
that Dean had then reported to Ehrlichman (Y~iT 968); and that Colson 
and Dean ,.Jere together with Ehrlichman when Ehrlichman advised Hunt 
to get out of town. (WHT 969) 
With respect to payments to the ~vatergate defendants, 
Petersen reported that he had been informed that Mitchell had requested 
that Dean approach Kalmbach to raise funds, and Dean had contacted 
Haldeman and Haldeman had authorized the use of Kalmbach. (HHT 969, 
975-76) Petersen told the President that Kalmbach would be called 
before the Grand Jury regarding the details of the fund-raising opera-
tion. (HHT 969) They also discussed the prosecutors' interest in 
the details of the transfer from Haldeman to LaRue of the $350,000 
Hhite House fund that was to be used for payments to the defendants. 
(HHT 976) 
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On the following morning, April 17, 1973, the President 
1/ 
met with Haldeman.- (Book IV, 1312) Early in the meeting, the 
President relayed Dean's disclosures to the prosecutor regarding his 
meeting with Liddy on June 19, 1972 .. (WHT 982) The President also 
told Haldeman that the money issue was critical: "Another thing, if 
you could get John and yourself to sit down and do some hard thinking 
about what kind of strategy you are going to have with the money. 
You know what I mean. 1I This comment is followed by a deletion of 
"material unrelated to President's action." (WHT 983) Follo\ving the 
deletion, the transcript shmvs that the President instruc.ted Haldeman 
to call Kalmbach to attempt to learn what Dean and Kalmbach were going 
to say Dean had told Kalmbach regarding the purposes 6f the fund-
raising. In addition, the President instructed Haldeman: 
Well, be sure that Kalmbach is at least aware of 
this, that LaRue has talked very freely. He is a 
broken man. (WHT 983) 
2/ 
At 12:35 p.m. on April 17, 1973,- the President met ~dth 
Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Ziegler. (Book IV, 1347) At this meeting, 
he again relayed information relating to the Watergate investigation 
which he had received previously in confidence from Petersen. The 
President and Haldeman discussed that Petersen's opinion, expressed to 
1/ The House Judiciary Committee on April 11, 1974 subpoenaed tQe tape 
recording of this conversation. The President has refused to produce 
this recording, but has produced an edited transcript. 
2/ 
Ibid. 
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the President, that while the prosecutors had a case on Ehrlichman, 
the Grand Jury testimony of Strachan and Kalmbach would be crucial 
to the determination of Haldeman's criminal liability. The President 
then returned to the issue of the purposes for which the funds were 
paid to the defendants -- the issue which Petersen had informed him 
was then being explored by the Grand Jury. The President encouraged 
Haldeman and Ehr1ichman to deal with the problem: "Have you given 
any thought to what the line ought to be -- I don't mean a lie 
but a line, on raising the money for these defendants?" (WHT 994) 
Later in the meeting, the President discussed with Haldeman 
and Ehrlichman the man Petersen had identified as critical to the 
issue of Haldeman's liability, Gordon Strachan. The President said, 
"Strachan has got to be worked out," (lmT 1011-12) and then proceeded 
to a discussion with Haldeman of the facts to which Strachan could 
testify. At this point, the President told Haldeman that Petersen 
believed that Strachan had received material clearly identifiable 
as telephone tap information. (WHT 1012) After a brief discussion 
of the issue, the President closed this discussion by saying, ". 
I want you to know what he's [Petersen] told me." (HHT 1013) 
VI. 
A. 
On April 17, 1973, the President met with Petersen from 
[12088]
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1/ 
2:46 to 3:49 p.m.- (Book IV, 1397) The President opened the meeting 
by asking if there were anything new that he needed to know; he also cau-
tioned Petersen that he did not want to be told anything out of the 
Grand Jury, unless Petersen thought the President needed to know it. 
(WHT 1060) 
Later in the meeting, they discussed the status of HaldeQan 
and Ehrlichman when Nagruder vJaS indic ted. 
liP 
P 
HP 
P 
HP 
P 
HP 
P 
HP 
P 
liP 
Let me ask you this, Mr. President, 
what would you do if we filed indictment 
.against Magruder, hypothetically, and 
Yeah - Magruder or Dean? 
Magruder 
Magruder - oh you have indicte? him. 
To which he is going to plead, and we named 
as unindicted co-conspirators everybody but 
Haldeman and Ehrlichman - never mind that the 
variation improves between them for the moment -
That you would name Colson for example? 
Well I don't knmv about Colson - Colson is again 
peripheral, but Mitchell, LaRue, Hardian -
what-have-you . . • 
Colson was a big fish in my opinion. 
Yeah, and a 
Would you name Dean for example? 
Oh yes. 
~/ The House Judiciary Cor:unittee on April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the tape 
recorciI'g of this conversation. The President has refused to pro(~uce 
this recording~ but has produce~ 3n edited transcript. 
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Oh yes he was -
And we name all of those people. We 
leave out Haldeman and Ehrliclunan. Now 
one of the things we had thought about -
I get your point 
leaving them out was to give you time and 
room to maneuver with respect to the two of 
them. 
Let me ask you - can I ask you - talking in 
the President's office 
Yes sir. 
[Sets up appointment - had to take time out 
to sign some papers] 
You see we've got to run the government too 
(inaudible) . 
You mean if Haldeman and Ehrlichroan leave you 
will not indict them? 
No sir, I didn't say that. 
That would be a strange (inaudible). 
No - it was not a question of that - it was a 
question of '-Ihe ther or not they were publicly 
identified in that pleading at that time. 
Yeah. 
And, well, for example, as a scenario - that 
comes out and you say -
(inaudible) 
this is a shocking relevation -
Yeah. 
as a consequence of that I have consulted and 
I have just decided to clear out everybor:;y here 
who might have had -- and as a consequence Mr. 
Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman are going. Thereafter, 
've would proceed with the evidence wherever 
it took us. That is what we were thinking 
about to be perfectly honest with you. 
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Well you really ought to include them 
(inaudible) if you include the others. 
Well 
Oh, you don't want" names in the indictment of 
Magruder. 
That's right - unless we were able to go forward. 
Well, I don't want to belabor the point - I 
have made it clear that my view that I think they 
have made you very very vulnerable. I think they 
have made you wittingly or unwittingly very very 
vulnerable to rather severe criticism because of 
their actions. At least in public forums they 
eroded confidence in the office of the Presidency 
by their actions. Well you know it, I don't have 
to belabor it here 
(.lo'HT 1087-891 
Petersen also reported that LaRue had broken down and cried like a baby 
when it came to testifying about John Mitchell (WHT 1095); that in all 
probability there was not enough evidence to implicate Strachan as a 
principal, that at this point he was a fringe character (ImT 1091-92); 
that the case against Ehrlichman and Colson was more tangetial than 
that against Haldeman (\mT 1081); that Hunt had testified in the Grand 
Jury that Liddy had told him that "his principals" (who remained un-
identified) had said Hunt should leave the country. (WET 1083) 
Petersen said that Gray admitted that Dean had turned over documents 
from Hunt's safe in Ehrlichman's presence (~rnT 1097-98); and that 
Magruder was naming Haldeman and Ehrlichman not by first-hand knowledge, 
but by hearsay. (WET 1105-06) 
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B. 
One minute after the end of his meeting with Petersen, the 
~j 
President met v:ith Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Ziegler. (Book IV, IH3) 
The President relayed the information that Petersen had talked to Gray 
and that Gray admitted receiving and destroying the Hunt files. 
1116) The President then told ralder.1an and Ehrlichman about his con-
versation with Petersen regarding the issue of their possibly being 
named as unindicted co-conspirators in an indictment of Jeb rlagruder. 
The President detailed the nature of this discussion: 
n Here's the zi~~~tion, basically, 
(unintelligible). They're going to haul 
him [Magruder] in court, have him plead 
guilty, put a statement out because Sirica 
ahTays ques tions the wi tnesses Hho plead 
guilty. They are going to make it as broad 
as they can and as narrow as they can at the 
same time. By being as broad as they can, 
they are going to say that he has named 
certain people and they are going to name a 
group of people that is non-indictable co-
conspirators. They're going to include 
everybody on that list. I said, "Is Dean 
going to be on that list?" He said, "Yes." 
He said, "Frankly (unintelligible) not include 
Haldeman and Ehrlichman, \(lhich gives you an 
option." I said, Are you telling me that if 
Haldeman and Ehrlich.man decide to take leave, 
that you will not then proceed with the prose-
cution. "No," he said, "I don't mean that." 
He said, "Khat I mean is that they are not 
going to appear on that list and that (unintelligible) 
Grand Jury and f!1.ake case there (unintelligible). So 
there's the --
1 / The }louse Judiciary CO~"r.1ittee 0['. April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the tape 
recording of this conversatiol"'.. The PresidenL hi'ls refused to produce tLis 
recording, but has produced 2n edited transcript. 
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Well, whether we take leave or not doesn't effect 
the list that they read off. 
Yes. Yes. 
Oh, it does? Yes, it does. They will put us 
on the list if we don't take leave? 
Yes, because otherwise, he says, he says 
Sirica is going to question Magruder and he's 
going to question (unintelligible) and it 
appears (unintelligible). If he does that, then 
it will appear that the Justice Department again 
is covering up. 
(PET 1116-17) 
The President also relayed Petersen's report on Dean's current 
situation with the prosecutors. He indicated that Petersen had told him 
that Dean's lawyers had threatened to try the Administration in Dean's 
defense. (HHT 1118) 
VII. 
During the course of the Grand Jury investigation the 
President tried to induce Petersen to refuse to grant immunity to Dean. 
The President was m.;rare that Dean vas attempting to provide the prosecu-
tors ~.;rith evidence to secure his irnnunity from prosecution, and that 
this testimony could implicate Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Colson, and 
possibly the President himself in wrongful conduct in the Watergate 
matter. Although the President did not order Petersen not to give 
immunity to Dean, the President did actively encourage him not to do 
so. 
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On April 8, .1973 Dean began meeting with the prosecutors, 
a fact that was immediately known to Haldeman, Ehrlichrnan and the 
President. (HHT 401; Book IV, 538) On April 11, 1973 Ehrlichman 
telephoned Kleindienst to advise him that no 'fuite House aide should 
be granted immunity; and Kleindienst relayed this message to 
Petersen. (Book IV, 548) Petersen has testified that this conversa-
. 
tion did not make much of an impression on him until the end of the 
week vlhen Petersen learned that Dean was cooperating with the prosecu-
tion. (Book IV, 548) 
By mid-April 1973, the potential threat Dean posed was well 
recognized. On April 14, Dean discussed with Haldeman and Ehrlichman 
his information that they Here t~rgets of the Grand Jury, and that in 
his opinion they could be indicted on obstruction of justice charges. 
(Book IV, 699-701) On the same day, the President said to Haldeman 
and Ehrlichman that they should find out about Dean: " ... To find out 
let me put it this Hay. You've got to find out Hhat the hell he is 
going to say. (unintelligible) \vhich is frightening to me, (unintel-
ligible) 11 (hTH'T' 540) 
On April 15, 1973, the President Has told by Petersen of the 
nature of Dean's disclosures thus far, and of the fact that Dean Has 
actively seeking inununity. nmT 885-87) During the next few days, 
the President closely follo~'ed the status of Dean.'s negotiations \-lith 
the prosecutors. At a meeting Ivith Petersen on April 16,1973, the 
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President asked about the deal with Dean; Petersen told the President 
that while there was no deal with Dean, Dean's counsel wanted one, 
and that Petersen was considering granting immunity to Dean. (lmT, 
885-88) The President was again reminded that Dean presented an 
important threat: 
P 
tIP 
P 
HP 
p 
HE 
P 
You mean -- yo u say that -- I'm a little 
concerned about Dean's or his la,-ryer s --
that he's going to attack the President 
and so forth. Other than that, I mean 
Dean above all else --
Well I don't the Pres ident personally 
-- the Presidency as an office as the 
Administration. 
Because of? 
Because of Ehrlichman and Ealderuan. 
It's Ehrlicr~an and Haldeman he's really 
talking about? 
That may be his guts poker in the course 
of negotiations. That's ~hat they say. 
Try the Administration and the President, 
(inaudible) affairs, (inaudible) huh? 
(FET 925-26) 
Pete~sen has testified that at this meeting on April 16, 1973 
the President appeared to be concealing from him the fact tLat Zhrlichman, 
one o~ th e principal people Dean's tes timony coulC! d3.'::age , had drafted 
for a Presidential announcel'.'ent on the \-Jaterga~~'. ,,~att p r- a provision 
declaring that the President disapproved the granting of immunity to hi~l 
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... '. 
White House officials. (Petersen testimony, 7/12/74, T 3892-95) 
On April 17, 1973, the President discussed Hith Haldeman 
Dean's efforts to secure immunity, and they acknmvledged the threat 
that that effort presented: "Dean is trying to tell enough .to get 
immunity and that is frankly Hhat it is Bob." Haldeman responded, 
1/ 
"That is the real problem He've got. ... '1-- (I·Hn 986-87) At a 
meeting later in the day, Ehrlichman relayed to the President Colson's 
recommendation that Dean be dealt with summarily: 
E 
P 
E 
E 
P 
Very simply put, I think his argu~ent 
will be that the City of Washington, 
generally kno'Js that Dean had little or no 
access to yuu. 
True, that's quite right. Dean was just a 
messenger. 
That knmvlecs;e imputed to us is knm·,ledge 
imputed to you and if Dean is (unintelligible) 
and testified that he imputed great quantities 
of knowledge to us, and is allowed to get away 
with that, that, that will seriously impair 
the Presidency ultimately. 'Cause it will be 
very easy to argue - that all you have to do 
is read Dean's testimony -
look at the previous relationships -
and there she goes! So, he says the key 
to t~is is that Dean should not get i~~urrity. 
Tha t ':i1i3. t he ,\,.'an ts to tell you. 
Hell, he told me that, and I couldn't agree 
more. 
'1/ The l~ouse Judiciary COr:'!:',ittee on April 11, 1974 sub?oenaed tl;e tape. 
~cordinC' of this conversation. The President has refused to prO(iU2e th:;,s 
recordin~, but has produced an edited transcript. 
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f';ov] he says you have total and complete 
control over whether Dean gets irr~unity through 
Petersen. ~ow that's what he says. He said 
he 'would be glad to co~e in and te 11 you hmv to 
do it, vrhy, and all that stuff. 
I realize that Dean is the (unintelligible). 
Dean, of course, let's look at what he has, 
his (unintelligible) and so forth about 
(unintelligible) go popping off about everything 
else that is done in the goverru:;.ent you knO'.·" 
and the bugging of the --
Well~ the question is, I suppose is which 
way he is liable to do it most. 
First of all, if he gets im.I!lUnity he'll Fant 
to pay just as little price as he can. 
Well, the price that - the quid-pro-quo 
f or the ir:m~uni ty is to reach one through 
us to all of us. Colson argues that if he 
is not given i~munity, then he has even more 
incen tive to go light on his o'.-/n malfactions 
and he ' i·,ill have to clinb up and he i,Till have 
to defend himself. 
('-'JET 987-88) 
Later in this converS3 tion the President acknOidedged that "Petersen's the 
guy that can give immunity .... " and "Dean is the guy that he's got 
to use for the purpose of making the case." (HHT 993-94) The 2eeting 
concluded wi th the President agreeing to get Petersen in to talk 
about iOl11unity at 1·.'hich time Petersen iwuld be told that the Presiceelt did 
not i·.:ant anybody on the I-,Thite Eouse staff to be given iIll.!1;unity. n:ET 
1051, 1056) 
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Following the President's expression of agreement Vlith 
Colson's recommendation that Dean should be denied immunity (vniT 987-88), 
the President, Haldeman and Ehrlichman considered the matters about \vhich 
Dean might t~stify. They expressed concern that Dean could disclose 
facts relating to the Ellsberg break-in; "the ITT thing" (vlHT 1029); 
and Dean's conversation with the President on March 21, 1973 regarding 
the payment to Hunt (WiT 991, 1031-34). The meeting ended with the 
President agreeing to get Petersen in to talk about immunity, at which 
time Petersen would be told that the President did not want anybody on 
the White House staff to be given immunity. (HHT 1051, 1056) 
Later in the afternoon of April 17, 1973, the President met 
with Petersen. (r-lHT 1060-95) At this meeting, the President attempted 
to influence Petersen's decision on the granting of immunity to Dean 
by suggesting to Petersen that any immunity grant to Dean Hould be 
interpreted as a deal on Petersen's part to conceal the fact that 
Petersen had provided Dean with Grand Jury information during the 
1/ 
summer of 1972.- (hl1IT 1061-62) The President first expressed his 
concern over leaks from the Grand Jury in 1972. (m-lT 1063) The 
President later stated that while he did not care what Petersen did 
on immunity to Strachan or other "second people" (hTHT 1077), Petersen 
could not give immunity to Dean because Petersen's "close relationship" 
with Dean "Tould make it look like a "straight deal". (lmT 1078). 
Near the end of the meeting, Petersen objected to the inclusion of a 
reference in the President's public statement opposing grants of inUllunity. 
1/ 
The House judiciary Committee on {-I/ll/74 subpoenaed the tape 
recording of this conversation. The President has refused to 
produce this recording, but produced an edited transcript. 
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(WHT, 1101-02) 
Within an hour the President issued a public statement on 
Watergate, including a provision that the President felt that no indivi-
dual holding a position of major importance in the Administration should 
be granted ·immunity. (Book IV, 1420) T\.]o days later the President 
met with ~lilson and Strickler, the attorneys for Haldeman and Ehrlichman. 
(Book IV, 1513) At this meeting the President described Dean as a 
"loose cannon", and indicated to them that he had put out his statement 
on immunity because the prosecutors were at that point hung up on the 
question of giving immunity to Dean. (llliT 1239). 
1/ 
On April 18, 1973, the President called Petersen.- (Book IV, 
1471) Petersen has testified that the President "Has rather angry," 
(Book IV, 1474) and that he che\ved Petersen out for having granted 
immunity to Dean. (Petersen testimony, 7/12/74, T 3874-75) According 
to Petersen, the President told him that he knew that Dean had been 
given immunity because Dean had told him; Petersen told the President 
that that simply \.Jasn' t so; the conversation got "nasty" and Petersen 
told the President that he would check on the matter and get back in 
touch. (Book IV, 1474) Petersen checked with the prosecutors and 
2/ 
called the President back- and reassured him that Dean had not been 
1/ The House Judiciary Committee on April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the 
tape recording of this conversation. The President has refused to 
produce this recording, but has produced an edited transcript. Petersen 
has testified that the edited transcript is not fully accurate. 
(Petersen testimony, 7/12/74, 4042-46) 
~/ The House Judiciary Commi ttee on April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the tape 
recording of tbis conversation. The President responded thClt the con-
versation was not recorded. 
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given inununity. When Petersen reported this denial, the President 
said he had a tape to prove his contention. (Book IV, 1474-75) 
By the end of April, the prosecutors' negotiations with Dean 
for immunity ~.,ere broken off, and Dean did not receive immunity from 
prosecution. (Petersen testimony, 7/12/74, T 3920; Book IV, 808-09) 
VIII. 
From April 18, 1973 through April 30, 1973, the date of 
Haldeman's and Ehr1ichman's resignations, the President continued his 
1/ 
series of meetings '\-lith Petersen.- (Book IV, 1532-34) At many of 
these meetings the President sought information from Petersen on the 
progress of the Watergate investigation and on the evidence that ,.;as 
being accUDu1ated on the involvement of Haldeman and Ehr1ichman. (Book 
IV, 1535-41) During this period, the President met frequently with 
2/ 
Haldeman and Ehr1ichman.- (Book IV, 1469-70, 1558; Meetings and 
conversations bet'\veen the President and John Ehr1ichman, 4/18·-29, 1973 
(received from the h'hi te House» 
The use to which the President put the information he had 
been obtaining from Petersen during this period, hmvever, is indicated 
by the events of April 15 and 26, 1973. At that time the President 
1/ 
The House Judiciary Comrnittee on 5/30 and 6/24/74 subpoenaed the 
tape recording of the 4/19/73 conversation. The President has refused 
to produce this recording. 
2/ 
TI1e House Judiciary Committee on 
recording of 19 such conversations. 
produce these recordings. (Book IX, 
5/30/74 subpcenaed the tape 
The President has refused to 
1060-6(1) 
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kne\V that Haldeman \Vas a prime suspect of the Grand Jury investigation. 
On April 15, 1973 Petersen had recoQffiended to the President that Haldeman 
be dismissed because of his alleged involvement in various Watergate-
related matters (Book IV, 990); from that date Petersen had kept the 
President informed about the evidence against Haldeman. (Book IV, 991) 
1/ 
On April 17, 1973,- Petersen also told the President that the evidence 
being accumulated on Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Colson indicated that 
Haldeman \Vas the most directly involved. (~~T 1081) By April 25, 1973, 
the President \Vas a\Vare that the issue of the payments to the Watergate 
defendants and Haldeman's involvement in this matter \Vere being closely 
investigated by the Grand Jury. (mU 994-95) 
On April 25, 1973 the President directed Haldeman to listen 
to the tape of the March 21 conversation with Dean. (Book IV, 1567) 
Dean had been speaking to the prosecutors during April; Haldeman in 
listening to the tapes would be able to prepare a strategy for meeting 
whatever disclosures Dean might make. (Book IV, 1569) 
On April 25, 1973 pursuant to the President's direction, 
Haldeman requested and received twenty-t,vo tapes of Presidential con-
versations during February, Harch and April 1973. (Book IV, 1560, 
1567) On the afternoon of April 25, 1973, Haldeman listened to the 
1/ 
The House Judiciary Committee on April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the 
tape recording of this conversation. The President has refused to 
produce this recording, but has produced an edited transcript. 
----------- - -----
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March 21, 1973 morning conversation and made notes from the tape. 
(Book IV, 1560) At 4:40 p.m. on April 25, 1973, Haldeman met with 
the President and reported to him on the contents of the tape. 
(Book IV, 1558, 1562) The President instructed Haldeman to listen 
to the March 21 tape again on the next day. (Book IV, 1562) 
The meeting bety7een the President and Haldeman on April 25, 
1973 ended at 5:35 p.m. (Book IV, 1558) Two minutes later, at 
5:37 p.m. Petersen entered and met "'ith the President for more than 
an hour. (Book IV, 1618) The President did not inform Petersen of 
the taping system, the contents of the March 21, 1973 tape, or of 
the fact that Haldeman had been directed to listen to it and h2d 
done so that very day. 
On April 26, 1973 Haldeman again received the group of 
tapes, including the March 21 tape. (Book IV, 1560) He listened 
again to the March 21 tape and reported to the President. (Book IV, 
1563 ,1573) On April 26, 1973, Haldeman and the President met for 
1/ 
more than five hours.-
1/ 
The House JudiciaD' Co~mittee subpoenaed on 5/30/74 the tape 
recordings of the conversations of April 5 and April 26, 1973, 
but the President has refused to produce the recordings. (Book IX, 
1036, 1060-64) 
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IX. 
On April 27, 1973 the President met with Petersen. (Book 
IV, 1633) They discussed the Grand Jury investigation and the Pres i-
dent's concern about rumors that Dean was implicating the President 
in the Watergate matter. (lmT 1257-93) Petersen assured the Presi-
dent that he had told the prosecutors that they had no mandate to 
i~vestigate the President. (WHT 1259) In this context, the President 
made the following statement to Petersen about this conversation of 
March 21, 1973 and the issue of the payment of Hunt: 
. let me tell you the only conversations we ever 
had with him, ,.;ras that famous Harch 21st conversation 
T told ~!ou about, where he t01d me about Bittman coming 
to him. No, the Bittman request for $120,000 for Hunt. 
And I then finally began to get at them. I explored 
with hiE. thoroughly, "Now \"hat the hell is this for?" 
He said, lIlt I s because he I s blackmailing EhrlichC"!an." 
Remember I said thatls what it's about. And Hunt is 
going to recall the seamy side of it. And I asked 
him, "\\'ell how \"ould you get it? Ho\\! would you get 
it tothem?" so forth. But [QY purpose \<las to find out 
vIha t the hell had been going on before. And believe 
me, nothing was approved. I mean as far as I'm con-
cerned -- as far as I'm concerned turned it off 
to ta 11y . (I·;ln 1259) 
The President's statement that he tUTI1ed off totally the payment of 
blackmail money to Hunt on Harch 21, 1973 is not consistent with the 
facts as reflected in the House Judiciary transcripts of the tape 
recordings of the meetings of that date. (HJCT, 89, 91) 
94-96, 103-06, 109-10, 114-16, 118-19, 121-22, 125) 
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Later at the meeting with Petersen on April 27, 1973 the 
President provided Petersen with another inaccurate version of the 
events occurring on March 21 and March 22, 1973: 
P: Dean. You will get Dean in there. Suppose 
he starts trying to impeach the President, 
the word of the President of the United 
States and says, "Well, I have information 
to the effect that I once discussed with 
the President the question of how the pos-
sibility, of the problem," of this damn 
Bittman stuff I spoke to you about last time. 
Henry, it won't stand up for five minutes 
because nothing was done, and fortunately 
I had Haldeman at that conversation and he 
was there and I said, "Look, I tried to give 
you this, this, this, this, this, and this." 
And I sa id, "\--'hen you finally ge tit ou t , 
it \Von' t \York. Because, I said, "First, you 
can't get clemency to Hunt." I mean, I ... ras 
trying to ~et it out. To try to see what 
that Dean had been doing. I said, "First 
you can't give him clemency." Somebody has 
thrown out something to the effect that Dean 
reported that Hunt had an idea that he \Vas 
going to get clemency around Christmas. I 
said, "Are you kidding? You can't get 
clemency for Hunt. You couldn't even think 
about it until, you knm." '75 or something 
like that. II \illich you could, then because 
of the fact, that you could get to the --
ah -- But nevertheless, I said you couldn't 
give clemency. I said, ':The secon d poin t 
to remember is 'How are you going to get 
the money for them?' If you could do it, I 
mean you are talking about a million dollars." 
I asked him -- well, I gave him several ways. 
I said, "You couldn't put it through a Cuban 
COIfu~ittee could you?" I asked him, because 
to oe he was sounding so damned ridiculous. 
I said, "ll'ell under the circumstances," I 
said, "There isn't a damn thing ",e can do. II 
I said, "It looks to me like the problem is 
John Hitchell." Nitchell came dmm the next 
day and we talked about executive privilege. 
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Nothing else. Now, that's the total story. 
And ~- so Dean ~- I just want you to be 
sure that if Dean ever raises the thing, 
you've got the whole thing. You've got that 
whole thing. Now ki.ck him straight -- " 
(WHT 1278-79) 
[12105]
APRIL 30, 1973 TO THE PRESENT 
I. 
j 
On April 30, 1973 the President accepted the resignation of 
Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Kleindienst, and requested and received the 
resignation of Dean. (Book IX, 132) The President pledged to the 
American people that he would do everything in his power to insure that 
those guilty of misconduct within' the vlliite House or in his campaign 
organization were brought to justice. (Book IX, 135) He stated that he 
was giving Richardson absolute authority to make all decisions bearing 
on the prosecution of the Watergate case,'including the authority to 
appoint a special prosecutor. (Book LX, 134-35) On May 9, 1973 the 
President reiterated this pledge and added that the Special Prosecutor, 
appointed by Elliot Richardson, would have the total cooperation of the 
executive branch. (Book IX, 141) On May 21, 1973 Richardson appeared 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee with Special Prosecutor designate 
Archibald Cox. Richardson submitted to the Committee a statement of duties 
and responsibilities of the Special Prosecutor. The statement provided 
that the Special Prosecutor would have jurisdiction over offenses arising 
out of the unauthorized entry into the DNC headquarters at the Watergate, 
offenses arising out of the 1972 Presidential election, allegations 
involving the President, members of the White House staff or Presidential 
appointees and other matters which he consented to have assigned by the 
Attorney General. The guidelines also provided that the Special Prosecutor 
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would have full authority for determining whether or not to contest the 
assertion of executive privilege or any other testimonial privilege 
and that he would not be removed except for extraordinary improprieties. 
(Book IX, 150) 
On May 22, 1973 the President stated publicly that Richard-
son had his full support in seeing the truth brought out. The President 
also stated that executive privilege would not be invoked as to any testi-
mony concerning possible criminal.conduct or discussions of such conduct. 
(Book IX, 153) On May 25, 1973 just before Richardson was sworn in as 
Attorney General, the President mentioned privately to Richardson that 
the waiver of executive privilege extended to testimony, but not docu-
ments,(Book IX, 157) 
II 
Documents necessary to the investigation of wrongdoing were 
segregated in secure rooms in the EOB and the White House. Beginning 
in April, 1973 the files of Haldeman, Strachan, Ehrlichman, and Dean, 
among others, were locked in a safe room in the ~TIite House. (Book 
IX, 163, 258-59) On April 30, 1973, just before his resignation, 
Ehrlichrnan instructed David Young to make sure that all papers 
involving the Plumbers were put in the President's file. Ehrlichman 
told Young that Ehrlichrnan was going to be putting some papers in 
the President's file before he left. (Book IX, 128-29) 
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On June 11, 1973 and June 21, 1973 the Special Prosecutor 
wrote to Buzhardt, the President's Counsel, requesting an inventory of 
the files of Haldeman, Ehrlichman,Mitchell, LaRue, Liddy, Colson, Chapin, 
I 
Strachan, Dean, Hunt, Krogh, and Young, and other files related to the 
Watergate investigation. After many weeks Buzhardt told Cox there could 
be no agreement on an inventory. (Book IX, 258, 260-61) 
On August 23, 1973 Cox requested from the White House certain 
records relating to the Pentagon Papers and the Fielding break-in. 
(Book IX, 504-07) Cox repeated the request on October 4, 1973. (Book IX, 
508-10) As of October 29, 1973 none of the documents had been turned over 
to the Special Prosecutor. (Book IX, 511) On August 27, 1973 Cox requested 
White House records on Joseph Kraft and the electronic surveillance of 
Kraft. (Book IX, 518) As of November 5, 1973 this request had not been 
fulfilled. (Book IX, 302) 
In September 1973, prior to his appearance before the Senate 
Select Committee and the Grand Jury, Special Assistant to the President 
Patrick Buchanan was instructed by ~fuite House counsel to transfer certain 
documents to the President's files and not to take them from the White 
House. (Book IX, 600-02) 
III 
Important evidence bearing on the truth or falsity of allega-
tions of misconduct at the Hhite House is contained on recordings of 
conversations between the President and his staff. The President attempted 
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to conceal the existence of these recordings (HJCT 179-80, Book IX, 
246), refused to make them available to the Special Prosecutor once 
their existence became known (Book· IX, 408, 426); and the evidence 
indicates that he discha~ged Cox for refusing to agree to cease trying 
to obtain them. 
Before the existence of the White House taping system became 
known, Special Prosecutor Cox received information that the President 
had a tape of his April 15, 1973 meeting with John Dean. On June 11 
and June 20, 1973 Cox wrote to Buzhardt requesting access to that tape. 
Cox pointed out that the President had offered the tape to Henry Petersen 
when Petersen was in charge of the Watergate investigation. (Book IX, 
244-45, 248-49) Buzhardt spoke to the President about Cox's request, 
and informed Cox that the tape in question was a recording of the 
President's recollections of the day and that the tape would not be pro-
duced. (Book IX, 246-47) Buzhardt did not tell Cox that all Presiden-
tial conversations in the Oval Office and the Executive Office Building 
were recorded, many of which clearly had a direct bearing on the investi-
gation. 
On July 16, 1973 Alexander Butterfield testified before the 
Senate Select Committee and publicly disclosed the existence of the 
White House taping system. (Book IX, 380-81) On July 18, 1973 Cox 
requested tapes of eight Presidential conversations. (Book IX, 390-92) 
On July 23, 1973 White House counsel Charles Alan Wright refused the 
---- ~ -----------------------
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request, and Cox issued a subpoena for tape recordings of nine Presi-
dential conversations. (Book IX, 408-10, 414-16) On August 29, 1973 
Judge Sirica ordered the production of the recordings for in camera 
review. (Book IX, 586) After an appeal by the President, the United 
States Court of Appeals upheld Judge Sirica's order on October 12, 
1973. (Book IX, 748) No appeal was taken from this Court decision. 
(Book IX, 799-800) 
On October 17, 1973 Richardson transmitted a proposal to 
Cox whereby, in lieu of in camera inspection, Senator Stennis would 
verify White House transcripts of the .tapes. (Book IX, 762, 766-67) 
Richardson told Cox that the question of other tapes and documents 
would be left for later discussions. (Book IX, 763) On October 18, 
1973 Cox replied that the President's proposal was not, in essence, 
unacceptable. (Book IX, 767) The President, through his lawyer, 
Charles Alan Wright, sought to require Cox to agree not to go to court 
in the future for other tapes and documents. (Book IX, 791-92, 795) 
After Richardson learned of this new condition, he wrote the President 
that while he had thought the initial proposal reasonable, he objected 
to the added condition. (Book IX, 812-13) On the evening of October 
19, the President issued a statement ordering Cox to agree to the 
"Stennis proposal," and to agree also not to go to court for other 
tapes and documents. (Book IX, 800) On October 20, 1973 Cox replied 
that his responsibilities as Special Prosecutor compelled him to refuse 
to obey the order. (Archibald Cox Press Conference, October 20, 1973, 
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3-4, 6-7 and 16-17) On October 20, 1973 when the President instructed 
Richardson to fire Cox for refusing to agree not to go to court for tapes 
and documents, Richardson resigned. When the President gave the same 
instruction to Deputy Attorney General Ruckelshaus, Ruckelshaus also 
resigned. (Book IX, 817, 819) 
There is evidence that the President had decided to fire Cox 
well in advance of October 20. On July 3, 1973 General Haig told Richard-
son that it could not be a part of the Special Prosecutor's charter to 
investigate the President, and that the President might discharge Cox. 
(Book IX, 331) On July 23, 1973 Haig again called Richardson and com-
plained about various activities of the Special Prosecutor. Haig said 
that the President ,.,anted a "tight line drawn with no further mistakes," 
and that "if Cox does not agree, we will get rid of Cox." (Book IX, 
331-32) Richardson has stated in an affidavit submitted to the House 
Judiciary Committe~ that he met with the President in late September or 
early October, 1973. "After we finished our discussion about Mr. Agnew, 
and as we were walking toward the door, the President said in substance, 
'Now that we have disposed of that matter, we can go ahead and get rid of 
Cox.'" (Book IX, 159) 
After the President fired Cox, resolutions were introduced in 
the House calling for the President's impeachment. Bills were introduced 
in the House and Senate calling for the creation of an independent investi-
gative agency. (Cong. Record, October 23, 1973, H9356; Congo Record, Octo-
ber 24, 1973, H9397; Congo Record, October 23, 1973, S19439, S19443-44, 
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519454, H9354, H9355; and Congo Record, October 24, 1973, H9396) 
The President under enormous public pressure turned over some sub-
poenaed tapes and offered explanations for the absence of others. 
(Book IX, 673, 677, 230, 878) The President also authorized the 
appointment of another Special Prosecutor. (Book IX, 833) 
v 
On April 25, 1973 Haldeman, at the President's direction, 
listened to the tape of the March 21, 1973 morning meeting among the 
President, Dean and Haldeman. Haldeman made notes from the tape and 
reported to the President. The President concluded that Haldeman should 
listen to the March 21 tape again to ascertain the answers to certain 
points of doubt raised by the tape. On April 26, 1973 Haldeman again 
received the March 21 tape. He subsequently listened to the tape again 
and reported to the President. (Book IX, 109-21) 
On June 4, 1973 the President listened to a tape recording 
of certain of his conversations in February and March, 1973. During 
the day the President spoke with Chief of Staff Alexander Haig and Press 
Secretary Ron Ziegler about the March 21 conversation. The President 
said: 
President: [ .... ] Well, as I told you, we do know we 
have one problem: It's that damn conversa-
tion of March twenty-first due to the fact 
that, uh, for the reasons [unintelligible]. 
But I think we can handle that. 
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Haig: I think we ca--, can. That's, that's the --
President: Bob can handle it. He'll get up there and 
say that -- Bob will say, "I was there; the 
President said " 
* * * * 
President: Okay. The twenty-first and the twenty-second. 
Uh, uh, twenty--, twenty-first I've got to Bob 
already. The twenty-second [unintelligible]. 
Ziegler: [Unintelligible] 
President: Well--no, .if you can -- I don't think you can. 
He's, he's got it all in our file and I don't --
let's just forget it. I think after the twenty-
first we forget what the hell-- What do you 
think? 
(Book IX, 177-78, 193) 
Shortly after the existence of the White House taping system be-
came public knowledge, the President had the taping system disconnected. 
Custody of the tapes was taken from the Secret Service and given to a White 
House aide. (Book IX, 385-86) Special Prosecutor Cox wrote to Buzhardt 
to express concern that care be taken to insure the integrity of tapes 
that the Special Prosecutor had requested. Cox asked Buzhardt to take 
all necessary steps to see that the custody of the tapes was properly 
limited and that access to them was fully doc~ented. (Book IX, 394)' On 
july 25, 1973 Buzhardt stated that the tapes were being preserved intact. 
Buzhardt stated that the tapes were under the President's sole personal con-
trol. (Book IX, 396) 
After the Court of Appeals decision in Nixon v. Sirica requir-
tng the President to surrender the tapes that Cox had subpoenaed, the Pres i-
dent informed Judge Sirica that some of this material was unavailable --
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specifically, that there was an 18-1/2 minute gap on the June 20, 1972 
conversation between Haldeman and the President, and that there was no 
April 15 tape of his conversation with John Dean and no June 20, 1972 
tape of the telephone conversation between the President and Mitchell. 
(Book IX, 836, 869, 871) 
The erased conversation of June 20, 1972 contained evidence 
showing what the President knew of the involvement of his closest advisors 
shortly after the Watergate break-in. The erased meeting betlveen the Presi-
dent and Haldeman occurred approximately one hour after Haldeman had been 
briefed on Watergate by Ehrlichman, Mitchell, Dean and Kleindienst, all 
of whom had learned of m1ite House and CRP involvement. Haldeman's notes 
show and Buzhardt has acknowledged that the only erased portion of the 
tape was the conversation dealing with Watergate. (Book II, 237-38, 240-
43, 246, 249-50) 
The court-appointed advisory panel of technical experts, 
selected jointly by the Special Prosecution Force and the White House 
Counsel, unanimously concluded that: (i) the erasing and rerecording which 
produced the buzz on the tape were done on the original tape; (ii) the 
Uher 5000 recorder machine used by Rose Mary Woods probably produced the 
buzz; (iii) the erasures and buzz recordings were done in at least five 
to nine separate and contiguous segments and required hand operation of 
the control of the Uher 5000 recorder to produce each erasure and instance 
of rerecording; and (iv) the erased portion of the tape originally contained 
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speech which because of the erasures and rerecording could not be re-
covered. (An analysis of this report is set forth in Appendix A.) 
The President has stated that the April ,15, 1973 tape never 
existed, because the tape on the recorder in the White House taping 
system at his Executive Office Building office ran out. He also stated 
that the dictabelt of his recollections of the day (referred to by 
Buzhardt in June, 1973 in refusing Cox's request for a tape) could not 
be located. (Book IX, 860) Among the conversations that would have been 
recorded on the afternoon and evening of April 15, 1973 was a meeting 
between the President and Dean. Dean has testified that during this 
meeting the President stated in a low voice that he had been foolish 
to discuss Hunt's clemency with Colson and that he had been joking when 
he said one million dollars for the Watergate defendants could be raised. 
(Book IV, 1044-46) 
On April 18, 1973 the President offered to let Petersen hear 
the tape of his April 15, 1973 meeting with Dean. (Book IV, 1474-75) 
On June 4, 1973 the President listened to tape recordings of certain 
of his conversations in February and March, 1973. (Book IX, 170, 172) 
When his aide, Stephen Bull, asked which additional tapes he wanted, 
the President said: 
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President: March twenty-first. I don't need April, 
I don't need April fifteen. I need the 
sixteenth. [Unintelligible] correct. There 
were two on April sixteenth. I just want 
the second [unintelligible]. You can skip 
th~ -- April fifteen. 
Bull: And March twenty-first. 
President: March twenty-first, that's right, I have 
those. 
Bull: [Unintelligible] 
President: Yeah. Okay. I'll check. Haldeman's got 
them [unintelligible]. No, Ziegler's got 
them. Just ask Ziegler. All right . 
(Book IX, 183) 
During an interview with the Senate Select Committee staff in 
the summer of 1973, White House assistant Stephen Bull stated that in June 
1973 Haig called him to request that the April 15 tape of the President's 
conversation with Dean be flown to the President at San Clemente. Bull 
stated that since there were no further courier flights to San Clemente 
that night, Haig instructed Bull to arrange for the Secret Service to play 
the tape for Buzhardt, so that Buzhardt could ·brief the President by tele-
phone on its contents. (Book IX, 308, 12, 298-99) Later Bull testified at 
hearings regarding the missing Presidential tapes that he had only gqessed 
at the date of the conversation, and that the President must have been refer-
ring to the tape of a March 20 telephone call. (Book IX, 3l1-12)~/ 
Finally, when John Dean appeared before the Senate Select Com-
mittee before the existence of the White House tape recording system was 
1 / Buzhardt has testified that the taped conversation he listened to in 
June was a telephone conversation between the President and Dean which took 
place on March 20, 1973. (Book IX, 297) 
[12116]
-12-
publicly revealed, he testified that he had the impression that his 
conversation with the President on April 15 was being recorded. Dean 
testified that his suspicion was aroused when the President stated 
that he had been jokin~ when he remarked on March 21 that raising a 
million dollars for the Watergate defendants would be no problem, and 
when the President walked to a far corner of the room to say in a low 
voice that discussing Hunt's clemency with Colson had been a mistake. 
(Book IV, 1045-46) 
In addition to the gap in the June 20 tape and the nOll-
existence of the April 15 tape and dictabelt, all of which were in the 
sole personal custody of the President, there are also discrepancies 
in other dictabelts. There is a 38-second gap in the dictabe1t on which 
the President dictated his recollections of a June 20, 1972 conversation 
with Mitchell. (J. Fred Buzhardt testimony, January 18, 1974, In re 
Grand Jury, Misc. 47-73, 2479-81.) There is a 57-second gap in a cassette 
on which the President dictated his recollections of his March 21, 1973 
conversation with Dean. (J. Fred Buzhardt testimony, January 18, 1974, 
In re Grand Jury, Misc. 47-73, 2471-72.) On June 16, 1973 Buzhardt told Cox 
there was a dictabe1t of the President's reco11ectionsof his April 15 
conversation with Dean. (Book IX, 246) > But in November 1973, ·the Presi-
dent, through his attorney, informed the Court that he could not find this 
1/ dictabe1t. (Book IX, 850) 
lIOn November 12, 1973 the President announced that he would supply the 
tapes of two conversations with Dean on April 16, 1973 in lieu of the 
April 15 conversation. The President stated that the substance of the 
conversations on April 16 was similar to the matters discussed on April 15 
as reflected in the President's notes of the meeting. (9 Presidential 
Documents 1331) 
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VI 
Pursuant to the mandate of the House of Representatives, this 
Connnittee has issued subpoenas to the President requesting tapes and 
other material bearing on Watergate. In all instances the President 
refused to comply. The President has provided the Committee only with 
those materials he had already turned over to the Special Prosecutor and 
with edited transcripts of certain of the subpoenaed conversations. 
Certain documents and the edited transcripts provided by the 
White House differ substantially from other evidence on the same subjects 
in the possession of the Judiciary Committee. 
The House Judiciary Committee has been able to check eight of 
the White House edited transcripts against the transcripts prepared by 
its staff from the tapes which the President has turned ·over to the Com-
mittee. (Comparison of Passages from "Transcripts of Eight Recorded 
Presidential Conversations." and "Submission of Recorded Presidential 
Conversations.") The comparison shows substantial differences in all 
eight transcripts. The most frequent difference is that Presidential 
remarks are omitted from the White House version. 
When the President announced that he was providing tran-
scripts to the Committee, he stated that everything that was relevant to 
the President's knowledge or actions with regard to Watergate was included 
in the transcripts. (Book IX, 993, 999) The White House transcripts, 
however, are incomplete. The House Judiciary Committee transcript of 
~ ._-- - - .. -
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the March 22, 1973 conversation among the President, Haldeman, Ehrlich-
man, Mitchell and Dean shows that the participants continued to talk 
about Watergate after the point in the discussion when the White House 
transcript ends. In a portion of the discussion omitted from the White 
House version, the President tells Mitchell: 
[ .... ] Now let me make this clear. I, I, I thought 
it was, uh, very, uh, very cruel thing as it turned 
out -- although at the time I had to tell [unintel-
ligible] -- what happened to Adams. I don't want it 
to happen with Watergate -- the Watergate matter. I 
think he made a, made a mistake, but he shouldn't have 
been sacked, he shouldn't have been -- And, uh, for that 
reason, I am perfectly willing to -- I don't give a shit 
what happens. I want you all to stonewall it, let them 
plead the Fifth Amendment, cover-up or anything else, 
if it'll save it -- save the plan. That's the whole 
point. On the other hand, uh, uh, I would prefer, as 
I said to you, that you do it the other way. And I 
would particularly prefer to do it that other way if 
it's going to come out that way anyway. And that my 
view, that, uh, with the number of jackass people that 
they've got that they can call, they're going to --
The story they get out through leaks, charges, and so 
forth, and innuendos, will be a hell of a lot worse 
than the story they're going to get out by just letting 
it out there. 
* * * 
[ .... ] [U]p to this point, the whole theory has 
been containment, as you knmv, John. 
* * * 
[ ... ] That's the thing I am really concerned with. 
We're going to protect our people, if we can. 
(HJCT 183) 
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In response to the Committee's request for the conversation 
between the President and Dean on Harch 17, 1973 from 1:25 to 2:10 p.m., 
the President supplied the Committee with a three-page transcript that 
deals only with Segretti and the Fielding break-in. (WHT 157-160) 
On June 4, 1973 howeve~; the President described this March 
17 conversation with Dean to Ron Ziegler. The Committee has a tape record-
ing of that June 4 conversation. The President said: 
[ ••• ] then he said -- started talking about Magruder, 
you know: "Jeb's good, but if he sees himself sinking 
he'll drag everything with him." 
* * * * 
[ •••. ] And he said that he'd seen ( .•. ] Liddy right 
after it happened. And he said, "No one in the 
White House except possibly Strachan's involved 
wi th, or knew a bou tit. " He said, "Magruder had 
pushed him without mercy." [ .... ] I said, "You know, 
the thing here is that Magruder ( •.. ] put the heat 
on, and Sloan starts pissing on Haldeman." I said, 
"Tha t couldn T t be ( •.. ]" I said, "1.Je' ve, we've got 
to cut that off. We can't have that go to Haldeman." 
* * *. * 
( •••• ] And I said, well, looking to the future, I mean, 
here are the problems. We got this guy, this guy and 
this guy." And I said, "Magruder can be one, one guy 
-- and that's going to bring it right up home. That'll 
bring it right up to the, to the White House, to the 
President." And I said, "We've got to cut that back. 
That ought to be cut out." 
(Book IX, 209-11) 
The President has also provided the Committee with a five-
page transcript of his conversation with Assistant Attorney General Henry 
,_. - -_. ---- ----
I 
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Petersen on the afternoon of April 18, 1973. (WHT 1203-07) Petersen 
has testified as to his recollection of that conversation. The tran-
script is not in accord with Petersen's recollection. (Petersen testi-
mony, 7/12/74, T, 3990-91) 
Petersen has testified that during the telephone call the 
following conversation took place: The President called Petersen and 
told him that Dean had been immunized. The President told Petersen that, 
although Petersen had told the President that Dean had not been given 
immunity, the President knew that was not true. The President stated 
that he knew Dean had been immunized, and he knew it because Dean him-
self had told the President. Petersen again told the President that 
Dean had not been immunized. Later in the conversation, Petersen told 
the President he would doublecheck on Dean's status. (Book IV, 1474) 
Nowhere in the President's transcript of the conversation is there any 
discussion of Dean having been given immunity. (WHT 1203-07) 
On June 24, 1974 this Committee issued a subpoena to the 
President requesting copies of certain of John Ehrlichman's notes which 
were impounded in the White House. On July 12, 1974 the Committee was 
informed that the President would furnish the Committee copies of Ehrlich-
man's notes which the President had turned over the Ehrlichman and the 
Special Prosecutor. On July 15, 1974 the White House provided the notes 
to the Committee. Some of the material on the notes had been blanked out. 
On July 16, the Committee obtained copies of the notes which the White House 
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had furnished to Ehrlichman and the Special Prosecutor. Some of the 
material which had been blanked out on the copies provided to the 
Committee by the President had not been blanked out on the copies the 
Committee received from the Special Prosecutor. 
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APPENDIX A 
18-·1/2 MINUTE GAP 
On November 21, 1973, Chief Ju~~e Sirica appointed a panel 
of six technical e."'{perts nominated by the SpecJal Prosecutor and counsel 
for the President for the purpose of studying a tape recording that 
contained a conversation on June 20, 1972 between the President and 
Haldeman that had been subpoenaed by the Watergate Grand Jury. In 
particular, the panel Has to determine and rep-ort_on t.he nature and cause 
of the obliteration of an 18-1/2 minute portion of that tape-recorded 
conversatj,on. (House Judiciary Committee, Statement of Irlformation, Book IX, 
871. Hereinafter cited to book and page number.) On January 15, 1974 
the panel reported the conclusions of its study (Book IX, 926-28) and 
on May 31, 1974 the panells final report on the EOB tape of June 20, 1972 
was submitted. (The Eon Tape of June 20, ],972: Report on a Technical 
Investigation Conducted for the u.s. District Court for the District of 
Columbia by the Advisory Panel on Ttlhi te House Tapes, Hay 31, 19Ft. 1-lere-
inafter cited as May 1974 Tape Report). The key conclusions of the panel 
\-JerE' : 
(1) Ths Uher 5000 tape recorder used by the President's 
secretary, Rose :[al'Y I':COQS, to tr8Dsc.ribe tap~s oC Presidential conver-· 
s3tio:-.s probJhly ?ro~ucE'Q I~he 18-1/2 :::'J.i1utc erasure and buzz. 
(2) The 18-1/2 ninutes ()f eras'Jre aTld buzz were acco,',!,lished 
hy at least five, ;:mel pet'hai)S as r~a:')y as nine, CODU,gUQUS 3[;(1 separate 
OJ>,' y- at iO,lS . 
[12123]
-2-
(3) Erasure and recording of each segment of erasure and 
buzz required 8anual operation of keyboard controls on the Uher 5000 
recorder. (May 1974 Tape Report, 35-36) 
; 
The Uher 5000 tape recorder, like the Sony 800B tape recorder 
used to record the Presidential conversation, has t\vO magnetic "heads," 
an erase head and a record head. (The reconl head performs both record-
ing anel playback functions.) ~,!hen the "playback" button on the tape 
recorder is depressed, the erase head is inactive while the record 
head is activated to pick up electronic signals from the magnetic tape 
as the tape is drm,m across it. The nachine then translates the elec-
tronic signals into sound. Fhen the "record" button is depressed, both 
the erase head cmd the record head are activated. The tape is c1rmm 
first over the erase head where the tape is cleansed of prior mag-
netic signals and then over the record head where new magnetic signals, 
representing the sounds being recorded, are imparted to the tape. To 
erase a tape, the "record" button is depressed but no ne," sounds are 
introduced iuto the recording machine; the tape passes over the erase 
head and is erased, and then over the activated but silent record heael. 
The Uher 5000 nachine nay be used in conjunction with a foot 
pc,Jal . The pedal is. capable only of r:oving the tape fonvarel at re-
corclin:?; speed or backh'ard a t the higher rex-7ind speed. The foot pedal 
c.J.nnot, in effect, depress the "playbJ.ck" or "record" button; it 
cannot activate or dcactivnte citheL the erase head or the record head. 
(Trlo\'li1.S Stocl(haru testimony, In reo C;y 2nd Ju.rv, }:i~;c. -~- .. ------,-~-.--~- 47-73, 1/15/74, 16) 
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lfuenever the record head is activated by depression of the 
"record" button. it leaves a distinctive "record--head-·on" signal on 
the tape. (Richard Bolt testimony, In re Grand Jur~, Misc. 47-73, 
1/lS/7Lf , 2172) When the "record" button is released, and the erase 
and record heads are deactivated, the electronic pulses dying on those 
heads leave distinctive "erase-head-off ll and "record-head-off ll signals, 
respecti.vely, on the tape. (Thomas Stockham testimony, }n re Grand Jury', 
Misc. 47--73 ~ 1/15/74, 12-13) The "record-head--on. 1l "erase--head-off" 
and "record-head~offlt marks vary from one type of machine to 3nother, and 
may be used to help identify the machine on which tapes were recorded 
or erased. 
The panel was able to identify five cle.ar sets of "onll and 
"off" markings ,,"hieh enabled it to detenline that erasure of 18--1/2 
minutes of the June. 20 conversation \\fC'\S accmnplishcd in at least five 
different segments. 
1!15/7~', 8) 
\{hen a segment of erasure is completed, and the T'1achine is 
reversed and restarted, the "onll and IloffH markings of previous era-
sures ~~lay thenselves be erased. The panel found four additional me,rk-
ings that might have been part of se~lents of erasure where the 
matching "onll or "off!l markings the':lselves had been erased; the panel 
could not be sure. '<.Thether these ;:,arks \·;'ere evidence of additional 
segments of erasure. 
1/15/7ff,21-22) 
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The Advisory Panel conducted the following tests and analyses 
on the June 30 tape in reaching its conclusions: 
1. Critical Listeninl 
The panel played 67 ~inutes of the evidence tape, including 
the 18-1/2 ~inute buzz, through high quality play-back equipment. Their 
expertise enabled them to identify and clarify significant acoustic 
phenomena on the tape. (May 1974 Tape Report, 8) 
The tape '.Jas treated Hith a liqu-id that !'developed" the tape, 
tha t is, rendered visible the ilasnetic i)2t te;~ns ilr.:l r:ar:::.ir,?,s Oie. t~e 
tape ~ such as "record-heac!-on, II !!record-~eac1.-off," "erase-he.ad--off, \I 
and "K--l pulse" (see belo\v) marks. GIav 1974 Tape Report, 8--11) 
3. i1~ave Forras 
Hhe.n the electrical output 0= a recorded tape i s fed into an 
oscilloscope, each si~nal on the tape produces a distinctive wave for~. 
Fave form an<,.lysis enabled the panel to make a detailed study of the 
significant events on the Jlln~ 20 t ape . The panel scr;ltinized the Fave 
. forms of the events -that occun:e·.-I dut"ing the 18-·] /2 r.l imlte eU;SlJre aull 
b1.1?-2, a.nd found that the ,'lave fo)"~', 2.nalysis corroh oraled the conc.lusions 
dra~n from eX2iJ. ination of the Qagnetic ~arks. (Nay 1974 T",pco Report, 11·-13) 
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4. 5.pectra of ~ech and Buzz 
Throu3h spectral analysis (analyzing the component frequencies 
and amplitudes of sound signals), the panel was able to study the dif-
ferences, sir.::ilarities, and time of the signals. Through use of a 
chart of the spectral analysis of the 18-1/2 minute buzz (a spectrogram), 
the panel ,·l::'S able to examine '''-lindm·)s'' (tiny fraglc,ents) of original 
speech, to conclude that 60-Hz power line hum was the source of the 
buzzing sound, and to corroborate the evidence of stops and starts 
indicated by the magnetic marks. (Hay 1974 Tape Report, 13--16) 
There is a d i scernibl e wave pattern in the power line hum on 
all recorded tape; this ~vave pattern Hil l be of a continuous na ture until 
the recording i s stopped. Each uninterrupted portion is called a phase. 
The panel could determine ~rllere the recording mode has been stopped 
and restar ted by noting the phase discontinuities. The phase discon-
tinuities on the June 20 tape corroborated the "stop" and " start" con-
clusions drC1.\vn by the panp-J fron their study of the magnet ic l::Iarks· and 
\"ave fonns. (Hay 1974 Tape Report, 16-18, 43) 
The mec han ical irr egCllarit ie ':: in the r CI:C: ting el!2nents of 
every tape ~ecorJer are unique to tha t ~achine . These irr esularities 
produce additional tones k!1O'.·!\1 as "flutter sid>: 08.E(lS," dis t inc t fror.1 
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The degree of "flutter" can be plotted, and this 
phenomenon will aid in the identification of a particular tape 
recorder. 
The panel used this test to determine ,,'hich machine \qas re-
sponsible fo~ recording the 18-1/2 minute buzz on the tape. (Hay 1974 
Tape Report, 18-20) 
The panel studied the June 20 tape ,"ith an instrunent (an 
accelerometer) that could measure and detect any variances in tape thick-
ness. The panel copcluded as a result of their studies that the tape 
contained no physical splices. 01ay 1974 Tape Report, Technical Note ]3.1) 
() 
0. The K--l S,dtcll 
As further proof that the erasure was caused by manipulation 
of the keyboc:.rcl, the panel studiec~ evidence of 1:(-1 pulses all. tIle tape, 
The K-l s\'vitch is an internal mecll3ni.ca1 sultch. This s','Jirch 
only opens and closes as a result of pushing certain keys on the key-
board_ It cannot be actuated by a malfunction in the electronics of the 
recorder. It cannot be actu.8ted by the foor.;,eclal. (Hay: 197£. Ta.pe Report, L15) 
The s\'iitch opens [:lao closes :3.S & "[('su!.t or i:i ph::.'sicaJ. latchinG a.nd un-
latching C1ction thc:.t only occurs \.-1Le~1 one of the k2Ys is pressec1 c1o\\1n 
mEltlu.elly. There arc four kc-;"s L.h __ it can close thi.s s\vitci1: the recorrl-
ing key, the rUlinc key, die S Lart \ey, an·:l. the [on;,ird key. 
Report, Technical ,\;0,:0 S" 3) 
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K-l switch activity is reflected on the tape by K-l pulses. 
Because of the many other larger transient pulses that are generated by 
other electro-mechanical activity, K-l pulses are difficult to discern. 
Hmvever, ,.;-here a K-l pulse is UflCiillbiguou::ly idpotified, it is an unm:i.s-
takable sign of manual activity of the keyboard. The expert panel was 
able to identify six distinct K-l pulses. (May 1974 Tape Report, 
Technical Notes 8.3 - 8.5) 
Alternate Hypotheses 
A number of alternative hypothes~s to the conclusions reached 
by the expert panel were considered and rejected by the panel in 
arriving at its conclusions, including the following. 
on the June 20, 1972 tape at the same tin,e that the tupe 1\'2S originally 
recorded. This hypothesis fails because the June 20, 1972 original 
tape was recorded on a Sony 800B tape recorder. The experts determined 
that the 18-1/2 milHlte gap \Vas produced by a Uoer 5000 tape recorder. 
(May 197!~ Tape Repoet, Technic!;tl Notes 9.1 - 9.2) 
caused by settinz thp Uher. t2?C recorder in the record F\Ocle 2nd ope-
rating it in f.:1St re,·;,ind. This hy?otlw.sis \J8~: rejected because if the 
tape had been erased in rewind the obliterated section would have 
had em 2ildible tone of SOD cycles ','.'0211 plc~ycd b8ck i1t its usual op<::", 
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is on the 18-1/2 r:tinute gap is the normal 60-cycle frequency. This 
shows that the tape was erased at its standard operating speed of 24 
millimeters per second. Additionally, if the 18-1/2 minute buzz had 
been recorded in rel,ind, there ",",ould have been no record -:md erase -head-
off marks left on the tape. More than 20 such narks were ~ound in the 
obliterated section. (May 1974 Tape Report, Technical Note 9.2) 
Hypothesis c~o_~_~ -- The tape was erased through use of the 
foot pedal. This hypothesis was rejected because of the record and 
erase head signatures that were found on the tape; signatures that can-
not be made by the foot pedal. Second, a dis~iuc~ive set of magnetic 
marks is ~ade by the Uher tape recorder when stopped and restarted by 
the foot pedal. None of these ~arks was found on the 18-1/2 sinute 
buzz section, FurtheE'.ore, six K--l pulses Here fOemel in the obliterated 
section. K-l pulses 2.1so C8.nnot be ,-,ac'.e by the foot Dedal. (Hay 1974 Tape 
Report, Technical Notes 9.2 - 9.3) 
0.J?othesi~\;c. 1+ --- The distir,ctiv2 uagnetic Darks found on the 
18-1/2 ~inute gap carne fro~ a power supply failure within the Uher 5000 
;u-:d off, thu.s putting the d:Lstinctivc ,~ark.~,; on the ta118 vhile l.he tape 
was still moving. The experts rejected this hypothesis heca~se they 
ahle to cL::tetTline that the '::dve £01":'15 th3t 'oJoulc1 have ho.cn pro--
ducc:d by tl~:LS sort of act:i.','ity '·:2;:0. not present on the eV'jdencc ~cll,e, 
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Furthen:'-Ore, if this "sputter" activity hacl taken place, there ",ould be 
no phase discontinuity £011m,rin3 the record.--head-on marks. The evi-
dence tapesho,';s phase discontinuity ane erase head signatures associ-
ated with t~e record-he ad-on rnark~. Additionally, there are K-l 
pulses found on the tape that could only be caused r:lanually. (Nay 1974 Tape 
Report, Technical Notes 9.3 - 9.5) 
~ypothesis No. ~ -- Voltage irregularities on the AC power 
line working in conjunction with the failing diode of the bridge recti-
fier caused t~e distinctive m23:netic :'larks. A voltage drop sufficient 
to put these 1n.rks in the tape voulc1 heve caused a drop in motor speed 
with a reSUlting differential in tone frequency. There was no evidence 
of this on the evidence tape. Moreover, a drop in voltage could not 
cause the recordin,:; of 1(--1 pulses. (Hay 1974 Tape Report, Technical l'.fotes 
9.6 .. - 9.8) 
The Stanford Research Institute Report 
of Ha'i 31, 197!J 
----
Dr. Michael Hecker of the Stanford Research Institute con-
ducted eXperil':lents for the counsel to the ?resic1er,t "lith regard to the 
June 20,1972 tape, It should he nc)teJ that \vllile Dr. Eecker rev:~ei,!ect 
expc~ril;1ents and helci a l1ut:~her of conferences \.Jitl! the expert ;CoUiC.J., he 
never studied the June 20, J.972 tape directly. (Review of a Report Submitted 
to the U.S. District Com:t: for the. District of CO]i)li!bL:j TaDe 
-' 
of June 20. 19/,2,1/ l':ay 3J, 197~i. Hcrciui3fts'C cited 8S SRI RsporL.) 
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Dr. Hecker reviewed the findings of the expert panel and stated that he 
agreed with the panel's approach and agreed with the panel's expertise. 
(SRI Report, 3) Dr. Hecker stated further that he was in substantial 
agreement with the panelrs final report. (SRI Report, 3) The Stanford 
Research Institute found evidence that there had been manual manipulation 
of the keyboard controls of the VlIer 5000 tape recorder in order to cause 
some portions of the 18-1/2 minute gap. The Stanford Research Institute 
studied and rejected all the alternative hypotheses that were considered 
by the panel. (SRI Report, 4) 
Dr. Hecker vIas less willing to commit himself to at least 
five manual erasures than the expert panel. (Michael Hecker testimony, 
In re Grand Jury, Nisc. {',7-73 ~ 5/13/7/.f, 18-19; SRI Report, 3) The 
--~--.-~--.-.- ," 
panel rejected the hypothesis that any of chi=: magnetic: marks suggesting 
manual operation could hEl.ve heen ca.used by a malfunctioning machine. 
(SRI Report, 3-4) Dr. Hecker was of the opioion that it was wrong to rule 
out conclusively the chance that the malfunctioning machi.ne could have 
caused some of the indicia of manual operation. (SRI Report, 4; 
18-19) Dr. Hecker stated this beCDllSe the lt1 .3.chiLle had broken dOl"n once 
during te:::ting; and after a defective diode br:icl~;e. rectifier \\las r8placec1 > 
the di~,tinctive buzz could no longu' t)8 rf'py'(',QUccc1.. Dr. Hecker did not 
state that any of the indicia of f'1 2nual opc:catipll ",Jere u!1J.sed by the 
defect on the nwchLI1.e; he m:c:re1.y SEliG that, in h:i.s opinion, this possibility 
could not be ruled out compJ.etcly. (SRI R2port, 4-5) Ho~ever, Dr. 
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caused by manual manipulation of the keyboard controls. Dr. Hecker 
stated that he was absolutely sure that three events associated 
with the 18-1/2 minute gap were caused by manual operation of the key-
b02rd controls and that he 'il&S practically cert ,1 ir ... that t\>/O othe.l" marks hael 
been caused by manual operation of the k~jboard controls. He testified 
on May 13, 1974 that he was willing to agree wi.tll the panel that at 
least five of the events on the 18-1/2 minute buzz had been caused by 
manual operation of the machine. (Michnel Hecker testimony, In Ye 
-_/ 
/ 1'11 e CO':1M j_ t t c£ st elf f u!ld er s Lands t.li 8 t t\-JO 1: epor ts \ ·!8 re s (:" t to 
the Court that ~ussti0~ad the co~c lusions of t he Panel, whose conclu-
SiO'1.S in subs>::;,'.r:ce --;':8:~~, <:'l~~o COil: in~('(: by the St(l.nfor(~ '\esec·.rch 
Ins tit ute.,. exy,·.rt: fOe ·':.11E! cCJln'.sel t.o the Presid e nt:. The? CO'·F<i.ttc.e 
s t2.tf h2..s obte: i.ne6 c0)i(:s 0:; t.h~:-!S0 repo:- ts. The o::;.~. n:Ll..a tl.0: ..... S. s~~b·­
r;!ttlili.~ the rc~C):..-~:; ~.rC:. Hc:.~c S(;::-'rj.c~ ~ 1:1C.~ y a ~l(!.~;l~cl\/O:':-: sa.12s and 
servic.e c~~nt~~ :L',:.':. Clc-\Yf,-lt~r: (~ [~e~_ ~~ l:ts) Ohio) dGtc:(3. :'[::iY ~~~} 19~;L't i ::lr:J 
Dcl~ t or CO~ll t E:yi '''A t ~ 1 ~. :~ z: e:l :~\~ 2n::-1. Se':\.1r~i_ Ly, Inc . in Spr.: in~.; ·i:i.c::l(~} V.l.r'-
g in 1~:. ~ cLJ. t cd >1 , ~'; y 3~1 ) :. 9~' <.'~ c :~ cit ~) (~ ~ o:c:~ [.rni ZD .. tiOT!. c>:<~ ~: ~i ~ ·L~-.:.L t L (: t..:\:,,:LdenC·2 
t2P~ or Uh e~ 5000 
expert p~.ncl .. 
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U.S. HOUSE OF REPHESENTATIVES 
COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRE~JCY 
NINETY-T HIRO CONGRESS 
2129 RAY8UR:-'~ HOUSE OFFICE BUIl_DU"G 
Wf:.sH!NGTOr'~, D.C. 20515 
Mc.y 11, 1974 
Honorable Peter W. Rodino, Jr. 
Chairman j Commi i:t.ee on t be J-udiciary 
U. S. House of Representatives 
Washington, D. C. 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
WILU;..M n. WID:-..lALL. N.J. 
AL8ERT W. JOHI'W-ON. P,I\. 
J. V"/1L!.!AM STANTOi,l. OHIO 
BEN 3. BL/\CK2.UP.N. GA. 
C.<\RRY BRO\\'N. MICH. 
LAWY~ENCE G. W1LU~,MS, PA. 
CH/\LMERS P. WYU=:'. OHIO 
r .... ~AHGARET M. PECKLSR. MASS. 
PHILIP M. (;.~,6,:-iC:. ILL. 
JOHN H. ROUSSELOT. CALIF. 
STEVJART 9. McKIN:-'I:-£Y, CONN. 
BILL Fr.EI';Z!:-:t.... MINN. 
f..o.~~GELO D. KONCAl.LO. N.Y. 
JOH~~ D. CONLAN. A;:-';'I7,.. 
CLAIR W. BURGENER. CAi...IF. 
MATTHEW J. RINALDO, \",,j,;. 
PAUL. NeL.SON. 
Cl.E:r..V~ I\:-.D STAFF O[RECTOi1 
225-421,'l 
I : .'C 1/ 
;,. •.• < .... ' U/< 
On Monday, April 29, 1974, the President of the Unit~d 
States submitted to you copies of edited transcripts of 
White House conversations including a September 15, 1972 
meeting between the Presi6ent, H. R. Haldeman, and John Dean. 
This meeting is devo'C:ed 12.rgely to a discl..Js .; ion of a. 
then-pending investigation before the House Ranking and 
Currency Committee into vari.ous allegations concerning the 
Committee to He-Elect the President and the Finance CormnittGP 
tb Re-Elect the President. 
Questions have been r?ised at vurious pointn over the 
past eighteen months concerning efforts to bloc]: the Banking 
and Cu:crency COlcL.'l1.i·ctee i:r.'\/cst.igaLi_on durin~!, the FEllI of 1972 
and the release of this transcript sheds new light on these 
activities D.ncJ est.ar-lishes t..1"J.ac. such em effort 1:7as undey'\,,ray. 
However, the September 15, J972 transcript covers only the 
beginning of t.his ope:r:a.t:~()n ,,,nc i in :CC'.ct r this cOl.")versation 
took place even before we had scheduled a formal. meeting to 
vote 2ubpoenc:.s. 1-:: SeeFl.S reas"Y,,2blc to Q::;~~ume -" in liqht 
of the furor evicJel,t j.n 'Ule transcript ot t.his Sepb~illber 15 
meeting -.-. that then:: ,'lore E:.~.~1,,:;ccp1en·i.~ \'Jhi'Le UOUc38 cODversations 
and Clc-:'::.ivi·Lics !:clat.iu.::f to th2 }3a:(lk~i..ng and Cu:cn:,n.cy COTL1rrd.ttee 
inves 'cigc.lt ion 0 nut U")e t:CG(L"~ cr.ir,ts skip over <':d.l of thir:3 
per iod and 1e:3.1/8 a creat nL?f'k a s to v,ben and hr.)\-.7 the 
act.i v i ti0.s and a. S3 i(1:~-;rrlent.s dis cns sed in the S epC-,81y:beJ: 15 
meeting were carried out. 
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Honorable Peter W. Rodino, Jr. Page T,,'1O 
As you are aware from previous transmittals that have 
been made from this Corr~ittee to your Committee, the subpoena 
list prepared by the Banking and Currency Committee in 
October of 1972 was extensive and did i.nvolve most of the 
-major persons who have been named in other hearings and 
legal proceedings since that time. Since the President 
and his aides took the time to discuss the Banking and 
Currency Committeels activities on September 15, I am 
reasonably sure that they took even more time to discuss 
this subpoena list when it became public knowledge and I 
would think that transcripts and tapes covering these 
conversations would be most useful in your investigation. 
I am attaching another copy of this subpoena list which my 
Committee attempted to issue in 1972 but which was blocked 
by a 20 to 15 vote. 
Therefore, I am urging that your Committee take the 
steps necessary to obtain the additional transcripts and 
tapes of Presidential conversations between September 15 
and the October 3 meeting on the subpoenas in the Banking 
and Currency COH<rnit.tee. In addition, I urg·e that your 
Committee take steps to obtain tIle transc:cipt and tape 
and/or not.<o~s ldhich m:':l.y exist in connection "\d.th a ·t:elephone 
call from the President of: the Unit.ed States ·to J.f:a.uricc 
St2ns. This telephone call interru?ted a staff interrogation 
of Mr. Stans in the hearing room of the Banking and Currency 
Committee on the afternoon of Autust 30, 1972. Our records 
indicate this call took place s~metiDe between 2:00 p.m. 
and 2:30 p.m. on that date. 
I feel that these transcri.pts, tapes and notes will 
contain iln?Ortant information on the Presidentls attitude 
tOl.·JCl.i.'d blocking- Cone; res sion.::.l :inquir i e s :i. n to I} a terg a.te and 
I feel that it is reasonable to assume that such tapes and 
transcripts will provide insights into the President's 
k:nO\vledg(~ of persons or, the subpoena list ClneJ. theil' possible 
involvcmeJyt in ma.tt.ers tren un.del~ investis'ation by the 
Banking c.nd Currency Co')J"clittce. In ackU tion; this period 
-- September 15 through October 3 -- was a time of fast-breaking 
ne\\/s stories in various pu.::;J.jcCltions o.nd subsequent. sta·tC';ments 
by the Ehite House denyi~g verious alJ.egations. It would 
seem that a review of Presi.denti&l conversations durj.nq this 
period would reveal what, if 2ny, part the President Ray 
have pIa.yeel in covcc-·uq F;cti V i tie f3 'ib ich Here occur iriS" 
durj,ng the YcJ.l]. of 1972 :cl1cl1'.oi:ccc; those invo.lvin<} the::; COf:'Ll.it_tee 
on Banking ana Currency as weI] as provi.ding an insight into 
the extent of his knowleCge of these activities. 
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Honorable Peter W. Rodino, Jr. Page Three 
The September 15 transcript is filled with plans to 
bring various pressures to stop the Banking and Currency 
Committee investigation and the President is the focal 
point of the discussions. In fact, he orders specific 
courses of action in some areas and suggests moves in 
others. At times, there are discussions of involving 
defense counsel for some of the watergate defendants and 
there is an implication that the Justice Department is 
to be ussd. Earlier in the same tape there is a rather 
bald threat by the President to s-;ather "notes" on those 
pushing investigations and to use the Justice Department 
and the Federal Burea·ll. of Investigation in thi s regard. 
The President states in the transcript: 
I' •• • they were doing this quite deliberately 
and they are asking for it and they are 
going to get it.1I 
A review of subsequent transcripts ~nd tapes should 
reve&l whether such threats were intented against the Banking 
and Currency Con!l<ii ttee and v.rhether they' were carried out 
and whether the President issued orders for such Rctivity. 
In add:L tion to shedding 1. igh-t on the impeachment is sues 
before your Committee, a relci3_se of the additional transcript:s 
would do much to preserve the integrity of the investigative 
processes of the Congress. Frankly, the name of this 
Connni tt.ee has been pullc~d into the picture from time to t-ime 
and the names of indivic1L-'o.l ;vlembers hove been bandied a.bou·t 
and I think the C01,,':,littee and i 1:S inoi v :i~dnal l\'~eTilbers \\(ould 
1)2 better served if all the facts couJ.d be laid on the 
recorei throuqh 'elle reJei3_~ie of adc.i t ional tr.'anscripts 0 As 
it stands no':,' there are only crypt.ic comments relat.ing to 
individuals and events in the September 15 transcri_pts and 
these references mayor m2y not be a. fair unO. accurate 
indication of what occured subsequently. It seems only fair 
to inLl.:i.vid.uals and t:o the COrf!"c,i'ct.E:c and the COj!9re~3sthat 
tl'o_nscripts and tapes fo11mrLnq trle ,sept_elr:ber 15 meeting be 
released publicly. After other Commi.tte0of the Congress and 
other investigating agencies took up tho rn2tter r I sought to 
remain out of the picture and to abandon any efforts to 
re-opent.he iSE;ue in the Bc:.nki:og Cind Cun:--ency Committee 0 But 
'chrot-'_9h tf.:stimorJY in the SenC:l-ce \'7at_er(jiJ.1:e Cornsn.it:tee and 
through the investigative efforts of your Committee and the 
President's deci_sion to release edited transcripts, the name 
of this Co~nittee has come DD. 
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Honorable ?eter W. Rodino, Jr. Page Four 
In addition to these questions, a release of the additional 
transcripts and tapes to which I refer would aid greatly 
in clarifying the role of Vice-President Gerald Ford in 
blocking the 1972 investigation. At this juncture in history, 
it seems very important that such an issue be cleared up. 
As the transcript in your possession clearly shows, the 
President and his aides were attempting to bring the then 
Minority Leader Ford in to lead the effort to block the 
investigation. Mr. Ford conceded in his confirmation he2rings 
that he had two meetings with the RepublicQD Members of the 
Committee but he emphat:ically denied that he discussed the 
issue of the Banking Cownittee investigation with the President, 
Mr. Dean, Mr. Ehrlichman, or Mr. Haldeman. The transcript 
which is in your possession, however, contains an explicit 
statement by the President that Mr. Ford should become active 
in the effort. The transcript shows that Mr. Dean and Mr. 
Haldeman followed the President's statement with equally 
explicit COlmnents ahout vlhat tv::r, Fo;cd should do regarding 
the Banking Committee's hearings. 
Later in the same transcript, the President is quoted: 
"Tell Ehrlichman to get Brown 2nd Ford in t.ogether 
and they can work out something. They ought to get 
off of their and push it. No use to let 
Patrra.n have a-~:Free -rIde here," 
Despite the President's very clear statements in th8 
several instances in the transcript I t'le:- ,Ford c3enies oIlY 
such approaches in answer to a question put by Senator 
Robert Byrd of West Virginia in hearings ~efore the Committee 
on Rules and Administration of the U. S. Senate on 
November 5; 1973 r and I quote from Pages 13,1-5 of the 
hearing-s: 
",sENATOR BYED: jV\r. Fo:cd f you undoubtedly \vould 1.·ecal1 
any cc:o.ve:csation you might h2.Vl': hd.d OUlj.ilg· 'chat period 
of Au<::ust--Oc-lober v.':i_th the P:cc:;sidcnt, \,ti.th i"'ir. Haldenw)~r 
Mr. Ehrlic)")man, j\'jr. Deem, or ar,yone at the \'-'hit.e T-Icll.J.2,e f 
in conllection with the proposed investigation by the 
Patman cO)"f)T'.lit tee., 0 Do you :t:'(;cal J. oJ)',' such co,veJ:.sa ti.o~l s 
that vlould indiccd~e t:hc:"C tl,.C: (}ili to HC1U::;8 punted ,;o~: t() 
lend your e:f:' forts f as a leader, 'U) bJ()c)~i l1'] such c;!l 
inves t i.q o.l: :i.on? 
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Honorable Peter W. Rodino, Jr. Page Five 
"HR. FORD: I can say categorically, Senator Byrd, 
I never talked with the President about it, or 
with Mr. Haldeman, l\'1r. Ehrlichman, -and .Mr. Dean. 
I know emph~tically I had no conversation with 
them now." 
Obviously, either the President's orders were not c~rried 
out by his trusted aides or Mr. Ford's testimony before ~he 
Sena.te Committee is untruthful. 
Mr, Chairman, all of us in the House appreciate the 
judicious manner in which you are carrying out your 
investigations and this letter is sent to you in a spirit 
of continuing cooperation with the activities of your 
Committee. 
With very best regards; I am 
[12138]
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lJO:tP .~ 
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This Committee r o:C cou:Cc~ei s0unded.thc. a12J::-ffi 
.f-- -. "\' 
~Ct A>. eVcision! 
Lhrow;h ths House on 0.1: uncLL.'Jilii;:)l;S vote" 
t.o 
of 
poJ.itical figu~Qs. 
This is a serious C0SC 
st:.oc);~ 
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In liS:-:-;: of i:-,hc seer iou::;ncs:=: of: UiCSC ch3r9~s 
i 1- J. (' - ., 
reasoDaols ::0 expect t,hcsc. o-Cfic.ials to C01.::8 f.():C'.·}(~rd 
tr-u:oUCTh 
p:ce:,:cnt, the- :::c_cts in on ope:n fo:cu:" 0 
- _ ... - --
v. .. .- .-:.. ; . . ~- I 
.. 
.: .~~\'>"~ () 1.1 
f a.c L.,J ( 
is n.C) t 
., -, (; J C.'C'_ j_' C' c .. 
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~n this Com~ittee 
public he want2d aone 
cvc:cythi:J.g 
It lS 
. . 
G f) c· r., L.\~~ ~:.~_ ~ .i .. (1, ~j ::J (. 
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)\'10 r-,i cs t.h:co'--'gh iure:i S r: countri es u!:.d bo. ck into the 
seven Cc£endarts. 
r'j·ll. . 
... ,10 
ci ):.C(i.. .l._}1 tl 
been 
. '-' 
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This 12.st···minute CO::--;CCTn 06inCj cxvccssed .::,bout. 
the: dc£cnC:.a2,ts! :eight.s is, lYl 1C::/ OPL'llOD, not.hiLg 
more i.-:.h::i~1 a S80xc;;,crccn to hic;J:O Uw rc~a.l reasons 
why SO~2 people do not WQnt t~csc hG2r~nsS to proceed. 
pcoplQ to know the facts the fuLL fc:cts ..... arxmt: 
this sor~id casco 
! i~ '-: .' 
~. ). 
\_. J •• ~_. 
.......,~ "/ 
<-~ J .;. '_ \ 
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A~eric~n ?~8p}C will neve~ have th8 facts. 
shreds 
r "1' O~ pape~ ana a ong list of wJLnesscs who can no 
cons:i.d.2i:" c:.j=:ont~ the tilllincJ of U.!csc hcc:.:cings. In a 
ve:cdic~ . 
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RESOLUTlO:-1 
.Rc.sol·:e~l That the Committee on Banking and Curre l.1cy <luthorizcs tho. 
ChainllCln to use a.ll necessary and proper j,]t::a[lS \d.l:hin the Rules of :.:h,; 
HOLlse of R2prCsenl:o.tivC's and the rules of the COTnmi.l:tee on Danking and 
Cun:ency, i.ncluding the use of subroen" pOI}er> to compel (:he au:enda.ncc 
of the witnQsscs specified in section 2 2nd the production by such witnesses 
of all. books$ records i minuu~s, r!1c;noJ:'anclo., correspondence and other relato.cl 
docul'i1(~nl:s anclmat:8rJ.i:"oL, \,!bich ,'/:Ul enable l:hc Committc;c, to fully inveSl:iZ3tc 
the extent to which--
(1) financial institutions and foreign financial arrangc-
r:l'211ts 'dere 1)ssd in f'l"C!vidin~~ 01. fo.cilil~"Ling Li,:] c:oJ.lc(:l:ion of 
funds £0:(' t.he C(;'Ir:[ .. d.tt:0.(~ to nE:>EJ.2('.r: t:hc pt:(;siclertt: or any 
(2) c:ol1l~dbl1!:i(lns Lo LllC2 Fl.partee C01T\\:LttC8 Lo ~·~c"E12ct 
J.cg},slatJ.on \;,hich is \7J.Lhin ,-1-:2 jurisdicLion of Lhl.C; CO[jFtd_ttce; 
illeg01 aCLS, if any; 2nd 
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in order to detenlinc \'lhether leLiislativc proposals} the subject matter 
of \-.,hich is in the jurisdiction of this Committee, should be initiated. 
'Fhe IlS~ of s!lhpoena pm-lcr shall be aUlhor'izecl to obtaifl oflly ~:ucb bool~s, 
records, minutcs, memorClndi3., coru~sponc1cnce and other pertinent documents 
and materials and the at.:tcliOal1CC Bnd tC8l.i:nony of \.'d.tr\(~ssQs frOTH the 
CorrG'littee {:o Ec-Elect the President its o[fJ.ce:cs$ offJcials, and directors, 
both past <md present:, 2S \·,1el1 ,).s [ro;n all parties to such funding and fin811-
cial transactions mentioned above, only so long as they arc relevant to the 
transactior!c;, [lod fl-om institutions) !"iUd.n the jur:Lsdicl:loLl of this 
Com:Td. t tee, 
Sec. 2. Subpoenas under this resolution shall issue to--
(1) Robrrt Allen; 
(2) AmerJcan Telephone L Tclegraph Cm~pany and all Fed~ral 
ChQ:~2pc:akc D. Potom,ClC Tcdcrhoc,e COlDf12ny _ f:: UJ. l-r.:-1.rylQnd 
Chcsap;:;akc L Po l: 0),,):0:(: T2 l(~ ph ,,1 t.-1 c~ C C~:lp::1. rl.y elf V:i.]~gini.3. 
(~) Alfreri D~lriwin; 
[12147]
- 3 -
(6) ReC(H'ds relating to the Vexican transfer of ca.mt)Clign fUl1cls 
in the possession of appropriate Federal Reserve Banks and the 
Internal Revenue Service; 
(7) John Caulfield; 
(8) Ardc,', Chamber8; 
(9) l'laury Choti.ner; 
(10) eh a:., e Hanhiltt[~n Dank; 
Ul) CO'lUr,enl:21. (Illinois BreDk and Trust CC:i:1pany of: Ch:Lc8.go; 
(12) Kenne til H(. Do.11 lbcJ.:'g; 
(J.3) John Drell1; 
co,rmi.tlecs X"p-latcd thereto; 
Riggs Natio021 Dank 
[12148]
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(20) Harry fleming; 
(21) Sally }!anTIony; 
(22) Gulf Resour.CCil fi nd ChemicaJ. COi~porat:i.ol1 and all its 
subs1.Ji;:;r:I.cs ; 
(23) Frederick La Rue; 
(2/{) Cl a rk rl<1cGregor; 
(25) Jeb Stuart Magruder; 
(26) gcbeH C. )-!a.!:dian; 
(27) . John N. i.J.iLcilcU; 
(28) Robert OdIe; 
(30) Er.::::~o:tC r.ey[~;J1.d() i 
(31) RcpubU.;:: r~ati()llal Bar.-;k of Nimr.i; 
( ') r, ) .. )t. 
(33) 
\\; eshingtoI1~ D.,C.; 
(39 ) 
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(40) Hal: e.:cg&.Le \'Jest Apart m2.ntCj " 2700 Virgil<~? AVent12 ~ N. H .. ~. 
9ngton~ D.G. 
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ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 
The evidence relating to the Watergate break-in and cover-
up, reviewed above in detail, demonstrates various abuses of Presi-
dential power, including: 
The directive to the CIA to interfere in the FBI in-
vestigation. 
The use of Counsel to the President John Dean to 
interfere with the investigation. 
Offers of executive clemency fer improper purposes. 
Obtaining information from Assistant Attorney General 
Petersen and passing it on to targets and potential targets of the 
investigation. 
Discouraging the prosecutors from granting immunity to 
Dean. 
The firing of Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. 
In this section of the memorandum, other instances of possible 
abuse of Presidential powers are examined" They involve seven areas: 
(1) intelligence gathering, including the 1969-1971 wiretaps authorized 
by the President and conducted by the FBI;, the wiretap and FBI sur-
veillance of Joseph Kraft, the Huston Plan, the Secret Service wiretap 
of Donald Nixon, and the FBI investigation of Daniel Schorr; (2) the 
Special Investigations Unit, including the Fielding break-in and the 
use of the CIA; (3) the concealment of intelligence-gathering activi-
ties, including the concealment of the records of the 1969-71 wiretaps 
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and the Fielding break~in, and the offer of the position of FBI 
Director to the judge presiding in the Ellsberg trial; (4) endeavors 
to use the Internal Revenue Service for the political benefit of the 
President; (5) the appointment of Richard Kleindienst as Attorney 
General; (6) the 1971 milk price support decision, and (7) expenditures 
by the General Services Administration on the President's properties 
at Key Biscayne and San Clemente. 
The issue in each of these areas is whether the President 
used the powers of his office in"an illegal or improper manner to 
serve his personal, political or finanoial interests. 
[12152]
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,': . 
ILLEGAL It.'TELLIGE):CE-GATHE!{IXG 
From early in the President's first term, the ~~ite House, 
at his direction or on his authority, engaged in a series of activities 
designed to obtain intelligence for the political benefit of the Presi-
dent. These activities involved widespr e ad and repeated abuses of 
power, illegal and improper activities by executive agencies, and 
violations of the constitutional rights of citizens. 
A. The 1969-1971 \'iiret a ps 
In 1'1ay 1969 the President au thorized a program of \,rlretaps 
of government employees and newsmen, origiually in an effort to deter-
mine the sources of leaks of secret inforDk1.tion related to foreign 
{. 
\ ...... . '. 
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policy. (Book VII, 147) Under this program, electronic surveillance 
was instituted by the FBI at the request of the White House on seven 
National Security Council (NSC) employees, three employees of govern-
ment agencies, four newsmen, and three WhiteHouse staff members. 
(Book VII, 153) The FBI was instructed by NSC official Alexander Haig 
at the time of the first taps not to enter records of the surveillance 
in FBI indexes. 
Normally, the Justice Department reviews the necessity and 
propriety of the taps every ninety days. This .practice was not 
followed with respect to the taps of any of these 17 individuals. 
(Book VII, 175, 178, 189-90) 
The directions to the FBI to institute the wiretaps came 
variously from Haig, Mitchell, and Haldeman, but the President has 
acknowledged that he authorized each of them. (Book VII, 160-61, 189, 
198) Reports o~ the special wiretaps were sent during 1969 and 1970 
1/ 
to the President, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Kissinger. From May 12, 
1970 to February 11, 1971 reports were sent only to Haldeman. (Book 
VII, 187, 370) 
The reports sent to the White House included information 
on the personal and political activities of the persons who were wire-
tapped. They included information with respect to the voting plans of 
certain Senators, the activities of critics of administration ~olicies, 
!/ The President received 34 reports, Kissinger 37 (of which all but 
three were copies of those sent to the President), Ehrlichman 15, and 
Haldeman 52. (Book VII, 371-73) 
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a Democratic Presidential candidate's campaign and the personal acti-
vities and political plans of White House employees. None of the 
reports bore on the disclosure of classified material. (Book VII, 
224-30, 253-56, 280-82, 302-04) The President acknowledged that the 
reports contained no information useful to national security, and 
demonstrated an awareness of the political nature of the contents of 
the reports in his conversation with John Dean on February 28, 1973. 
(HJCT, 37) 
Three of the seven NSCstaff members subject to the special 
wiretaps continued to be wiretapped for substantial periods after 
leaving the NSC, one tap remaining in place nine months after Assistant 
FBI Director ~ullivan recommended that coverage be remove~ and after 
the employee terminated all relationship with the NSC. Two of these 
three NSC employees who had left the government were wiretapped while 
they were serving as advisers to a United States Senator who was a 
candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination. (Book VII, 
203-05, 211-17) The reports from these taps, which had previously 
been sent to Kissinger, were shifted to Haldeman at the direction of 
the President after the two men's affiliation with the NSC ended. 
(Book VII, 370) Three White House staff members working in areas un-
related to national security and with no access to NSC materials were 
wiretapped. (Book VII, 260) The requests for two of these wiretaps 
were oral, one by Haldeman and one by Mitchell. A wiretap of a member 
of Ehrlichman's staff was specifically denominated as off the record. 
Reports of the wiretap and physical surveillance of this staff member 
were sent to Ehrlichman. (Book VII, 267-73) 
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On at least one occasion, material contained in a summary 
1/ 
letter sent by FBI Director Hoover to the President was used by 
the President's staff for political purposes. Director Hoover's 
letter disclosed former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford's plan 
to write an article attacking President Nixon in connection with the 
Vietnam war. (Book VII, 360-61) White House staff members devised 
methods of countering Clifford's article and sent them to Haldeman. 
Haldeman directed Magruder to be ready to react and suggested finding 
methods of "pre-action." He concluded, " . the key now is how to 
lay groundwork and be ready to go -- as well as to take all possible 
preliminary steps." And: "Let's get going." Ehrlichman characterized 
the Clifford information as "the kind of early warning we need more 
of." And he noted to Haldeman: "Your game planners are now in an 
excellent position to map anticipatory action." (Book VII, 365-68) 
B. Joseph Kraft Wiretap and Surveillance 
In June 1969 Ehrlichman directed his assistant, John 
Caulfield, to have a wiretap installed on the telephone of newspaper 
columnist Joseph Kraft. The wiretap was installed by John Ragan, a 
security consultant to the Republican National Committee, and it 
remained in place for one week. Kraft was in Europe, and none of his 
m~n conversations were intercepted. (Book VII, 314-17) Ehrlichman 
has testified that he discussed the wiretap with the President and 
that the wiretap was authorized for a national security purpose, but 
1./ The evidence shows that sununary letters were signed by 
Hoover and hand-carried to the offices of the addressees. 
187-88) 
Director 
(Book VII, 
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that Ehrlichman did not know that the wiretap had in fact been in-
stalled. (Book VII, 323) 
The wiretap on Kraft's home was not approved by the Attorney 
General and no record was made of· it. The Kraft tap was installed 
within three weeks after the first FBI wiretaps under the President's 
special program (Book VII, 314, 317), and within a week after a tap on 
another newsman was installed by the FBI. (Book VII, 214, 356-57) 
Kraft had no history of using leaked national security information in 
his newspaper column. 
After the tap was installed, Ehrlichman told Caulfield that 
the FBI had been persuaded to take over the surveillance of Kraft. 
The FBI arranged for a microphone to be installed.in. Kraft's hotel room 
in a European country. FBI records stated that in July and November 
of 1969 reports on the coverage were sent to Ehrlichman. From November 
5 to December 12, 1969 the FBI conducted spot physical surveillance 
on Kraft in Washington, D. C. (Book VII, 356-57) 
C. The "Huston Plan" 
On June 5, 1970 the President appointed an ad hoc committee 
consisting of the heads of the FBI, CIA, National Security Agency (NSA) , 
and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to study the need for better 
domestic intelligence operations in light of an escalating level of 
bombing and other acts of domestic violence. (Book VII, 377) On June 25 
the ad hoc committee submitted a report containing options for relaxing 
existing restraints on intelligence-gathering procedures. Footnotes in 
the report noted the FBI's objection to relaxing the restraints on 
intelligence-gathering. (Book VII, 384-431) 
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During the first week of July, Presidential Staff Assistant 
Tom Charles Huston sent a memorandum to Haldeman recommending that 
the President adopt options in the report of the ad hoc committee to 
relax restraints on intelligence-gathering collection. Huston noted 
that the options to relax restraints for surreptitious entries and 
covert mail covers were illegal, but nevertheless recommended them 
and wrote that in earlier years Hoover had conducted surreptitious 
entries with great success. (Book VII, 438-40) 
On July 14 Haldeman sent a memorandum to Huston stating that 
the President had approved Huston's recommendations. (Book VII, 447) 
On Haldeman's instructions Huston prepared and distributed to the 
members of the committee a formal decision memorandum advising that 
the President had decided to relax restraints on electronic surveil-
lances and penetrations, mail covers, and surreptitious entries. 
(Book VII, 450) 
FBI Director Hoover and Attorney General Mitchell opposed 
the decision and Mitchell has testified that he informed the President 
and Haldeman of his opposition. On July 27 or 28, 1970 on Haldeman's 
instructions, Huston recalled the decision memorandum. - (Book VII, 
470-71, 475-77) 
Huston had also endorsed the ad hoc committee's recommenda-
tion for the establishment of an Intelligence Evaluation Committee. 
Book VII, 442) The recommendation was implemented in the fall of 1970, 
for the stated purpose of coordinating and making more effective the 
separate intelligence efforts of the DIA, NSA, CIA and FBI. (Book VII, 
499) Some of the material gathered by the Intelligence Evaluation 
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Committee was sent to Haldeman in a "Political Matters" memorandum 
dated February 1, 1972 reporting on potential demonstrations at the 
Republican National Convention. (Political Matters Memoranda, February 
1, 1972, 69-74) 
D. The Donald Nixon Surveillance and Wiretap 
In 1969 Haldeman and Ehrlichman requested the CIA to conduct 
a physical surveillance of Donald Nixon because he was moving to Las 
Vegas and would come in contact with criminal elements. The CIA 
refused. (Report of conversation between CIA Inspector General and 
Robert Cushman, June 29, 1973, received from CIA) 
In late 1970 the Secret Service, whose primary duty is the 
physical protection of the President, placed a wiretap on the telephone 
of Donald Nixon, the President's brother. (Book VII,·S09) The Presi-
dent has said that the wiretap "involved what others who were trying 
to get [Donald Nixon], perhaps, to use. improper influence, and so 
forth, might be doing and particularly anybody who might be in a 
foreign country." (Book VII, 522) The President also said that his 
brother knew about the "tyiretap "during the fact." 
While there is no direct evidence that the President ordered 
the installation of the tap, it would seem extremely unlikely that a 
wiretap on his brother would have been undertaken without the Presi-
dent's approval. 
E. Daniel Schorr Investigation 
In August 1971 Daniel Schorr, a television commentator for 
CBS News, was invited to the White House to meet with staff assistants 
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to the President about what they considered to be unfavorable news 
analysis by Schorr of a Presidential speech. (Book VII, 1113) 
Shortly thereafter, while traveling with the President, Haldeman 
directed Lawrence Higby, his chief aide, to obtain an FBI background 
report on Schorr. Following Higby's request, the FBI conducted an 
extensive investigation of Schorr (Book VII, 1120, 1123-24), inter-
viewing 25 persons, including members of Schorr's family, friends. 
employers, and the like, in seven hours. (Book VII, 1115, 1118-19) 
Following public disclosure of the investigation, a "cover story" was 
created. Colson testified that the President and Colson agreed to 
state that Schorr was investigated in connection with a potential 
appointment as an assistant to the Chairman of the Council on Environ-
mental Quality. Colson testified that the President knew Schorr had 
never been considered for such a position. (Charles Colson testimony, 
July 15, 1974, T. 4113) Haldeman has testified that Schorr was not 
being considered for any federal appointment and that he could not 
remember why the request was made. (Book VII, 1120) 
Wiretaps without a court order are generally illegal and 
violate the constitutional right of citizens against tmreasonable 
searches and seizures. (18 U.S.C. §25l0, et ~.; Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1969)) The Supreme Court held in 1972 that the 
President had no constitutional power to authorize warrantless wire-
taps for domestic security purposes; it reserved the question of his 
constitutional authority to conduct national security electronic 
surveillance to gather foreign intelligence information. (United 
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States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). The 
wiretaps conducted by the FBI in 1969-71, however, did not meet the 
Justice Department criteria then in effect for national security wire-
taps or the definition contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3). In the case 
of the three taps of members of the President's domestic staff and 
the continuation of reports of the political activities of two NSC 
employees long after they had terminated their relationship with the 
the NSC, there could be no national security justification under any 
reasonable interpretation of that term. 
Similarly, the Kraft wiretap was illegal. The eavesdropping 
in Kraft's hotel room in a foreign country also violated his consti-
tutional rights -- which do not end at the nation's borders. (Reid 
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)) It also involved the FBI in foreign 
operations beyond its authority. 
The Donald Nixon wiretap exceeded the statutory authority 
of the Secret Service to provide physical protection for the President 
and his immediate family; and consensual wiretap is nonetheless ille-
gal unless the consent is obtained before the interception of conver-
sations. (18 U.S.C. §2511(2)(c) and (d)) 
These activities and other surveillance that may not have 
)j 
been illegal per se were intended to serve the personal political 
purposes of the President, not any national policy objective. They 
1/ Such as the activities of Anthony Ulasewicz from 1969 to 1971. 
Ulasewicz was paid by Herbert l~almbach out of surplus 1969 campaign 
fUrlds, but '''as ~iven his orders by the \·;rhite House. (Book VII, 
336-53) 
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were often directed at people whose sole offense was their consti-
tutionally protected political views. The fruits of the intelligence-
gathering were provided to the Pr~sident's political aides and in at 
least one instance used by them for political purposes. The Committee 
could conclude that these activities constituted an abuse of the powers 
of the Office of the President. 
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SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT 
There is evidence that the President encouraged and approved 
actions designed to provide information that would be used to discredit 
Daniel Ellsberg, the peace movement, the Democratic party, and prior 
administrations. These actions included the break-in at the office of 
Dr. Lewis Fielding. Ellsberg's psychiatrist. The~e is also evidence 
that in aid of this information-gathering program the President 
authorized activities by the Central Intelligence Agency that violated 
its statutory charter. 
In the week following the June 13, 1971 publication of 
excerpts from a top secret Defense Department study of the history 
of American involvement in Vietnara (the "Pentagon Papers") (Book VII, 
593) the President authorized the creation of a special investigations 
unit within the White House. He has stated that the mission of the unit. 
which became knmm as the I1Pl.umbers. 11 ~.]as to investigate security leaks 
and prevent future leaks. The President has also stated that the first 
priority for the Plumbers was the investigation of Daniel Ellsberg, 
(Book VII, 651) who was under federal indictment for the theft ·of the 
Pentagon Papers. (Book VII, 616-17) 
Documents written at the time of the formation of the 
Plumbers, however, show that the Pentagon Papers matter was viewed 
primarily as an opportunity to discredit Ellsberg, the peace movement, 
the Democratic party and prior administrations. In a memorandum to 
Haldeman dated June 25, 1971 Colson wrote that it was important to 
keep the Pentagon Papers issue alive because of their value in evidencing 
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the poor judgment of prior Democratic administrations, thus working 
to the disadvantage of most Democratic candidates. The memorandum 
made no mention of any effect on national security of the disclosure 
of the Pentagon Papers, but said that the greatest risk to the Adminis-
tration would be to get caught and have its efforts become obvious. 
(Book VII, 664-73) 
Patrick Buchanan, in declining to serve as the person 
responsible for the project, wrote in a memorandum to John Ehrlichman 
dated July 8, 1971 that the political dividends would not justify the 
magnitude of the investigation recommended for "Project Ellsberg". 
He referred to the investment of "major personnel resources" in a 
"covert operation" over a three-month period timed to undercut the 
McGovern-Hatfield opposition by linking the theft of the Pentagon 
Papers with "ex-NSC types," "leftist writers" and "left-wing papers." 
(Book VII, 708-11) 
John Ehrlichman's hand\.,ritten notes taken during meetings 
with the President in June and July 1971 confirm that the President 
viewed the prosecution of Ellsberg not principally as a national 
security matter, but with a view toward gaining a public relations 
and political advantage. 
On June 17 under the designation 7T(Ehrlichman's symbol for 
the President), Ehrlichman noted: "~.Jin PR, not just court case." 
And on June 19, the notes state, "Win the case but the NB thing is to 
get the public view right. Hang it all on LBJ." 
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On June 23, ten days after publication of the Pentagon 
Papers and several weeks before the organization of the Plumbers,the 
notes show that Secretary of Defense Laird advised the President and 
Ehrlichman that 98% of the Pentagon Papers could have been declassified. 
This was acknowledged on July 1 when the President said, according 
to the notes, "Espionage -- not involved in Ellsberg case," and "don't 
think in terms of spies." The President advised Ehrlichman to read 
the Alger Hiss chapter in the President's book Six Crises, observing 
"It was won in the press." At the same meeting Ehrlichman wrote, 
"Leak stuff out This is the way we win." 
On July 6 "77 to 1M: must be tried in the papers. Not 
Ellsberg (since already indicted). Get conspiracy smoked out thru 
the papers. Hiss and Bently cracked that way." During the same 
converation, Ehrlichman wrote: "f'1 Leak thee [evidence] of 
guilt." The President also asked, "put a non -,.( [legal] team on 
the conspiracy?" The July 9 notes reflect the assignment of David 
Young "to a special project. II The overall goal of the Ellsberg matter 
was set out in Ehrlichman's notes of July 10: "Goal - Do to McNamara, 
Bundy, JFK elite the same destructive job that was done on Herbert 
Hoover years ago." (John Ehrlichman handwritten notes of meetings 
with the President, received from the Sepcial Prosecutor, July 15, 1974) 
At the reconnnendation of Charles Colson, E. Hmvard Hunt was 
hired by the White House as of July 6. (Book VII, 506) Hunt ~vas asked 
to assure that the portions of the Pentagon Papers being published 
included information derogatory to Democratic administrations. (Book VII, 
714-26) In a July 1 telephone conversation Colson asked Hunt if the 
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Pentagon Papers could be turned into a major public case and Ellsberg 
and his co-conspirators could be tried in the newspapers. Runt said 
yes. (Book VII, 699-702) 
On July 7, after Ehrlichman was introduced to Hunt by Colson, 
(Book VII, 718-19) Ehrlichman called CIA Deputy Director Robert Cushman 
and said: 
I want to alert-you that an old acquaintance, 
Howard Runt, has been asked by the President 
to do some special consultant work on security 
problems. He may be contacting you sometime 
in the future for some assistance. I wanted 
you to know that he was in fact doing some 
things for the President. He is a long-time 
acquaintance with the people here. He may 
want some help on computer runs and other 
things. You should consider he has a pretty 
much carte blanche. (Book VII, -728) 
While denying any recollection of this telephone call, (Book VII, 733) 
which was transcribed by Cushman's secretary, (Book VII, 729, 732) 
Ehrlichman has testified that the President authorized enlisting the 
aid of the CIA in the activities of the Plumbers and that his only 
contacts with the CIA were at the direction of the President. (Book 
VII, 734-38) 
On the weekend of July 17, Ehrlichman recruited David Young 
imd Egil Krogh as co-chairmen of the Plumbers. (Book VII, 796, 807) 
During the following week, G. Gordon Liddy and Hunt joined the Unit. 
(Book VII, 816, 819) Krogh and Young were told to report to Ehrlichman, 
the President's Domestic Affairs Advisor. (Book VII, 651, 654) Colson 
was given the task of publicly dissewinat~ng tQe material acquired 
by the unit in the course of its investigation. (Book VII, 830-32) 
The organizational chart of the Unit shows that the group intended 
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to accumulate data from the various agencies and executive departments, 
pass it through Ehrlichman to the President, and make it available 
to the press and to any Congressional hearings. (Book VII, 814, 
834-41) 
Hunt began receiving assistance from the CIA on July 22, 
when the CIA provided him with alias identification and disguise 
materials. (Book VII, 845-58) This assistance was in excess of the 
]j 
statutory jurisdiction of the CIA. On July 28 Hunt sent a memorandum 
to Colson suggesting that the CIA be asked to supply a psychological 
profile on Ellsberg. The memorandum also suggested that the files 
on Ellsberg be obtained from his psychiatrist, for use in destroying 
Ellsberg's public image and credibility. (Book VII, 914) Young 
subsequently requested such a profile from the CIA's Director of 
Security and the Director of the CIA himself, stressing the high level 
of interest of the White House and the personal interest of Ehrlichman 
in the project. (Book VII, 898-905) The profile~ the only one ever 
prepared by the CIA on an American civilian, was delivered to the White 
House on August 11. (Book VII, 1009, 1011-19) The CIA staff psychia-
trist involved in the profile met with the Plumbers on August 12 and Young 
requested that the profile be further developed. (Book VII, 1083-84, 1091) 
1/ The CIA's jurisdiction is limited by a prov~s~on in the National 
Security Act of 1947, as amended, which states: "[T]he agency shall have 
no police, subpoena, lal,,-enforcemen t powers, or internal-security functions; 
[and] the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for 
protecting intelligence Sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." 
50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3). Hunt first used the disguise materials for an inter-
view intended to obtain derogatory information about the Kennedy political 
g~oup. (Book VII, 853) As Hunt continued to make requests, the Agency recog-
nlzed that he clre\" it "into the sensitive area of domestic operations against 
Americans. II Hhile the CIA asked Ehrlichman to restrain Hunt \"hen his demands 
became excessive, (Book VII; 1226-38) the materials were used again in Hunt's 
interview ,-lith Dita Beard in the spring of 1972 and in the \-Jatergate break-
in. O/ouse Armed Services Committee Report No. 93-25 October 23 1973 3) 
, " 
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The Plumbers had been informed that the FBI failed on July 
20 and 26 to get the cooperation of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. 
(Book VII, 983, 987-90) On or about August 5, Krogh and Young informed 
Ehrlichman of the FBI's failure to cooperate fully in the Ellsberg 
investigation and Krogh recommended that Hunt and Liddy be sent to 
California to complete the Ellsberg irivestigation. Ehrlichman 
stated that he discussed "lith the President the conversation Hith Krogh 
and the FBI's failure to cooperate and that he passed on the President's 
instruction to Krogh that he shotild do whatever he considered necessary. 
Ehrlichman has testified that the President approved the 
recommendation that the unit become operational and approved a trip 
by Hunt and Liddy to California to get "some facts which Krogh felt 
he badly needed . " (Book VII, 993, 997-98, 1001) 
On August 11 Krogh and Young made a ,rritten "recommendation 
for a covert operation to obtain the files of Ellsberg's psychiatrist 
because the CIA psychological profile received that day Has unsatis-
factory. Ehrlichman initialed his approval. The only qualification 
Ehrlichman imposed was an assurance that it not be traceable to the 
White House. (Book VII, 1022-28) 
Hunt and Liddy made a reconnaissance trip to California to 
inspect Dr. Fielding's office, equipped with alias identification, 
disguise materials and a camera provided by the CIA, \vhich also 
developed the photographs taken there. On August 30, 1971, after Runt 
and Liddy reported that their reconnaissance satisfied them that an 
entry operation was feasible, Krogh and Young have testified that they 
called Ehrlichman and told him that they believed an operation was 
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possible that could not be traced to the White House, and Ehrlichrnan 
gave his approval. (Book VII, 1240-44) 
The break-in of Dr. Fielding's office was carried out over 
the Labor Day weekend of September 3 and 4, by a team under the direction 
of Hunt and Liddy. (Book VII, 1276, 1281-92) The operation was 
financed by Colson, Hho borrowed $5,000 in cash from a Hashington public 
relations man, and repaid him with a $5,000 political contribution 
Colson solicited from the dairy industry. (Book VII, 1248-49, 1252-53, 
1266-74) It remains uncertain whether the burglary netted any in for-
mation about Ellsberg, in light of conflicting testimony by the burglars 
1/ 
and Dr. Fielding. (Book VII, 1293-97) 
On September 8 Ehrlic~~an met with Krogh and· Young and later 
"dth the President. On September 10 he went directly from a meeting \vith 
2/ 
the President to meet with Krogh and Young. (Book VII, 1335-57) 
The President's concern Hith the ~llsberg case was not Hith 
espionage or national security, but 'vith politics and public relations. 
He discussed with Colson disseminating to the press derogatory infor-
mation about Leonard Boudin, Ellsberg's attorney. (Colson testimony, 
July 15, 1974, T 4090-94) A memorandum by Hunt on Boudin was subse-
quently leaked. (Book VII, 1126, 1128-38, 1140, 1144) The Plumb.ers 
1/ Krogh pleaded guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241 for consplrlng 
to injure Dr. Fielding in the free exercise or enjoyment of his Fourth 
Amendment rights. (Book VII, 1608-13) On July 12, 1974 Ehrliclunan was 
found guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 241 for his participation in approving 
the break-in. Liddy and tHO others ,v'ere also found guilty. (U.S. v. 
Ehr1ichman, July 12, 1974, transcript) 
Jj The House Judiciary Committee 
cordin~s of those conversations. 
these recordings. 
on June 24, 1974 subpoenaed the tape re-
The President has refused to produce 
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hoped to find damaging material about Ellsberg in the psychiatric 
records that could be incorporated into a media and Congressional 
1/ 
publicity campaign. When the break-in at Dr. Fielding's office 
produced no usable material, they again asked the CIA for a follow-up 
psychological profile of Ellsberg. The CIA resisted attempts to 
produce a second profile. Internal CIA memoranda demonstrate that 
the staff was opposed to preparing the profile because it was beyond 
the Agency's jurisdiction and the staff was suspicious of the use that 
might be made of the profile. (Book VII, 1408-11) The affidavit of 
the staff psychiatrist who directed the efforts concluded that the 
purpose was to defame or manipulate Ellsberg. (Book VII, 1400-07) 
Despite the resistance, a second profile was written and delivered 
to Helms ~vho directed its delivery to the White House. Helms sent 
a separate letter to David Young expressing the CIA's pleasure in 
being of assistance but impressing upon Young the importance of 
concealing the CIA's involvement. (Book VII, 1412-20) 
The Plumbers had no police powers or statutory authority; 
indeed their existence was kept secret until 1973, after they had 
ceased functioning. Their primary purpose -- to discredit Daniel 
Ellsberg for the President's political advantage -- violated 
Ellsberg's constitutional right to a fair trial on the criminal charges 
against him; it interfered with the fair administration of justice. 
On June 3, 1974 Charles Colson pleaded guilty to obstructing the trial 
of Daniel Ellsberg by carrying out the plan to publicly discredit Ellsberg. 
(Book VII, 1139-49) 
--------------------
1/ This ~vas articulated in an August 26 memorandum from 
Ehrlichman entitled, "Status of Information Hhich Can Be 
Congressional Investigation on Pentagon Papers Affair." 
1215-20) 
Young to 
Fed Into 
(Book VII, 
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The Fielding break-in, conducted by agents of the Plumbers, also 
was a violation of Dr. Fielding's constitutional rights and at least 
one federal civil rights law, 18 U.S.C. §241. The President's chief 
domestic aide, John Ehr1ichman, has been convicted of this offense. 
The Committee could conclude that the break-in was a natural and 
foreseeable consequence of activities authorized by the President. 
The use of the Central Intelligence Agency to prepare the 
psychological profiles of E11sberg and to provide materials for Hunt's 
use in the E11sberg project (as w~ll as political intelligence-gathering 
by Hunt) involved the misuse of the President's power as Chief Executive. 
The CIA has no authority to engage in domestic activities. Indeed, 
its jurisdiction is expressly limited by statute to prohibit its 
involvement in domestic intelligence-gathering. 
[12171]
III. 
CONCEALHENT OF TIlE EVIDENCE OF 
INTELLIGENCE-GATHERI~G ACTIVITIES 
There is evidence that the President directed and engaged 
in activities to prevent the revelation of the 1969-1971 wiretaps and 
the Fielding break-in, including concealment of the wiretap records, 
creation of a ~ational security justification for the Fielding 
break-in and ordering Assistant Attorney General Petersen not to in-
vestigate the break-in on the basis of this justification, and the offer 
of the position of Director of the FBI to the presiding judge in the 
Ellsberg trial. In addition, as discussed in previous sections of this 
memorandum, the President's desire to conceal the Fielding break-in 
was one of the purposes for the Watergate cover-up and a specific objec-
tive of the payment of money to Hunt. 
A. Concealment of Records of the 1969-1971 Wiretaps. 
When the FBI conducts national security wiretaps, it normally 
maintains a central file and indexes of the records of the taps so that 
the names of persons overheard are retrievable for production in a crim-
1/ 
inal trial. The FBI ~!as expressly ordered by Haig, "on the highest 
authority," not to maintain records of the wiretaps initiated uncey tr_c 
President's 1969 authorization. (Book VII, 189) 
1/ Under the rule of Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 169 (1969), 
the Government is required to produce all materials generated by wiretaps 
for inspection by the defendant in a criminal case. 
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In June 1971 publication of the Pentagon Papers began, (Book 
VII, 593), and on June 28 Daniel Ellsberg was indicted in connection with 
their release. (Book VII, 616-17) On July 2 the Internal Security 
Division of the Justice Department, which had responsibility for the 
Ellsberg prosecution, asked the FBI to check its files to determine if 
Ellsberg had been overheard on any electronic surveillance. (Book VII, 
686-87) 
Morton Halperin's telephone had been tapped for 21 months 
(Book VII, 204-05) and Ellsberg had been overheard on it 15 times. 
(Book VII, 696) Shortly after the Internal Security Division had requested 
the FBI check of its files, Assistant: FBI Director William Sullivan in-
formed Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian, the head of the Internal 
Security Division, that he had custody of the files and logs of the 1969-
1971 wiretaps, that he expected to be forced out of the FBI by Director 
Hoover and that he desired to turn the wiretap records over to Mardian. 
Mardian has testified that Sullivan said he feared Hoover would use the 
wiretap material to pressure the President to keep him on as Director 
of the FBI. (Book VII, 757,766-67) 
Mardian sought advice from Attorney General Mitchell and then 
contacted the White House. (Book VII, 758) He was instructed to fly 
to San Clemente to discuss the matter with the President. (Book VII, 
767) John Ehrlichman's notes of a July 10 meeting with the President 
include: liRe: Grand Jury -- Don't worry re taps on discovery -- re WH." 
(John Ehrlichman handwritten notes of meetings with the President, 
received from the Special Prosecutor, July 15, 1974) 
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On July 12, Hardian met with the President and Ehrlichman 
at San Clemente (John Ehrlichman Logs, July 12, 1971) and the 
President directed Mardian to obtain the logs and files from Sullivan 
and to deliver them to the White House. (Book VII, 776) 
Mardian delivered the wiretap files to the Oval Office of 
the White House, but he has refused to say to whom he actually de-
livered them. (Book VII, 2063) Ehrlichman has testified that the 
President ordered him to take possession of the files and that he 
picked up the documents in the Oval Office and placed them in a filing 
cabinet in his office, \"here they remained until April 30, 1973 Hhen 
they were removed from his office and filed with Presidential papers. 
(Book VII, 782) 
As a result of the concealment of the wiretap logs and files 
at the direction of the President, the Government filed three false 
affidavits in the Ellsberg trial denying that there had been electronic 
surveillance or overhears of Ellsberg or Halperin. (Book VII, 1504-1511) 
In February 1973 the Hbite Eouse learned of a forthcoming 
Time magazine story disclosing the existence of Hi'retaps on 'C<,Thite House 
employees and ne\.Jsmen. (Book VII, 1742) John Dean, who had learned 
of the files from Mardian, investigated the Time story by contacting 
Assistant FBI Director Mark Felt, Sullivan and Mardian. [ach confirmed 
the existence of the wiretaps and Mardian said that he had delivered 
the files to Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman told Dean that he had the files, 
but directed Dean to have Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler deny the 
story. (Book VII, 1743) The Time article, pu~lished on February 26, 
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stated that a "Vihite House spokesman" had denied that anyone at the 
White House had authorized or approved any taps on White House employees 
or ne\vsmen. (Book VII, 1748) On February 28, Dean reported to the 
President on the Time story and his meeting with Sullivan about the 
wiretaps. Dean told the President that the White House was "stonevlBlling 
totally" on the vliretap story and the President replied, "Oh, absolutely." 
(HJCT 36) 
The following day Acting FBI Director 1. Patrick Gray pub-
licly testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in his confirma-
tion hearings for the position of Director of the FBI, that FBI records 
did not reveal any such taps and that, as a result of the White House 
denial of their existence, he had not investigated the matter further. 
The ~~ite House continued to deny the existence of the wire-
taps and the files and logs remained in Ehrlichman's safe until 
May 1973. On May 9 Acting FBI Director William Ruckelshaus received 
a report that an FBI employee recalled hearing Ellsberg on a wiretap 
three years earlier. Ruckelshaus reported this information to Assistant 
Attorney General Henry Petersen, who forwarded it to Judge Hatthew 
Byrne, who was presiding over the Ellsberg trial. Petersen also informed 
Judge Byrne that the logs could not be located and there were no records 
of the date, duration, or nature of the \.,iretap. (Book VII, 2051) 
Judge Byrne ordered an immediate investigation. (Book VII, 2047, 2053) 
On May 10 the FBI interviewed Hardian, who revealed that he had delivered 
the records to the ~Jhite House. (Book VII, 2061) Ehrlichman could 
not be located until the following day. Two hours before Ehrlichman 
[12175]
-5-
was interviewed, Judge Byrne dismissed all charges against Ellsberg 
and his co-defendant on the basis of misconduct by the Government, 
specifically including the failure of the Government to produce the 
wiretap records. (Book VII, 2079) 
[12176]
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B. Concealment of the Plumbers' Activities 
The President's objective in authorizing the Plumbers' 
activities, as described above, was to obtain information to dis-
c:redit Ellsberg, the peace movement, -the Democrats and past admin-
istrations. Following the Watergate break-in the President initiated 
a policy of keeping federal investigations away from discovering the 
Plumbers' activities, repeatedly using a national security justifi-
cation for that purpose. On June 23, 1972 the President directed 
Haldeman to discuss '''ith Ehrlichman, CIA Director Helms, and Deputy 
CIA Director I-lalters the possible disclosure of the Plumbers' activities. 
(Book VII, 1534-40) Ehrlichman and Dean subsequently directed FBI and 
Justice Department personnel to concentrate on the Watergate burglars 
themselves and attempted to prevent interviews and investigations of 
individuals who could reveal the Plumbers' activities. (Book II, 
451-70) 
In March and April 1973, when the T",'hite House was seeking 
to prevent disclosure of h'hite House involvement in Watergate, the 
added threat of Hunt to reveal the Fielding break-in surfaced. John 
Dean reported to the President on March 17 that Hunt and Liddy had 
1/ 
broken into Ellsberg's doctor's office. (WHT, 157-60) 
1/ The House Judiciary Co~ittee on 
tape recording of this conversation. 
produce this recording, but produced 
April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the 
The President has refused to 
an edited transcript. 
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On March 21, Dean and the President discussed Hunt's threats 
against Ehrlichman arising from Runt's kno~ledge of t~e Fielding 
break-in. Dean told the President that Hunt and Liddy were totally 
aware of the fact that the authorization came right froID' th~ Hhite Rouse 
and the President sa-id, "I don't know what the hell He did that for." 
Dean said, "I don't either." (HJCT, 92) 
Later in the same conversation, Dean conceived the idea of 
using an excuse of "national security" to cover the break-in: 
J)EAX. 
l'm:sIDF.);"T. 
IhLODL\);". 
l'RF.;;IDIST. 
H,\},DF.:\L.>,.);" • 
PHl':~IDF.);"T. 
H,\LDDL\X. 
1)£.\);. 
PRF.SlD.E);"T. 
DE,\X. 
PRE~lDF.XT. 
Dux. 
l'm:STDExT. 
PiU:SlDE);"T. 
I r. \ L0~)f.\);. 
Pi-O:::"iur:XT. 
H,\LClDL\);. 
P::::::::"!t;EXT. 
_YOII see, .fohn is 
--concerned, as YO\l kno;\', Dob. :11)ollt. ult, Ehrlidllllull, 
"hich, ult, worries me a great dlO':1I.lJeeallse it's a, ull, 
it-and it, and tllis is why the Hllllt prolJlem is 50 
seriou~, nil, ueeause, tilt, it ltaclllothillg to do \\"it It the 
campalg-n, 
Rifrht, it, nh-
Properly, it h11s to cia w'ith the Ellsbel'g thillg. I 
dl)n't kno\\- what the hell, uh-
Rut ,\-il\"-
YC':th. \\'11\"-1 don't kIlO\\". 
'\\1\Ut I \\":1's going to say is-
\\"h:1t is the alls\\'er on that? Ho\\- do YOIl keep that 
out? I elon't kllo\\'. ",,'elL \Ye Ul.l1·t keep it Ollt if HlIlIt-
if-You see the point is, it is irrelexallt. OneB it 1111;:: 
gotten to this poillt-
You might, YOll migltt pllt it all a 1l<ttioll:11 security 
gronnel, ba;::is, \\"hic,1t it really~ jt was. 
H absolntely was. 
Alld just say that, uh, 
Yeah. 
that this is not. \'011 kno'" this \\'as---
:0"ot paid with CL-\. funds. 
Uh-
':00, seriollsly. Xntional sC'curity. ,\Ve had to get. infor-
n1:1tion for ll:1tion:d security !2TOI1!1c1s, 
\\'ell, then the f)uestion is,' \\:lty didn't thE' C'IA do it 
or -why didn't the FBI do it? 
Becat;se they \\-ere-II'e had to do it. we had to elo it 
on a confic1eli.t: J l basis. 
BC'C':lUSC' we \\e:'~ checking thelll ~ 
X eitller \.·otilel be trusted, 
"·ell. I rhin.k 
That's the way I "jew it. 
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that has nen'r been pro\-en. There was reason to 
que:o--tion their 
Yeah. 
posirion. 
You see reallv. with the Buncly thin'" awl enrdhin rr 
... ... ~. "" ~ 
commz out. the ,\-hoJe thillCT was llational se.curit\,. 
I thir.k:we can probably get,gd by on that. -
HJCl' 112 
Dean told the President that Ehrlichman had potential criminal liability 
for conspiracy to burglarize the Fielding office. They needed·'p'To-
tection if, as the President put it, Hunt "breaks loose," and they 
sought it by invoking "national security." (HJCT, 113) 
In a meeting that afternoon, Ehrlichman told the President 
what he would say if Hunt were to reveal the existence of the Fielding 
break-in. At the conclusion of Ehrlichman's statement, he said, "Now, 
I Supp0Sf> t-hat lets Ellsberg- out, .... 1-. 2 "':' ~ an i:!.lf>gal sear_ch ;!C'.~ ~"'l ~"~'? 
that may be sufficient at least for a mistrial, if not for a .... " 
The President asked whether the Ellsberg case was about to end and 
Ehrlichman said that it would go on for a while yet. TIley discussed tee 
possibility that the case against Ellsberg could be dismissed even 
after a conviction if the existence of the break-in were to come to 
light. Ehrlichman also said that the question was, "Did we, did we 
authorize it, did ,,,e condone it." The President responded, "Yeah." 
(HJCT, 139) Although the national security defense was created in 
these discussions on March 21, the President was told that it could 
not be a defense to criminal liability (HJCT, 125) and that the prose-
cution of Ellsberg would be dismissed as a result of this illegal search 
1/ 
and seizure. 
lJ In a May 22, 1973 statement the President reiterated the national 
security justification for his order that investigations that might 
lead to the Plumbers not be pursued. (Presidential Statements, HJC 
compilation, 21-23) 
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On March 27, 1973 the President and Ehrlichman were dis-
cussing whether it would be necessary for Krogh to take responsibility 
for the Fielding break~in and Ehrlicruman said he did not believe it 
would be necessary because if it came to light he would "put the 
national security tent over this whole operation." The President 
]j 
agreed with Ehrlichman's recommendation to hard-line it. (vffiT, 
334-37) 
In April, the President actively participated in an effort 
to implement the plan agreed upon with his aides. In a conversation 
with Attorney General Kleindienst on April 15, the President told 
Kleindiensf that the "deep six thing" related to some of Hunt's 
operations in the White House on national security matters and n2d 
]j 
nothing to do with Watergate. n;'HT, 721-23) On April 16 the 
President was advised by Henry Petersen that the Department of 
Justice had information that Hunt had received documentation and a 
CWlera from the CIA. The President told Petersen that such action 
was perfectly proper because Hunt was conducting an investig~tion in 
the national security area for the ~TIite House at that point in 
1/ 
time. (WHT, 883-85) 
1/ The House Judiciary Committee on 
tape recording of this conversation. 
produce this recording, but produced 
April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the 
The President has refused to 
an edited transcript. 
2/ The House Judiciary COr.1lllittee on April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the 
tape recording of this conversation. The President has produced an 
edited transcript for a portion of this conversation. 
3/ The House Judiciary Con®ittee on 
tape recording of this conversation. 
-p~oduce this recording, but produced 
April 11, 1974 subpoenaed the 
The President has refused to 
an edited transcript. 
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In a meeting with Haldeman and Ehrlichman on April 17, 
1973, the President told them that he had instructed Dean not to 
discuss these other areas (including the Fielding break-in) because 
they were national security and privileged and that Dean had agreed. 
The President said that it would be necessary to instruct Petersen 
that these were matters of national security and were subject to 
executive privilege and that Petersen should be instructed to pass 
II 
the word down to the prosecutors. (WIT, 1028-30) 
The President ordered the Department of Justice not to 
investigate the allegations surrounding the break-in of the office 
of Daniel Ellsb~rg's psychiatrist in a telephone conversation with 
Petersen or. the evening of April 18, 1973. Petersen advised the 
President that the Justice Department had learned that Hunt and Liddy 
had burglarized Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office and Petersen asked 
if he knew about lit. The President said he knew about it and that 
Petersen 'vas to stay out of it because it was national security and 
Petersen's mandate was Watergate. Petersen asked the President if 
the President had any information relating to these allegations and 
the President said no and that there was nothing for Petersen to do. 
(Book VII, 1951-52, 1956-66) On April 27, the President reminded 
Petersen of the President's call from Camp David on April 18 in which, 
according to the President, he told Petersen not to go into lithe 
national security stuff." The President told Petersen on April 27 
that Petersen's phone call of April IS was the first k..Tlmvledge the 
President had of the Fielding break-in. (\ffiT, 1266-67) 
1/ The }louse Jtalici2ry Cormittee on .'_~ril 11, 1974 subpoer12.ed the 
tape recording of this conversation. The President has refused to 
produce this recording, but produced 2n edited transcript. 
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On April 25 Attorney General Kleindienst told the President 
that he knew of the Fielding break-in and recommended that the fact 
be revealed to Judge Byrne at the Ellsberg trial. Kleindienst 
described the President as being upset at that meeting, but agreeing 
that the information about the break~in should be transmitted to 
Byrne. (Book VII, 1984-93) On April 26, memoranda regarding the 
break~in were filed in camera with Judge Byrne. (Book VII, 1996) 
He later reconvened the court and asked the government's position 
as to turning the materials over to the defendants. (Book VII, 
1998-2004) On the next morning Judge Byrne was informed that the 
Department of Justice did not want the contents of the in camera 
filine disclosed to the defense. Judge Byrne nevertheless orderpd 
the information to be supplied to the defense. (Book VII, 2005-13) 
On May 11, 1973 the charges against Ellsberg were dismissed 
by Judge Byrne on the grounds of governmental misconduct, including 
the Plumbers' use of CIA equipment and the psychological profile, 
the Fielding break-in, and the inability of the government to produce 
logs of wiretaps on \vhich Ellsberg' s voice was intercepted. (Book VIr, 
2076-90) 
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C. The Offer of the Position of FBI Director to Judge Byrne 
On AprilS, 1973,at the direction of the President, Ehrlichman 
contacted Judge Matthew Byrne, who was then presiding in the Ellsberg 
trial, and asked whether Byrne would be interested in becoming the 
Director of the FBI. (Book VII, 1882, 1885-87) Byrne met with the 
President briefly at that time, but they did not discuss the trial or 
the nomination. (Book VII, 1883, 1885-87) 
As has been noted above, at that time the President was 
concerned that the Fielding break-in and other Plumbers' activities 
might be re~ealed, and he had decided that the matter would be cloaked 
in "national security." On Narch 28 Hunt had been given use immunity, 
and had begun testifying before the Grand Jury. (Book VII, 1863) Liddy 
was granted immunity on Harch 30. (In re Grand Jury, Misc. 47-73, docket) 
The President may have thought it likely that their testimony would 
expose the Fielding break-in, which would then be disclosed to Judge 
Byrne, since it affected a defendant in his court. In addition, the 
President was probably concerned with disclosure of the 1969-71 wiretaps, 
which he had authorized (\ffiT 330-37) and which had been reported by 
Time magazine on February 26. 
Although there had been repeated court orders for the pro-
duction of any electronic surveillance material on both Ellsberg and 
Morton Halperin because of the recoval and concealment of the files in 
the lfuite House, the Justice Department had filed three false affidavits 
denying the existence of overhears or surveilL:r:~e of E31perin ano 
Ellsberg. (Book VII, 1504-1511) Only a month before the offer ~~2S made 
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to Judge Byrne, the President agreed vlith John Dean that the Hhite 
House should "stonewall totally" on the existence of these wiretaps 
after the Time magazine story. (HJCT 36) 
The potential motives for this offer to Byrne which may be 
inferred frora the evidence are complex. The conclusion most likely 
from the evidence is that Byrne was in a unique position to protect 
the President from damage resulting from disclosure of the Fielding 
break-in and the 1969-71 wiretaps. Byrne, if he accepted the "national 
1/ 
defense" justification, could have held the matters in camera, could 
have minimized their impact, or could have excused theo entirely. 
The offer to him of the directorship of the agency that coad~ct8d the 
taps could be concluded to have been intended not only to make him 
fiiew..i.ly LV the A'~Lll::"nistration in a ge"e.:;.'al sense, but to have :::::n 
designed to give him a direct stake in protecting the FBI from damaging 
disclosures. 
The President I s concealment of the ,,,iretap records and the 
Fielding break-in involved a number of abuses of his po,vers as Chief 
Executive. Obtaining and concealing the wiretap records prevented 
the Justice Department from perfon:J.ing its duty to the court in the 
Ellsberg trial. (Book VII, 2076-83) His failure to reveal the 
Fielding break-in, his fabrication of a national security justification 
for it and his order to Petersen not to investigate it also impeded 
the Justice Departnent in the peformance of its duty to the court. 
1/ \\Then circumstances forced the release of information to Byrne about 
the Fielding break-in, the prosecutor was in fact ordered to file it 
in camera. Byrne refuse.d to accept it and released it to the press. 
(Book VII, 1996-2013) 
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Under all these circumstances the President's offer of the position 
of FBI Director to Judge Byrne raises serious concern that it was 
made in bad faith to induce Judge Byrne not to reveal the v7iretaps 
or the break-in. 
There is no question that the President directed these 
act~vities. He ordered the concealment of the wiretap records at 
the \fnite House (~ook VII, 2063, 2072-73); he ordered Petersen not to 
iqvestigate (Book VII, 1957, 1959)~ he directed Ehrlichman to convey 
the offer to Byrne. (Book VII, 1875) The purpose of these actions, 
the Committee could conclude, was to conceal politically embarrassing 
information about illegal and improper ~TIite House activity. The 
COIllIlli ttee could conclude that this conduc t \Vas a serious breach of 
hi::: ::-:':::;JC:-. .:ibilit:'~s as President. 
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IV. 
:t-HSUSE OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
The evidence before the Committee demonstrates that the 
power of the office of the President was used to obtain confidential tax 
return information from the Internal Revenue Service and to endeavor 
to have the IRS initiate or accelerate investigations of taxpayers. 
A. Wallace Tax Investigation. 
In early 1970 Haldeman directed Special Counsel to the 
President Clark Mollenhoff to obtain a report from the IRS about its 
investigation of Alabama Governor George Wallace and his brother, 
Gerald, and assured Nollenhoff that the report was for the President. 
Mollenhoff requested a report of Commissioner Thrower, received it, 
and gave it to Haldeman. Material contained in the report was there-
after transmitted to Jack Anderson, \-Tho published an article about 
the IRS inves tigation of George and Gerald \.,rallace on April ~3, 1970 
during George \.,Tallace' s Alabama gubernatorial primary campaign. 
(Book VIII, 38-41) 
B. List of l-kGovern Supporters. 
During 1971 and 1972 lists of political opponents and "enemies" 
were circulated "'ithin the Hhite House. (Book VIII, 66-75,104-09,113 
29) On September 11, 1972 Dean, at the direction of Ehrlichman, gave 
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a list of McGovern campaign staff and contributors to IRS Commissioner 
Walters and asked that the IRS investigate or develop information about 
the people on the list. WalteJ;s warned Dean that compliance with the 
request would be disastrous and told him he would discuss it with 
Treasury Secretary Shultz and advise that the IRS do nothing. (Book VIII, 
115, 238-39,242-43; Dean testimony, 7/11/74, T 3522-23) Two days 
later Walters and Shultz discussed the list and agreed to do nothing 
with respect to Dean's request. (Book VIII, 275-79) 
On September 15 Haldeman informed the President that Dean was 
"moving ruthlessly on the investigation of McGovern people, Kennedy 
stuff, and all that too." Haldeman said that he didn't know hmv much 
progress Dp;ln was making, and the President interrupted to say, "The 
problem is that's kind of hard to find." Haldeman told the President 
that Colson had "worked on the list" and Dean was "Horking the, the 
thing through IRS." (HJCT 1) Later, Dean joined the meeting, and there ,vas a 
discussion of using federal agencies to attack those who had been 
causing problems for the Hhite House. (HJCT, 10-11, 15) 
They also discussed the reluctance of the IRS to follO\v up 
on complaints (Book VIII, 333) and Dean informed the President of his 
difficulties in requesting Halters to commence audits on people. The 
President became annoyed and said that after the election there ~vould 
be changes made so that the IRS would be responsive to ~~'hite House 
requirements. The President also complained that Treasury Secretary 
Shultz had not been sufficiently aggressive in mw<ing the IRS responsive 
to 1fnite House requests. (Dean testimony, 7/11/74, T 3523-24; Book 
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1/ 
VIII, 334- 36 ) Because of his conversation with the President, Dean 
again contacted Walters about the list, but Commissioner Halters refused 
to cooperate. (Book VIII,354; Dean testimony, 7/11/74, 3523) 
C. O'Brien Invcstigation. 
During the spring or summer of 1972, John Ehrlichman received 
an IRS report concerning an investigation of Howard Hughes' interests 
that included information about Democratic National Con@ittee Chairman 
Lawrence O'Brien's finances. (Book VII, 223-24) Ehrlichman latcr 
obtained information from Assistant to the Commissioner Roger Barth 
2/ 
about O'Brien's returns. Ehrlichman also told Shultz that the IRS should 
investigate and interview O'Brien about his tax returns. Ehrlichman's 
demand caused the IRS to accelerate an interview of O'Brien in connec-
tion \vith the Hughes investigation (normally an interviev) of a politically 
prominent person like O'Brien would have been held in abeyance until 
after the election), and to intensify its investigation of O'Brien. 
(Book VIII,219-22) 
The evidence suggests that about September 5 \valters gave 
Shultz figures concerning O'Brien's tax returns, which Shultz was to 
1/ This discussion is not reflected in the portion of the conversation that 
was furnished by the President to the Committee. A tape recording of the 
approximately 13 minutes of conversation not supplied to the Committee has 
been subpoenaed. The President has not complied with the subpoena. 
2/ Roger Barth, SSC Executive Session, June 5, 1974. This information 
was received after presentation of this matter to the Committee. 
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give to Ehrlichman.~/ On September 10 Ehrlichman gave Kalmbach 
figures about a 'Brien's allegedly unreported income and reques ted 
that Kalmbach plant the information with the press. Kalmbach 
refused to do so, despite subsequent requests by Ehrlichman and 
Mitchell. (Kalmbach testimony , 7/18/74, T 4783-87) On September 15 
during the meeting among the President, Haldeman and Dean, the IP~ 
2/ 
investigation of O'Brien was discussed.- (Book VIII, 337-39, 344-45) 
D. Other Tax Information 
From time to time in 1971 and 1972, a member of Dean's staff 
obtained confidential information about various people from the IRS 
(Book '.T~I~, 132-4!:, llf6-47; 153-':':, ::5E ~0, 212) and, atthe-reqt::::::t 
of Haldeman and under Dean's direction, endeavored to have audits con-
ducted on certain persons. (Book VIII, 166-70, 176-82) 
On March 13, 1973 during a conversation among the President, 
Haldeman and Dean, they discussed campaign contributions to the NcGovern 
campaign. The President asked Dean if he needed "any IRS stuff." 
Dean responded that he did not at that time. Dean said, "[U]e have a 
couple of sources over there that I can go to. I don't have to fool 
around \07ith [Commissioner] Johnnie Halters, or anybody, \07e can get 
1/ Johnnie Walters, SSC interview, June 14, 1974. This information 
was received after presentation of this matter to the Committee. 
2/ 
This discussion, like the discussion about the IRS lack of respon-
siveness referred to at footnote 1 referred to on pnge 3, is not 
reflected in the tape recording of a portion of the conversation that 
\07aS furnished by the President to the Committee. 
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right in and get what we need." (HJCT 50) 
This use of the IRS is an abuse of the powers granted to 
the President by the Constitution to superintend the agencies of the 
Executive Branch. The Constitution entrusts that power to the 
President with the understanding that it will be used to serve lawful 
ends, not the personal political ambitions of the President. This mis-
use of pOVler is a challenge to the integrity of the tax system, which 
r~quires taxpayers to disclose substantial amounts of sensitive 
personal information. It is also a crime to interfere with the 
administration of the internal revenue laws, and to divulge confidential 
)) 
information. This policy of using the IRS for the President's 
political ends is an abuse of office and may be deemed by the Committee 
ImoJs are faithfully executed. 
The Committee could conclude that attempts to bring about 
political discrimination in the administration of the tax laws -- to 
2/ 
have them lIapplied and adminis tered Hi th an evil eye and uneq ual hand, 11_ 
to use the classic test of discriminatory enforcement of the laHs --
is a serious abuse of the President's power and breach of his duty as 
Chief Executive. 
~I 26 U.S.C. §6l03 provides for the confidentiality of an individual's 
tax return and 18 U.S.C. §190S makes it a crime for an officer or 
employee of the United States to disclose confidential information. I.R.C. 
§7212 forbids intimidating or impeding an I.R.S. agent in the performance 
of his duty . 
.-1./ Yick \~o v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
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V. 
KLEINDIENST APPOINTMENT - ITT 
In 1969 three antitrust suits were filed by the United States 
against the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT), 
each seeking to prevent a corporate acquisition or to require a 
corporate divestiture. (Book V, 91) During 1970 and 1971, particularly 
in August of the former year and March and April of the latter, officials 
of ITT made numerous personal contacts and had substantial corres-
pondence with Administration officials for the purpose of attempting to 
persuade the Administration that the suits should be settled on a 
basis consistent with the interests of ITT. (Book V, 142, 144-48, 
256-58, 268-70, 284-305, 367-70, 378-92, 404-22) 
On April 19 the President, in the course of a meeting with 
John D. Ehrlichman and George P. Shultz, telephoned Deputy Attorney 
General Kleindienst. The President ordered Kleindienst to drop an appeal 
pending before the Supreme Court in one of the antitrust suits. (Book V, 
312, 315-16) He criticized Antitrust Division chief ~1cLaren and said that, 
if the order to drop the appeal was not carried out, McLaren was to resign. 
On April 21 the President met with Attorney General Hitchell. 
In this meeting, ~litcheil stated that it was inadvisable for the Presi-
dent to order that no appeal be taken in the Grinnell case, because 
there'would be adverse repercussions in Congress and Solicitor General 
GrisHold might resign. The President Agreed to follo\v the Attorney 
General's advice, and the appeal was subsequently filed. (Book V, 372-73) 
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During June the Antitrust Division proposed a settlement 
of the three ITT antitrust cases, which was accepted by ITT. (Book V, 
550-52, 555-56) The final settlement was announced on July 31. (Book V, 602) 
On February 15, 1972 the President nominated Richard G. 
Kleindienst to be Attorney General to succeed John Mitchell, who was 
leaving the Department of Justice to become he~d of CRP. (Book V, 
606-08) The Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the nomination 
and recommended on February 24 that the nomination be confirmed. (Book V, 
609, 612) 
On February 29 the first of three articles by Jack Anderson 
relating to thesettlernent of the ITT suits was published, alleging a 
connection between a pledge by an ITT subsidiary to support the 1972 
Republican convention and the antitrust settlement. The article reported 
that both Mitchell and Kleindienst had been involved. (Book V, 634) 
Kleindienst immediately asked that the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings 
on his nomination be reopened so he could respond to the allegations. 
(Book V, 637) 
About Harch 1, as a result of information published in the 
Anderson column, the Securities and Exchange Commission demanded that 
ITT turn over any documents in the files of ITT's Washington office within 
the scope of subpoenas ~reviously issued. (Book V, 646-47) Within the 
files of ITT's Washington office were several documents that reflected ITT 
conta~ts with the Administration in 1970 and 1971 and would have been· 
embarrassing to the Administration if disclosed. (Book V, 647-48) On 
}1arch 2, the first day of the resumed Kleindienst nomination hearings, 
- - ----- --------
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attorneys for ITT gave copies of one or more of these documents to 
White House aide Hallace Johnson, who gave them to Mitchell. (Book V, 
713-14) The following week others of these documents were also furnished 
to Johnson. (Book V, 683-85) Later, during March and April, copies of 
the documents were provided by ITT attorneys to the SEC. (Book V, 685-86) 
During the first day of the resumed Kleindienst hearings, March 2, 
1972, and again on the following day, Kleindienst denied under oath having 
received directions from the White House about the handling of the ITT 
cases. (Book V, 680, 732) On March 3 Kleindienst also was asked by 
Senator Edward Kennedy about the extension of time to appeal the Grinnell 
case, which had in fact and to Kleindienst's knowledge resulted from 
the President's April 19, 1971 telephone call to Kleindienst. Kleindienst 
responded: 
Senator Kennedy, I do not recollect why that extention 
\Vas asked. (Book V, 734) 
Four days later, Kleindienst read a prepared statement describing in 
detail circumstances surrounding the request for an extension. There 
was no mention of the President's telephoned order to drop the case. 
(Book V, 753-54) 
The President and Haldeman returned from a five-day stay in 
Key Biscayne on March 5. ( Book V, 739-40) The next day, immediately 
after meeting with the President and Haldeman, Ehrlichman Dlet \,Tith SEC 
Commissioner Cas~y. (Book V, 736) Evidence before the Co%~ttee tends to 
establish that it was at this meeting that Ehrlichman e}"---pressed concern 
about documents relating to ITT contacts \Vith the Administration that 
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ITT lawyers had collected and were about to furnish to the SEC. (Book V, 
~/ 
743-48) 
At about this time the President established a White House 
task force to monitor the Kleindienst nomination and hearings; the 
task force operated throughout the mohth.(Colson testimony, 7/15/74, 
T 4337-39, 4366-67; Book V, 765) 
On March 14 John Mitchell appeared before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. He twice testified that there had been no communication 
between the President and him with respect to the ITT antitrust liti-
gat ion or any other antitrust litigation. That evening Mitchell had 
a telephone conversation with the President. 
.--2/ 
(Book V, 773-75) 
On March 24 the President held his only press conference 
during this period. He said: 
• • . as far as the [Senate Judiciary Committee] hearings 
are concerned, there is nothing that has happened in the 
hearings to date that has in one ,.Jay shaken my confideIlce 
in Mr, Kleindienst as an able, honest man, fully 
qualified to be Attorney General of the United States. 
(Book V, 801) 
The President refused to comment on any aspect of the hearings ","hile 
the Senate is still conducting them . and is still trying to determine 
the authenticity of the evidence that is before it.;' He said it was 
a matter for the Committee "to continue to consider ll but expressed the 
~/ The House Judiciary Committee has issued a subpoena to the President 
for tape recordings and other materials relating to the conversations 
between the President and Ehrlichman, Haldeman and Colson on this date. 
The President has failed to comply with the subpoena. 
2/ The Committee has issued a subpoena to the President for a tape 
recording and other materi21s relating to this conversation. The President 
has failed to comply with the subpoena. 
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opinion Kleindienst would "go in as Attorney General with no cloud 
over him" when the hearings were concluded. (Book V, 801) 
Colson bas testified before the Committee that during the 
period of the Kleindienst hearings he attended a meeting with the 
President and Haldeman and heard them ·briefly discuss the telephone 
call between the President and Haldeman on April 19, 1971. (Colson testi-
mony, 7/15/74, T 4341-43) According to Colson the President expressed 
~elief when told by Haldeman that they had not discussed the ITT case. 
(Colson testimony, 7/15/74, T 4341-43) Colson testified further that he 
met with the President throughout l1arch and discussed with him what Colson 
knew about the Kleindienst hearings and related events, but not specific 
testimony. (Colson testimony, 7/15/74, T 4339-40) 
According to Colson, on March l7 and 28 the President discussed 
wi th Haldeman, Colson and HacGregor \vhether the Kleindienst nomination 
should be withdravm. (Colson testimony, 7/15/74, T 4343-46) On the 
morning of }larch 30, according to Colson, Haldeman told him and NacGregor 
that the President had met \vith Kleindienst and talked v7ith Mitchell 
by telephone the day before, <'Jld had decided not to withdrB\.' the nomination. 
(Colson testimony, 7/15/74, T 4347-48; 7/16/74, T 4596-97) After meeting 
with Haldeman, Colson vITote a memorandum addressed to Haldeman (Colson 
testimony, 7/15/74, T 4351-55) stating disagreement with continuing the 
Kleindienst nomination. (Book V, 805-07) His reasons included the 
possibility that docl@ents Colson had reviewed would be revealed and show 
that the President had a meeting with Mitchell about the ITT case in 
1971 and would contradict statements made by Mitchell under oath during 
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the Kleindienst hearings. (Book V, 808-09) Colson testified that, 
assuming normal White House practice was follovred, the President received 
~/ 
this memorandum. (Colson testimony, 7/15/74, T 4123-24, 4356-57) 
On April 4, 1972 the President, Haldeman and Hitchell met and 
discussed among other things changing the convention site from San Diego 
to Miami. (WHT 3-13) A Vlhite House edited transcript of this conversation 
~/ 
has been supplied to the Committee. 
On April 25 the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
requested access to ITT documents in the possession of the SEC. (Book V, 
865-66) Had the SEC complied, the Senate Judiciary Committee would have 
received and been able to review documents previously collected by ITT 
attorneys and turned over to the SEC reflecting efforts by ITT to 
obtain favorable treatment from the Administration with respect to the 
ITT cases. Chairman Casey, who had previously discussed the documents 
with Ehrlichman, refused Chairman Eastland's request. (Book V, 866) 
On April 27 Kleindienst testified that no one in the \\Thite House 
had called him and instructed him on the handling of the ITT case. 
(Book V, 852) On June 8 Kleindienst's nomination was confirmed. (Book V, 
903) At his s,vearing-in ceremonies on June 12, 1972 the President expressed 
his great confidence in Kleindienst's honesty, integrity and devotion to 
law. He said that the Senate confirmation proceedings had in no way 
reduced that confidence. (Book V, 908) 
1/ The Committee has issued a subpoena to the President for tape recordings of 
and other materials relating to conversations bet~"een the President and Haldeman 
and Colson on this date. The President has failed to comply with the subpoena. 
~/ The House Judiciary Committee subpoenaed on June 24, 1974 the Presidential 
tape recordings of and oL-ller materj_dls relating to several other convers.'lLions 
between the l'resiucLt and lialdemCli, 011 April !I, 1972. The l'residcl1t il~lS failed 
to pl:oduce tiles", recordir,gs. 
------ - ------- - --.--- - -----
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Article II, section 2 of the Constitution provides that the 
President "shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of 
the Senate, appoint" certain officers established by law whose appointments 
are not otherwise provided for by the Constitution. The Attorney 
General of the United States is among the officers nominated by the 
President and appointed by him with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
The.. right of advise and consent is one of the key checks the legislative 
branch has over the power of the President. There is no surer way to 
frustrate this Constitutional safeguard than for the President or others 
in the executive branch to permit perjury to be conduct or evidence 
withheld in connection with the confirmation process. 
In this connection the statement before the North Carolina 
Constitution convention by James Iredell, later a Supreme Court Justice, 
is note\vorthy. In the context of the treaty-making pouer, where (as with 
nominations to office) the Senate's role is to advise and consent, Iredell 
said, the President "must certainly be punishable for giving false 
information to the Senate." It would be an impeachable misdemeanor, 
Iredell contended, if "he has not given them full information, but has con-
cealed important intelligence uhich he ought to have communicated, and 
by that means induced them to enter into measures injurious to their 
country, and which they would not have consented to had the true state 
1/ 
of things been disclosed to them."-
The two primary factual questions are whether the President 
knew about Kleindienst's and Hitchell's false testimony before the 
_~I 4 Elliot 127. 
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Senate Judiciary Committee and whether the President remembered the 
nature. of the telephone conversation with Kleindienst and discussion 
with l1itchell ten and one-half months before. Given the strident tone 
of the telephone call, the fact that the conversation with Mitchell 
caused the President to rescind his order, the extensive press coverage 
of the Kleindienst hearings, the personal interest that the President 
took in them; the existence of a White House task force whose job it 
was to monitor the progress of the nomination hearings, and the observation 
in Colson's }~rch 30 memorandum to Haldeman that there existed evidence 
contradicting Mitchell's sworn testimony, it would appear likely that 
the President had such knovlledge. Yet Colson had testified that the 
President was assured by Haldeman (who had not overheard either critical 
conversation ·betHeen the President o.nd l'...Leindiellst or Mitcheii) LIldL 
the President had not discussed the ITT case \vith Kleindienst. And 
Colson has testified that he did not discuss in detail with the President 
the testimony before the Judiciary Committee. Evidence exists in the 
tape recordings of key Presidential conversations that would probably 
enable the COIJ1~nittee to determine the facts. i3ut the President hils re-
fused to comply wit:l the Committee! s subpoena for such tapes. 
If the President had knowledge that false testimony had been 
given under oath by Kleindienst and Mitchell, he neither informed the 
Senate Judiciary Committee or the full Senate about the actual facts 
nor withdre\v Kleindienst's nomination. Instead, at his Harch 24 
press conference, he reiterated his confidence in Kleindienst's honesty 
and qualifications to be Attol~ey General, saying that nothing had happened 
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in the hearings to shake that confidence in one way. After 
Kleindienst's nomination was confirmed, the President appointed him 
Attorney General. 
.,',;; .. 
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VI. 
THE DEPARTI1U:T OF AGRICULTURE 
The Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1949 authorizes and 
directs the Secretary of Agriculture to make available an annual price 
support to producers of milk. Under the Act as it applied in 1971 
th~ price of milk was to be supported at such level, beb~een 75 and 90 
percent of the parity price, "as the Secretary determine[d] necessary 
1/ 
to provide an adequate supply." The statute further provides that 
2/ 
the Secretary's determinations "shall be final and conclusive." 
After detailed study aed revie~ in the Department of 
Agrir"ltUTP. the Secretary decided bv March 3, 1971 that the then 
current support price of $4.66 per cwt. should be continued for the 
1971 marketing year, which was to begin on April 1. (Book VI, 361-62) 
This represe~ted approximately 79 percent of parity. The decision was 
revie"ed and concurred in by offici21s of the Office of ?<[anagement 2nd 
Budget, economic advisors to the President, and members of the President's 
staff. (Book VI, 367, 371, 379, 385) The President approved the 
decision (Book VI, 396, 399), and on :farch 12 the Secretary announced 
the milk price support and his determination that it assured an adequate 
supply of milk. (Book VI, 392) 
After the Secretary's decision was announced, a number of 
bills \-.'ere introduced in Congress to increase the rninimur:1 level of 
price supports for milk to at least 85 percent of parity, parti211y as 
----------------------
1/ 7 U.S.C. 1446(c). 
2/ 7 U.S.C. H26. 
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a result of intense lobbying by certain milk producer cooperatives. 
(Book VI, 163, 425-26, 431-32) Some 118 Members of the House and 
29 Senators sponsored these bills. (Book VI, 164) Milk producer 
cooperatives engaged in further intense efforts to contact Administra-
tion officials and obtain a reversal of the Secretary's decision and 
an increase in milk price supports. (Book VI, 425-26) They also 
determined to cancel plans to purchase $100,000 in tickets to a 
R.epublican fund-raising dinner. (Book VI, 528) 
On March 23 the President met in the morning with repre-
sentatives of the dairy industry and thanked them for their past 
political support, which, as the President knew, had included finan-
cial contributions and pledges. (Book VI, 154, 569) In the after-
ncc~) ~h~ ~residE~t met with his a~~isc~3 and directed that th2 wii~ price 
support levels be increased to approximately 85 percent of parity. 
(Book VI, 641) According to figures that OHB had developed, the 
increase had a "budget cost" to the American taxpayer of approximately 
$60 million. (Book VI, 374) The President directed that announce-
ment of the decision be delayed while certain political and other 
contacts were made. (Book VI, 669) 
Then-Secretary of Agriculture Clifford Hardin has stated 
in an affidavit filed in a civil suit challenging the increased price 
support that the decision was based entirely on a reconsideration of 
the eyidence on the basis of the statutory criteria. (Book VI, 776-77) 
But the President has stated otheThlise. The President has said that he 
was motivated largely by political considerations in directing the 
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Secretary to increase the price support level. (Book VI, 165, 641) 
Indeed, just 11 days earlier, the President had approved the Secre-
tary's deterL1ination not to increase the support level, on the reCOffi-
mendation of his key economic policy advisors, based upon economic 
considerations. (Book VI, 396, 399) In the deliberations leading 
to the March 23 decision, there is no evidence that new economic 
arguments or data with respect to the adequacy of the milk supply 
were considered. During the President's afternoon meeting on March 
23 when the decision was reached, Treasury Secretary Connally, at the 
President's request) discussed in detail with concerned officials 
the politics of the decision. (Book VI, 630-31, 638) 
The President was aware of past financial support from 
the dairy cooperatives and their pledge of $2 million to his re-
election campaign. (Book VI, 154) A memorandum sent to the President 
on March 22, 1971 reminded him that the dairy lobby had decided to 
spend a lot of political money. (Book VI, 546) These considerations 
may also have influenced the decision to increase the price support 
Jj 
level. (Book VI, 733-34) 
The Committee could conclude from the evidence before it 
that the President, who is without statutory power to do so, ordered 
the increase on the basis of his mm political "relfare rather than 
the statutory criteria. 
1/ The Committee has subpoenaed tape recordings and other materials 
relating to conversations during this time period bet"reen the President 
and various aides involved in the price support decision and in soliciting 
or receiving dairy cooperative contributions. The President has failed to 
comply with the subpoena. 
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Evidence before the Committee also suggests that the Presi-
dent directed or was a,yare of a plan to secure a reaffirmation of the 
milk producers' $2 million pledge to his reelection in return for the 
milk price support decision (Book VI, 546-47, 556-58, 562-63, 570; 
Kalmbach testimony, July 17, 1974, T "4774-76). The President's refusal 
to comply with the Committee's subpoena has left the evidence inc om-
plete as to whether the milk producer cooperatives' contributions were 
made with the intent to influence the President's official acts or 
whether the President acquiesced in their acceptance with this kno\y-
ledge. If these elements were present, then the President's acceptance 
constituted bribery, whether or not the contributions actually in-
l/ 
fluenced the price support decision. 
l! United States v. Bre,vster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972). 
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VII. 
IMPROVB1ENTS MADE BY GOVEru~ENT AGENCIES 
TO THE PRESIDENT'S PROPERTIES 
---
On December 19, 1968 the President purchased two houses at 
Key Biscayne, Florida. (Report to the Congress--Protection of the 
President at Key Biscayne and San Clemente (with information on pro-
tection of past Presidents)~ Comptroller General of the United States, 
December 8, 1973, 11. Hereinafter cited as Comptroller General Report) 
On July 15, 1969, he purchased a residence at San Clemente, California. 
(Comptroller General Report, 27) Since that time, the General Services 
Administration (GSA) has spent approximately $701,000 directly on the 
San Clemente property ("Expenditure of Federal Funds in Support of 
Presidential Properties," Hearings before the Government Activities 
SubcoIT@ittee on the House Government Operations Committee, October 10, 
11$ 12 and 15, 1973, 47. Hereinafter cited as House Government Activi-
ties Subcommittee Hearings) and $575,000 directly on the Key Biscayne 
property for capital expenses, equipment, and maintenance. (House 
Government Activities Subcommittee Hearings, 18) Congress has recog-
nized that the Secret Service may require the installation of security 
devices and equipment on the private property of the President or 
others to perform its mission of protecting the President. (PL 90--331, 
1/ Because the staff report with respect to this matter is being 
presented simultaneously \,ith this memorandum, citations in this 
section are to the original source. 
--------
1/ 
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June 6, 1968, 82 Stat. 170) The General Services Administration is 
authorized to make expenditures for this purpose at the request of 
the Secret Service. The General Services Administration is also 
authorized to provide services and administrative support to the 
Executive Office of the President. ("Examination of President 
Nixon's Tax Returns for 1969 through 1972," prepared by the staff of 
the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, April 3, 197L~, 169; 
hereinafter cited as Joint Committee Report) 
Evidence before the Committee establishes that substantial 
expenditures for improvements and maintenance services on the Pres-
ident's properties were made by GSA that cannot be justified on the 
basis of the duty to protect the President. Some of these expendi-
tures were made by GSA at the direction of the President or his repre-
sentatives, with no Secret Service request. Others were made pursuant 
to Secret Service requests but included substantial amounts to meet 
aesthetic or personal preferences of the President and his family. 
Yet others, while they have served security purposes, invo1v~d items 
that are normally paid for by a homeo"mer himself, such as replacement 
of worn-out or obsolete equipment or fixtures and routine landscape 
maintenance. The staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue 
Taxation concluded that mOLe than $92,000 of expenditures on the 
President's properties was for his personal benefit and constituted 
income to him. (Joint Committee Report, 201) The Internal Revenue 
Service concluded that the President had realized $62,000 in such 
imputed income. (HJC Tax Report, Appendix 10) 
[12205]
-3-
Certain of the improvements were made at his express direc-
tion a nd others upon the instructions of John Ehrlichman. Many 
involved aesthetic choices that were likely to have been made by 
the President. Alexander Butterfield has testified before the Com-
mittee that the President was livery interested in the grounds at 
Key Biscayne, Camp David, San Clemente, the cottage, the house, the 
grounds. ~ .. " (Butterfield testimony, 7/2/74, T 2442) The Presi-
dent knew of the improvements as they were being made from his 
visits to San Clemente and Key Biscayne; presumably he also knew that 
he was not personally paying for them. In any event, on August 20, 
1973, he received a specific breakdown of his personal expenditur2s 
at San Cleme~te and Key Biscayne, (Coopers & Lybrand Financial State-
ments, August 20, 1973, 9 Presidential Documents 1438-47) but to date 
has made no atte~pt to reimburse the government for any expe~ditures 
for his personal benefit on these properties. 
The Cownittee could conclude that the President directed or 
knowingly received the benefit of i~proper expenditures on his San 
Clemente and Key Biscayne properties. 
Article II, section I, clause 7 of the Constitution pro-
vides that the Pr e sident sball not receive "any . . . emolument 
from the Unit e d States" during his term of office other than a stated 
compensation for llis s ervices. This explicit constitutional pro-
hibition applies solely to the President. It reflects the fear of 
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the framers of the Constitution that "powers delegated for the pur-
pose of promoting the happiness of a community" might be I!perverted 
to the advancement of the person emolu~ents of the agents of the 
1/ 
people. 11- The Commit tee could conclude that, by knovlingly receiv-
ing the benefits of expenditures on his personal properties, the 
President violated this Constitutional prohibition. 
In addition, the Committee could conclude that the Presi-
dent directed or caused the Secret Service and the GSA to exceed 
their authority and to violate the constitutional provision by 
authorizing and making these expenditures. 
1/ III Elliott, The Dehates on tIle Adoption of th~ Federal Constitution, 
117 (reprint of 2d cd.) (Randolph) . 
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CONCLUSION 
There is evidence before the Committee from which it may 
conclude that the President has used the powers of his office in an 
illegal and improper manner for his personal benefit. This evidence, 
especially in the area of intelligence-gathering, demonstrates a 
continuing pattern of conduct, beginning soon after the President 
took office, of using the FBI, the CIA, the Secret S~rvice, and 1fuite 
House aides and agents to undertake surveillance activities unauthorized 
by law and in violation of the constitutional rights of citizens. These 
activities were conducted in the political interests of the President. 
The President directed or participated in efforts to conceal 
these activities. He had the files and Ings of the FBI wiretaps 
transferred to the Hhite House, \"here they ",ere concealed. He invoked 
a false national security justification and ordered the Justice Depart-
ment not to investigate the Fielding break-in. He used his power to 
choose an FBI Director in a possible endeavor to prevent the revelation 
of both these matters in the Ellsberg trial. And he made deceptive 
and misleading public statements in an apparent effort to further this 
concealment. 
The use of the powers of the office to obtain confidential 
information for the political benefit of the President \Vas not limited 
to surveillance activities. In addition, there is evidence that the 
'(.fuite House endeavored to misuse the Internal Revenue Service to obtain 
confidential tax return infoDnation on individuals and to accelerate 
or initiate IRS investigations or audits of political critics or 
opponents of the PresiGent. 
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Concealment was also apparently involved in the Kleindienst 
nomination and appointment for the office of Attorney General. Kleindienst 
and Mitchell testified falsely in Kleindienst's confirmation hearings 
as to the President's role in the ITT litigation. If the President 
knew of the testimony and its falsity, he failed to correct the record 
or to withdraw the Kleindienst nomination and publicly reiterated 
his confidence in Kleindienst's honesty. Such conduct vffiuld be an abuse 
of the President's appointment power and a deprivation of the Senate's 
right of advise and consent. 
In the case of the 1971 milk price support decision, the 
President ordered that the price support be raised, despite an earlier 
decision that there 'vas no statutory justification for doing so, for 
his 0\-;::: :;;o~:'~ical gain -- a consis.::::-.:::~ic:: outsid::: the authority 
granted by statute. There is evidence suggesting that political 
contributions by milk producers cooperatives may have been given with 
the intention of influencing this decision. If the President knew 
of this -- and he has failed to comply with subpoenas for evidence 
bearing upon it -- then his abuse of his discretion as Chief Executive 
might also involve bribery. 
Finally, there is evidence that the President abused his 
office to obtain personal pecuniary benefit from expenditures on his 
properties at San Clemente and Key Biscayne. GSA made expenditures 
for the President's personal benefit beyond its legal authority 'vith 
the apparent knO\vledge and consent of the President. 
r 
I 
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The Committee could conclude that these instances -- and 
those disclosed by the evidence on Hatergate and its cover-up -- are 
part of a pattern of the use of the powers of the Presidency to serve 
the President's personal objectives, ~~ithout regard to the legality or 
propriety of. 'the conduct involved. The COl11luit tee could conclude that 
this pattern constitutes a serious abuse of the Office of President. 
[12210]
THE REFUSAL OF PRESIDENT NIXON TO CO}~LY WITH SUBPOENAS 
OF THE CmlMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 
1. 
THE COMNITTEE'S SUBPOENAS AND 
THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSES 
On February 6, 1974, the House adopted H. Res. 803, directing 
the Committee on the Judiciary to investigate fully and completely 
whether sufficient grounds exist for the House to exercise its consti-
tutional power to imp~ach Richard M. Nixon, President of the United 
States. That resolution specifically authorized the Committee to 
compel the production by subpoena of all things it deemed necessary for 
the investigation. 
A. Efforts of Committee to obtain pertinent 
materials from Hhite House. 
1. Introduction. 
On February 25, 1974, acting pursuant to the instructions 
of Chairman Rodino and Ranking Minority Member Hutchinson~ John Doar, 
Special Counsel to the Committee, wrote to ~ames D. St. Clair, Special 
Counsel to the President, requesting specified tape recordings, trans-
cripts and other materials, including 19 tape recordings and certain 
other materials previously furnished by the President to the Wate~gate 
Special Prosecution Force. 
• ! 
, i 
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Following the February 25 letter a number of other letters 
were sent requesting tapes and other documents. Ultimately, the 
Committee on the Judiciary issued eight subpoenas to the President between 
April 11 and June 24, 1974. Those subpoenas required the production 
of: (I} the tape recordings of 147 conversations and documents relat-
ing to those conversations; (2) a listing of presidential meetings and 
telephone conversations (termed presidential "daily diaries") for 
five specified periods; (3) documer.ts from the h1hite House files of 
specified former Hhite House employees relating to the Watergate 
matter and the vlhite Eouse Special Investigations Unit (the "Plumbers"); 
and (4) copies of daily news summaries relating to the ITT matter 
for a specified period in 1972 containing presidential notations. 
produced: 
In response to these letters and subpoenas, the President 
(1) 19 tape recordings and certain documents which 
had previously been supplied to the Special 
Prosecutor; 
(2) edited vlhite House transcripts of 32 subpoenaed 
conversations; 
(3) edited Hhite House transcripts of 8 conversations 
not subpoenaed and of 3 public statements; 
(4) selected notes of John Ehrlich~an relating to the 
Fielding break-in and wiretaps, which were ex-
tensively edited; 
(5) h1hite House news summaries, without Presidential 
notations, for 2 period in 1972 relating to the 
Kleindienst hearings; 
(6) on July 18, 1974, in the course of his counsel's 
oral statement, a 2-1/2 page excerpt for the 
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edited transcript of an hour and twenty-four 
minute meeting on March 22, 1973 between the 
President and Haldeman. 
In addition to the above, the Committee -- when its staff 
was re-recording a conversation which took place on September 15, 1972 
to secure a better copy of the tape -- also obtained as a result 
of an accident by Y~ite House personnel approximately fifteen minutes 
of conversation on that date not previously supplied to the Special 
Prosecutor or to the Committee. This additional conversation 
proved to be relevant to the Committee's inquiry. Apart from this 
small segment obtained by accident, the Committee has not received a 
single tape recording ~vhich Fas not in the possession of the Special 
Prosecutor. The Committee has not received any of the 147 tape record-
ings which it has subpoenaed (98 of Hhich relate to the Hatergate matter); 
nor, except as specified above, has it received any of the documents 
or materials it has sought. As indicated, the bulk of the materials 
which the Committee has received was not in response to its subpoenas, 
but stemmed from the fact that the Special Prosecutor received the same 
material as a result of public pressure following the firing of Archibald 
Cox. 
2. The Subpoenas. 
On April 11, May 15, May 30 and June 24, 1974, after receiving 
detailed memoranda from its staff setting forth facts that demonstrated 
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the need for the materials to be subpoenaed, the Committee issued a 
total of eight subpoenas to the President. In each instance the 
subpoena was issued only after the President refused to produce 
voluntarily materials which had been requested by the Committee. The 
staff memoranda setting forth the bases of the requests Here .pro-
vided to the Special Counsel to the President. 
(a) The Four Watergate Subpoenas. 
(i) April 11, 1974. The subpoena of April 11, 1974 required 
the production of all tapes, dictabelts, notes, memoranda and other 
things relating to 42 Presidential conversations in February, March and 
April 1973. In a letter of April 4, 1974 to Mr. St. Clair, Mri Doar 
explained that the Committee believed that the conversations '(vere 
likely to: 
(1) .bear upon the knovlledge or lack of knovlledge 
of, or action or inaction by the President 
and/or any of his senior administration officials 
with respect to the investigation of the Hater-
gate break-in by the Department of Justice, the 
Senate Select Committee, or any other legislative, 
judicial, executive or administrative body, 
including members of the ~~ite House staff; 
(2) bear upon the President's knowledge or lack of 
knmvledge of, or participation or lack of 
participation in, the acts of obstruction of 
justice and conspiracy to obstruct justice charged 
or othenJise referred to in the indic tments returned 
on March 1 in the District Court for the District 
of Columbia in the case of United States v. 
Mitchell, et al.; and 
I I 
I 
I 
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(3) bear upon the President's knowledge or lack 
of knowledge of, or participation or lack 
of participation in, the acts charged or 
otherwise referred to in the informations or 
indictments returned in the District Court 
for the District of Columbia in the cases of 
United States v. Magruder, United States v. 
Dean, United States v. Chapin, and United 
States v. EhrlichQan, or other acts that may 
constitute illegal activities. 
The Committee discussed in open session the necessity and pertinency 
of the materials with respect to the President's knowledge or lack of 
knowledge and involvement or lack of involvement in \~atergate. The 
subpoena was authorized by a vote of 33 to 3 and was properly issued 
and served. It had a return date of April 25, which was extended for 
five days at the request of the President. 
The subpoenaed tape recordings included four conversations 
prior to March 21, 1973 -- the date on which th~ President has stated 
he originally learned of White Eouse involvement in the Hatergate cover-
up. The first three conversations included: (1) a meeting on or 
about February 20, 1973 at which Haldeman and the President discussed 
a possible government appointment for Jeb Magruder, who had perjured 
himself in the Watergate trial; (2) a conversation among the President, 
Haldeman and Ehrlichman on or about February 27, 1973, at which 
they discussed the assignment of Dean to report \.latergate matters 
directly to the President; and (3) a March 17, 1973 meeting between 
Dean and the President. The other subpoenaed tape recordings contained 
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conversations of the President with Haldeman and Ehrlichman from 
April 14 to April 17, 1973; and of the President with Kleindienst 
and Petersen from April 15 to April 18, 1973 -- the four days immedi-
ately follov7ing the prosecutors' br~akthrough in the Watergate case. 
(ii) May 15, 1974. On May 15, after the Inquiry 
Staff's initial presentation had begun, the Committee issued tvw 
additional subpoenas. Again this ~vas done after public consideration 
of the necessity to obtain materials sought. The first subpoena, 
authorized by a vote of 37 to 1, covered tape recordings and other 
materials related to eleven conversations on April 4, June 20 and June 
23, 1972, which the Committee believed were likely to bear on the 
President's involvement or lack of involvement in the Hatergate matter. 
The second covered the President's daily diaries for four time periods 
in 1972 and 1973; each of the time periods vlas separately voted upon 
by the Committee. That portion of the subpoena covering the diaries 
froID April - July, 1972 was authorized by a vote of 36 to 1; the portions 
for February - April, 1973 and October 1973, by votes of 32 to 6; and 
the portion for July 12 - July 31, 1973 by a vote of 29 to 9. The 
tHO subpoenas of May 15 were properly issued and served.' They.had a 
return date of May 22, 1974. 
The eleven subpoenaed conversations were pertinent to 
the questions of whether or not the President had advance knowledge 
of the Liddy Plan, Vlhat the President ~vas informed of on June 20, 1972, 
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and the President's directive on June 23, 1972 to the CIA in connec-
tion with the Watergate investigation. Six of the suhpoenaed conver-
sations occurred on June 20, 1972. The President had previously 
produced for the Special Prosecutor a tape of another June 20 conversa-
tion containing an 18-1/2 minute gap, which Court-appointed experts 
have subsequently concluded resulted from five to nine manual erasures. 
The four time periods reflected in the subpoenaed 
Presidential daily diaries related to (1) the period immediately 
preceding and follmving the break-in at DNC headquarters; (2) the 
period immediately preceding and following the Harch 21, 1973 meeting 
and the reconvening of the Watergate grand jury; (3) the period immediately 
preceding and following Butterfield's disclosure of the lfuite House 
taping system; and (4) the period immediately preceding and following 
the President's dismissal of Special Prosecutor Cox. 
(iii) May 30, 1974. The subpoena of May 30, which Has 
authorized at a public meeting by a vote of 37 to 1, directed the 
production of tape recordings and other materials related to forty-five 
conversations that might bear upon the President's involvement or 
lack of involvement in the Watergate matter. This subpoena also sought 
all papers prepared by, sent to, received by or at any time contained 
in the files of five former I-.Thite House aides (Haldeman, Ehrlichman, 
Colson, Dean and Strachan) to the extent that they related to the 
Watergate matter. This subpoena was properly issued and served. It 
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had a return date of June 10. 
The forty-five conversations, the recordings of \vhich 
were sought by the May 30 subpoena, occurred between November 15, 1972 
and June 4, 1973. The initial presentation to the Committee showed 
that there was a reasonable basis to conclude that the conversations 
might include, among others: Presidential discussions of clemency 
for Hunt; statements by Colson to the President about the Watergate 
cover-up in February 1973; conversations in March 1973 among the 
President, Dean, Colson, Haldeman and Ehrlichman; and discussions among 
the President, Haldeman, Ehrlichman or their attorneys during the 
period in April when Petersen was reportin~ Watergate investigative 
developments directly to the President. 
The evidence also indicated that on April 25 and 26, 
1973, Haldeman, at the President's request, listened to the March 21 
tape, among others, and reported about it to the President in several 
meetings one of which lasted six hours. The subpoenaed conversations 
included the meeting at which Haldeman reported to the President 
about the March 21 tape. The subpoenaed conversations were relevant 
tQ the President's knowledge or lack of knmvledge about Watergate 
prior to March 21, 1973 as well as the President's actions after that 
date. 
Of the 98 conversations subpoenaed by the Committee re-
lating to the Watergate matter, 64 have been subpoenaed by the Special 
Prosecutor for the trial of United States v. Mitchell. Judge Sirica 
has ordered the President to produce the recordings of these 
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conversations. That order has been appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court. 
(b) The ITT, Dairy, IRS and Domestic 
Surveillance Subpoenas. 
On June 24, 1974, following the Staff's initial presenta-
tion of evidence, the Committee authorized the issuance of four sub-
poenas compelling the production of material related to the 1971 milk 
price support decision, the ITT antitrust case, domestic surveillance, 
and allegedly improper use of the Internal Revenue Service. The first 
two of these subpoenas were authorized by votes of 34 to 4; the other 
two by voice vote. All were properly issued and served and had a re-
turn date of July 2. 
The subpoena for dairy tape recordings and documents was 
designed to determine whether or not the President caused milk producers 
cooperatives to believe he would be influenced in raising the milk 
price support level in March 1971 by campaign contributions or pledges. 
The subpoena relating to domestic surveillance ordered the production 
of tape recordings and docur;.ents tha t might shmv the President's know-
ledge or lack of knowledge of the Fielding break-in before March 17, 
1973. An edited transcript of one of the conversations (April 19, 
1973, between the President and Petersen) had been produced in United 
States v. Ehrlichman. The subpoena in the ITT area was designed to 
determine whether or not the President knew of the false testimony 
given by Kleindienst relating to the ITT antitrust litigation during the 
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hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the nomination of 
Kleindienst to be Attorney General. The subpoena relating to the 
inquiry about misuse of the IRS ordered the production of two tapes 
on September 15, 1972, one of HhichJudge Sirica said involved 
discussions relating to use of the IRS. 
B. The President's response to letters and subpoenas. 
1. Response to February 25, 1974 letter. 
After the Grand Jury informed Judge Sirica on March 1, 1974 
that it wished to make a submission to the House Judiciary Committee, 
Mr. St. Clair on March 6, 1974 announced in open court that President 
Nixon had agreed to supply to the Committee those materials previously 
furnished to the Special Prosecutor. 
Suhsequently, between March 8 and Narch 15, 1974 the COT!lDlittee 
received those materials that had been furnished the prosecutors. This 
included the tape recordings of 10 Hatergate-related conversations 
or portions of conversations on June 30, 1972, September 15, 1972, 
February 28, 1973, March 13, 1973, March 21,1973 (two conversations), 
}larch 22, 1973, April 16, 1973 (tHO conversations) and June 4, 1973. 
Also included were tapes of presidential recollections respecting 
conversations on June 20, 1972 and ~larch 21, 1973, making a total of 
12 Watergate-related conversations produced by the President. 
The recordings of June 30, September 15, March 13, 21 and 
22 and the tapes of the two presidential recollections, had been 
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surrendered pursuant to a grand jury subpoena obtained by Special Prose-
cutor Cox and sustained by the Court of Appeals in Nixon v. Sirica. 
The tape recordings of two conversaiions between the President and Dean 
on April 16, 1973 had been submitted when the President was unable to 
deliver the tape of the conversation of April 15, 1973. The President 
announced following the Court of Appeals decision upholding Special 
Prosecutor Cox's subpoena that the April 15 conversation between the 
President and John Dean had not been recorded because the tape in 
the President's EOB office allegedly ran out. The tape recordings of 
t~.,o other conversations submitted to the Committee in March, those 
on February 28, 1973 and June 4, 1973, had been previously given by 
the President to Special Prosecutor Ja~.JOrski. The Committee also 
received from the President logs and documentary materials previously 
supplied to the Special Prosecutor. 
Each of the 12 tape recordings relating to the Watergate 
matter which the Committee received from the President betl'leen Barch 8 
and 15, 1974 were already part of the Grand Jury submission announced 
on March 1, 1974. Thus, with respect to the Watergate matter, the 
the Committee did not receive from the President a single tape recording 
of a conversation which it had not been scheduled to receive and did 
receive on March 26, 1974 from the ~rand ~ury. As will be seen, apart 
from these 12 Watergate-related conversations which the President de-
livered to the Committee after the announcemnt of the existence of a 
Grand Jury submission, the Committee to date has not received a single 
-------- -
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additional Watergate-related recording, despite the issuance of 3 
subpoenas in this regard requesting 98 such recordings. 
2. Response to April 11, 1974 subpoena. 
In response to the Committee's first sur.poena -- that was 
issued on April 11, 1974 -- the President on April 29, 1974 appeared 
on nationwide television. lIe said that he Hould submit to the Committee, 
on the next day, edited transcripts of subpoenaed conversations that 
had been taped, .as well as transcripts of some taped conversations that 
had not been subpoenaed. The President also announced that these trans-
cripts, which had been prepared at the White House, Hould be made public. 
The next day these transcripts were delivered to the Committee and 
released to the public; the Committee received no tapes, dictabe1ts, 
memoranda, or other subpoenaed documents. 
lvith respect to the three earliest suhpoenaed conversations, 
the President responded that a search of the tapes failed to disclose 
either the February 20, 1973 or February 27, 1973 conversations. 
With respect to the Harch 17, 1973 conversation, the President 
produced a four page edited transcript relat~ng only to a discussion 
of the Fielding break-in. On June 4, 1973, the President listened to 
the March 17, 1973 recording. In a recording of a conversation on 
June 4, 1973 the President talked to Ziegler about Watergate-related 
matters that the President had just heard on the Harch 17 tape. The 
President recalled that on Harch 17, after hearing that Magruder had 
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put the heat on and Sloan had started blaming Haldeman, the President 
stated, in effect, "He've got to cut that off. He can't have that go 
to Haldeman." On May 21, 1974, the Chairman directed the Committee's 
Special Counsel to discuss with the President's Special Counsel the 
omission of this material in the edited transcript of March 17, 1973. 
The President has, to date, declined to produce the other portions 
of the conversation. 
Of the other 39 subpoenaed conversations, the President 
reported that five were not recorded because the tape in the EOB office 
ran out on April 15, 1973; that four telepho~e conversations were not 
recorded because they were made on a residence telephone; and that 
another telephone call on April 18, 1973 to Henry Petersen (during which 
the President alluded to the existence of a tape recording relating to 
his allegedly unrecorded April 15, 1973 conversation with Dean, and in 
the course of \vhich Petersen told the President about the Fielding 
break~in) had been made from Camp David and was not recorded. 
The President's submission included seven other transcripts, 
three of which did not involve the President. None of the volunteered 
transcripts related to conversations prior.to March 21, 1973. 
Specifically, the volunteered transcripts did not relate to the following 
conversations relevant and necessary to a determination of the President's 
direction or lack of direction in the Watergate cover-up: (1) the 
conversations on June 20, 1972 with Haldeman and Colson; (2) the con-
versations on June 23, 1972 with Haldeman relating to the President's 
i ' 
f 
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directions to Haldeman to meet with the CIA; (3) conversations with 
Colson on January 5, 1973, February 13 and 14, 1973 and (4) of the President 
with Dean, Colson, Haldeman and Ehrlichman prior to ~1arch 21, 1973; (5) the 
long conversations with Haldeman on April 25 and April 26 after 
Haldeman had listened to the tape recordings; and (6) the conversation 
between the President and Henry Petersen on April 25 immediately after 
the President had talked with his Chief of Staff Haldeman about what 
Haldeman had heard on the tape recordings. The President nonetheless 
stated on May 22, 1974, that after the production of the edited trans-
cripts, "the Cor.rrnittee has the full story of \vatergate, in so far as 
it relates to Presidential knouledge and Presidential actions." 
Accompanying the submission of edited \.]hite House transcripts 
was an unsigned memorandum setting forth the President's interpretation 
of the contents of the transcripts. The memorandum said that the 
Committee ~ad called for the production of tapes and other materials 
relating to forty-two Presidential conversations; and claimed that, 
with respect to all but three of these conversations, the subpoena 
had heen issued "without regard to the subject matter, or matters, 
dealt with in these conversations. 1I The memorandum stated that the 
President considered the subpoena lIunwarranted," and that he would 
not permit \-lhat he termed "unlimited access to .Presidential conver-
sations and documents." 
The memorandum claimed that the President IIdoes recognize 
that the House Committee on the Judiciary has constitutional responsi-
bilities to examine fully into his conduct." The memorandum said the 
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President was providing transcripts "of all or portions of the sub-
poenaed conversations that were recorded and of a number of additional 
non-subpoenaed conversations that clearly show what knowledge the 
President had of an alleged cover-up of the Watergate break-in and what 
actions he took when he was informed of the cover-up." 
The President ir.vited the Chairman and Ranking Minority 
Hember of the Cc",-unittee "to revieH the subpoenaed tapes to satisfy theP.1-
selves that a full and complete disclosure of the pertinent content of 
these tapes had, indeed been made. I!. The Conunittee declined this offer. 
Chairman Rodino explained that the subpoena issued by the Committee 
required materials covered by it to be delivered to the Committee in 
order that they be available for the Corm.,li ttee' s deliberations. Ee 
explained that the procedures follo,·;ed by the CCI!'lT!ittee must give all 
Members -- each of Hhom has to exercise his or her personal judgment on 
this matter of enormous importance to the nation -- a full ar.d fair 
opportunity to judge all the evidence for themselves. It was 
therefore necessary that the Committee not depart from the ordinary 
and accepted process in the way the President suggested, or in any 
other manner that might raise questions about the thoroughness, 
fairness and obj ec tivity of the COITunittee' s \,rork. Accordingly, on 
May 1, 1974, the Corrunittee advised the President by a letter, which 
"las approved by a vote of 20 to 18, tha t he had not complied with the 
subpoena of April 11. 
Both the Corrunittee's Special Counsel and Special Counsel to the 
Hinority have repeatedly cautioned Hembers of the Judiciary Committee 
i I 
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to consider the 'fuite House edited transcripts skeptically. The 
staff, by comparing those edited transcripts for which the Committee 
previously had recordings with the Committee's transcripts, isolated 
seven categories of inaccuracies: (1) misstatements, (2) omissions, 
(3) additions, (4) paraphrasing, (5) misassignment of conversations 
to other speakers, (6) selection of relevant portions and (7) unintel-
ligibles. Examples of these inaccuracies appeared in the "Comparison 
of Passages" of Committee transcripts of eight recorded conversations 
and the White House edited transcripts, released on July 9, 1974. 
In addition, throughout the edited transcripts there were 
references to "material unrelated to Presidential action deleted." 
Hr. Doar and Hr. Jenner advised the Committee that they did not know 
of any precedent for that kind of judgment with respect to the deletion 
or omission of material. They added that they did not know what those 
words meant, nor .did they understand what standards were being used 
in deleting material. 
3. Response to seven other subpoenas. 
Subsequent to his televised response to the April 11, 197LI 
subpoena, the President has virtually ignored the seven other subpoenas 
issued by the Committee on the Judiciary in its exercise of the House's 
sole po~.;er of impeachment. 
For example, the President failed to comply with the two 
subpoenas of May 15. On May 30, following the return date of those 
subpoenas, the Committee advised the President by letter of the grave 
[12226]
-17-
consequences of his noncompliance. The letter, approved by a vote of 
28 to 10, said that noncompliance might be considered independent 
grounds for impeachment, and that the Committee would he free to con-
sider whether noncompliance might warrant the drawing of adverse in-
ferences concerning the substance of the materials not disclosed. 
On June 9, 1974, the President wrote the Chairman a letter 
in 'l-7hich the President invoked "executive privilege" as his justi-
1) 
fication for the refusal to comply with the subpoenas of May 15. 
"My refusal to comply with further subpoenas with respect to lilater-
gate is based, essentially, on tHO considerations," the President 
wrote. "First, preserving the principle of separation of powers 
and of the Executive as a co-equal branch"-- requires that the 
Executive, no less than the Legislative or Judicial branches, must 
be immune from unlimited search and seizure by the other co-equal 
branches.\\ And the President continued, "Second, the voluminous 
body of materials that the Committee already has .,...".. and which I have 
voluntarily provided, partly in response to Committee requests and 
partly in an effort to round out the record -.,.. does give the full 
story of Watergate, insofar as it relates to Presidential knowledge 
"and Presidential actions. II 
liOn June 5, 1974, the President produced an edited transcript of a 
conversation on April 4, 1972 between the President, Mitchell and 
Haldeman. This conversation had been subpoenaed on May 15, 1974 and 
also requested by letter in connection with the ITT matter. 
r 
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The President's letter of June 9th went on to argue that an 
adverse inference could not properly be dra~.;rn "from my assertion of 
executive privilege with regard to these additional materials," 
contending that to draw such an inference would fly in the face of 
"established law on the assertion of valid claims of privilege." 
Othen.;rise, the President claimed, "the privilege itself is under-
mined, and the separation of powers nullified." 
Accompanying the Presidept's letter of June 9th was a short 
letter dated June 10th from the President's counsel, stating that the 
President declined to comply with the subsequent subpoena of May 30 
for the reasons set forth in the June 9th letter concerning the 
subpoena of May 15. 
The four subpoenas issued by the Committee on June 24 had a 
return date of July 2, 1974. On July 12, 1974 the Special Counsel 
to the President informed the Chairman that the President declined 
to produce either the tapes of the subpoenaed conversations or the 
subpoenaed daily diaries of the President. The President agreed to 
produce copies of the Hhite House nevIS summaries relating to the 
Kleindienst confirmation hearings without the President's notes 
and copies of some of Ehrlichman's subpoenaed notes relating to the 
Fielding break-in and the 1969-71 wiretaps. The xeroxed copies of 
Ehrlichman's notes given to the Committee ,,,ere edited so as to delete 
significant portions that the \fuite House had produced to the Court 
in United States v. Ehrlichman. On July 18, 1974 Mr. St. Clair advised 
the Committee this was done in error. 
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II. 
THE POw'ER OF THE HOUSE IN AN 
IMPEACl-~fENT INQUIRY 
The pm.Jer of impeachment is· an extraordinary remedy to be used 
as "an essential check in the hands of [the legislature] upon the 
1/ 
encroachments of the executive." As a power conferred by the 
Constitution, it is not to be construed in a manner that would 
cripple its execution or "render it unequal to the object for which 
2/ 
it is declared to be competent."- It is to be interpreted so that 
3/ 
"it will attain its just end and achieve its manifest purpose," 
Of necessity this must include the power -- indeed, the duty -- to 
inquiry -- to find out the truth. 
As early as 1796, it was stated on the floor of the House 
that the power of impeachment "certainly implied a right to inspect 
every paper and transaction in any department, othen.Jise the power of 
1/ The Federalist, No. 66 at 430. (Modern Library ed.) (A. Hamilton) 
(hereinafter cited as Federalist). 
11 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 83, 9 Wheat. 1, 188 (1824) 
(Marsh all, C.J.) 
11 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 611, 16 Pet. 345, 398 
(1842) . 
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II 
impeachment could never be exercised with any effect. lI- The im-
peachr."tent power is "the most undebatable power from which to deduce 
21 
an implied investigatory power .11- The II true spiritll of impeachment 
Alexander Eamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 65, is that it is 
IIdesigned as a method of national ir:quest into the conduct of public 
~I 
men,;1 initiated by the representatives of the people. 
~I 5 Annals of Congress 601 (1796) 
, 
In 1843, in a dispute with President Tyler about the production 
of documents requested for a legislative investigation (which he ulti-
mately provided), a House Committee said: 
The House of Representatives has the sole power of im-
peachment. The President himself, in the discharge of his 
most independent functions, is subject to the exercise of 
this power -- a pmver which implied the right of inquiry 
on the part of the House to the fullest and most unlimited 
extent. . •. If the House possess the power to impeach, 
it must like~vise possess all the incidents of that po,,,er 
-~ the pmver to compel the attendance of all ,,,itnesses and 
the production of all such papers as may be considered 
necessary to prove the charges on ,vhich the impeachment 
is founded. If it did not, the power of impeachment con-' 
ferred upon it by the Constitution would be nugatory. It 
could not exercise it with effect. H. Rep. Nb. 271, 27th 
Cong., 3d Sess., 4-6. (Excerpts from this report are 
printed in 3 Hind's Precedents of the House of Represen-
tatives, § 1885 at 181-86 (1907) (hereinafter cited as 
Hind's Precedents). 
2/ Dimock, Congressional Investigations 120 (1929). 
11 Federalist, No. 65 at 424. 
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Throughout all of our history this power of inquiry has been 
recognized as essential to the impeachment power. Before the current 
inquiry, sixty-nine officials have been the subject of impeachment 
investigations. \-lith one possible exception, in which the official 
}:! 
invoked the privilege against self-incrimination, none of them 
challenged the power of the committee conducting the investigation 
to compel the production of evidence it deemed necessary. 
In 1867, the Committee on the Judiciary conducted the initial 
inquiry concerning the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson. 
hearings were held over a period of eleven months. Records were 
requested from a number of executive departments and from the 
. Executive Mansion itself; there is no evidence of any failure to 
comply with these requests, nor of any objection to them by President 
Johnson. Cabinet officers and Presidential aides were questioned in 
detail about meetings and conversations with the President that led 
to decisions about the prosecution of Jefferson Davis, Presidential 
pardons, the issuance of executive orders, the conduct of Reconstruction 
~! 
and the vetoing of legislation. 
Only one witness in the hearings, Jeremiah Black, an adviser 
to President Johnson who later served as one of his counsel in his 
impeachment trial, protested against a question relating to private 
conversations that took place between him and the President in the 
l! See, H. Rep. No. 141, 45th Cong., 3d Sess. (1879); also 
printed in 3 Hind's Precedents_ § 1699 at 56~57.· 
2! See, generally, Reports of Committees, Impeachment Investi-
gation, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 183-578 (1867). 
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preparation of a veto message. Black recognized, however, that he 
was bound to answer the question if the Committee pressed it, and he 
acknowledged that "a witness sworn to testify before any tribunal 
declares he ought to anS\ver; that he is himself not the judge of vlhat 
he ought to answer and \vhat he ought not." After deliberation, the 
J) 
Committee required Black to anSvler, arid he did so. Black and other 
witnesses answered detailed questions on the opinions of the Presi-
dent and advice expressed to him in the formulation of Presidential 
Jj 
decisions. 
3/ 
Other Presidents, beginning with George Washington, have 
recognized the power of the House to compel the production of evidence 
in the custody of the Executive branch in an impeachment investigation. 
The clearest acknowledgment of the reach of this investigative power 
was made in 1846 by President James K. Polk. Polk, regarded by 
historians as a strong President, protested a legislative investi-
gation being conducted by a House committee. In his message to the 
House, Polk 1!cheerfully admitted ll the right of the House to investigate 
~/ Id. at 271. 
2/ The only evidence of President Johnson's views concerning the 
investigation relates to whether his personal bank records should be 
produced for the Committee. The cashier of the bank, who was reluctant 
to produce the records "simply upon the general principle of never im-
parting any information to outsiders in regard to the business of our 
customers,1I had told President Johnson of the request. The cashier 
told the Committee that the President made nO objection to the pro-
duction of the records: 
3/ 
He smiled, and said he had no earthly objection to have any 
of his transactions looked into; that he had done nothing 
clandestinely, and desired me to show them anything I had 
relating to his transactions. Id. at 182-83. 
1 Richardson, Messages and Papers of Presidents 194-95 (1896). 
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the conduct of all government officers with a view to the exercise 
of its impeachment power. "In such a case," he wrote, 
the safety of the Republic would be the supreme law, and 
the power of the House, in pursuit of this object would 
penetrate into the most secret recesses of the Executive 
Departments. It could command the attendence of any and 
every agent of the Government, and compel them to pro-
duce all papers, public or private, official or un-
official, and to testify on oath to all facts, within their 
knowledge·1} 
.III. 
ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT'S ASSERTED P~ASONS FOR 
NONCOHPLIANCE vlITH THE SUBPOENAS 
A. Relevance or need. 
In his letter of June 9 to Chairman Rodino, the President 
stated that one of the considerations on which he based his refusal to 
comply \\lith subpoenas was that ITthe voluminous body of materials lT that 
the Committee already has gives "the full story of YJatergate, insofar 
as it relates to Presidential knowledge and Presidential actions." 
The suggestion is either that the subpoenaed material is not needed 
because it duplicates what the Committee already has or that it is 
not relevant. This asserted justification for noncompliance is in-
valid because the material is both relevant and needed. Hhat is 
more important, it is for this Committee, not the President, to 
decide what is needed and what is relevant. 
1/ H. R. Jour., 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 693 (1846); 4 Richardson, 
Messages and Papers of the Presidents 434-35 (1896). 
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In an investigatory or adjudicative proceeding, the judge 
of the need or relevancy of subpoenaed evidence is the requesting tri-
bunal, not the subject of the investigation. The subject is not per-
mitted to determine the relevancy or the need for particular evidence. 
This is clearly established in judicial proceedings. As Dean Wigmore 
stated: 
• . • The question of relevancy is never one for the 
witness to concern himself with . . . It is his duty 
to bring what the Court requires; and the Court can 
then to its own satisfac"tion determine by inspection 
whether the documents produced are irrelevant .•.• 1/ 
The same rule must apply in an impeachment inquiry. 
It should be emphasized that there is no requirement that 
relevancy and need be established to a certitude before the issuance 
of a subpoena. Investigative bodies cannot b€ required to know all 
the facts before seeking evidence to determine them. Hhat is required 
is a reasonable belief that the subpoenaed material is relevant and 
needed for the inquiry. The Supreme Court has held that inquiry cannot 
"be limited ..• by forecasts of the probable result of the investi-1-/ " " 
gation". Even administrative agencies may determine their own 
investigative jurisdiction, and they may demand the production of 
3/ 
documents that permit that determination to be made. 
]) 8 \,Tigmore, Evidence 117-18 (3rd Ed. 1940). 
2/ United States v. Morton Salt Co., 388 U.S. 632, 642-43, 652-53 (1950). 
1/ See United States v. Horton Salt Co., ~ra; Oklahoma Press Pu['lishing 
Co. v. Halling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. L.8 
(1964) . 
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Each subpoe~a to the President was justified by a detailed 
memorandum describing the information that led the staff to request 
the Committee to authorize the subpoena. These memoranda show how 
limited and tailored the Committee's subpoenas have been and how 
necessary the material sought is to its inquiry. The President has 
asserted that the edited transcripts he provided in response to the first 
Committee subpoena gave the "full story" of Watergate. They do not, 
however, constitute the b.est evidence even of the conversations they 
cover. They were prepared by members of th~ President's staff, and 
the President himself made the final decisions as to what to excise 
from the transcripts. Moreover, the Committee cannot be bound by 
the President's determination as to whether subpoenaed material is 
"duplicative 'l of what the Conunittee already has. The subject of an 
inquiry cannot be the judge of what is needed to conduct it,for, as 
James Madison wrote) 'Ihis interest \vould certainly bias his judgment. 11 
As described above, the President has refused to provide 
1/ 
the Committee with any Watergate-related materials predating March 21, 
1973 -- the date on which the President c1a~ms he first learned of 
Watergate. There are only two minor exceptions: (1) an edited transcript 
of a telephone conversation with Dean on the evening of Yarch 20, and 
. (2) a four-page edited transcript from a conversation that lasted 45 
minutes between the President and Dean on March 17. Every pre-:-Harch 21 
tape in the possession of the Committee -- June 20, 1972, June 30, 1972, 
September 15, 1972, }'ebruary 28, 1973, and Harch 13, 1973 -- was 
previously provided to the Special Prosecutor. The President has 
1/ Federalist No. 10 at 56. 
-- - - - ... _----_ . 
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voluntarily given the Committee transcripts of seven conversations 
it did not subpoena (only four of which involved the President), all 
in the period from March 28 to April 30, 1973 to complete, according 
to the President, the record. Hithin that same period, he has 
refused to provide his April 25 and 26 conversations '''ith Haldcm.an 
just after Haldeman had listened to the March 21 tape of the Presi-
dent's conversation with Dean. Thus, as a factual matter, his claim 
to have provided "the full story of vJatergate" -- much less materials 
the Committee deems necessary for other aspects of its inquiry -- is 
insupportable. 
Moreover, as has been made clear above, all of the 19 tape 
recordings and the bulk of the documentary material which the Committee 
has received from the President has not been in response to the 
subpoenas issued as part of the Committee's impeachment inquiry. Rather, 
these recordings and materials Here supplied to the Committee only 
after they had been delivered to the Special Pr6secutor before this 
Committee's inquiry ever began, in response to Grand Jury subpoenas 
and court orders, and then only after a public outcry folloHing the 
firing of Special Prosecutor Cox. The response of the President to 
this Committee's inquiry -- the ignoring of its subpoenas for recordings 
and other documents, the production only of materials previously given 
to another entity, for other purposes, under other circumstances 
does not constitute a reasoned effort to respond to the powers 
granted to the House of Representatives under the Constitution. The 
conclusion cannot be avoided that the Corrunittee has been refused the 
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evidence which it has sought to conduct a full and complete inquiry 
as authorized and directed by the House of Representatives. 
B. Presidential Claim of Executive Privilege. 
In refusing to comply with the subpoenas the President in-
voked what he denominated as executive privilege. It is for this 
Committee and the House, not the President, to decide the validity 
of this claim of privilege. Wholly apart from any questions of waiver, 
it is submitted that there can be no place for executive privilege 
in an impeachment inquiry. 
1. Separation of Powers. 
The claim of executive privilege was in part based on a 
vieVl that it was the President's duty to "preserve the principle of 
separation of pOVlers." But separation of powers is simply inapplic-
able to an impeachment inquiry. As Hamilton said in The Federalist 
No. 66, the "true meaning" of separation of pOVlers is "entirely compatible 
with a partial intermixture" of departments for special purposes. This 
partial intermixture, he wrote, "is even, in some cases, not only 
proper but necessary to the mutual defense of the several me~bers of 
the government against each other." According to Hamilton, the "pm-lers 
relating to impeachment" are such a case -- "an essential check" in 
1/ 
the hands of the legislature "upon the encroachments of the executive. ,,--
1/ Federalist, No. 66 at 429-30. 
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The records of the Constitutional Convention establish 
that the Framers intended impeachment to be an exception to separation 
of powers. Impeachment was considered by the Framers almost exclusively 
in terms of the removal of the executive; it was written into the 
Constitution despite repeated arguments by its opponents that it would 
make the President overly dependent on Congress. Charles Pinckney' 
asserted in the major debate on impeachment of the executive that, if 
the legislature had the pO'ver, they would hold impeachment lias a rod 
over the Executive and by that means effectually destroy his inde-
pendence." Rufus King argued that impeachment by the legislature 
violated the separation of powers and would be "destructive of [the 
executive's] independence and of the principles of the Constitution. n 
These arguments were decisively rejected by the Convention, which 
voted eight states to two to make the executive impeachable by the 
1 . 1 11 egls ature.-
11 2 The Records of The Federal Convention 63~69 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). 
The constitutional' exception to the President r s pardon pO\ver, that it 
should not extend to cases of impeachment, provides support for the 
argument that he cannot seek to impede the House in the exercise of 
its sole power to impeach. Justice Story wrote, :IThe power of impeach-
ment will generally be applied to persons holding high office under the 
government; and it is of great consequence, that the President should 
not have the pm-ler of preventing a thorough investigation of their 
conduct, or of securing them against the disgrace of a public conviction 
by impeachment, if they should deserve it. The Constitution has, there-
fore, wisely interposed this check upon his power, so that he cannot, 
by any corrupt coalition with favorites, or dependents in high offices, 
screen them from punishment. I: 2 J. Story Commentaries on the Consti-
tution of the United States § 1501 at 368 (3rd ed. 1858) (hereinafter 
cited as Story). See also, 1 Kent, Commentaries on American Lm", Lect. 
XIII at 184 (6th ed. 1848) 
Story also asserted that the President should not have the power 
to pardon those whom the legislature held in contempt, a position later 
adopted by the Supreme Court in The Laura, 114 U.S. 411, 413 (1885). 
The main obj ect of the contempt power of Congress, Story ,rrote, "is to 
secure a purity, independence, anel ability of the legislature adequate 
to the discharge of all their duties. . . . If the executive should 
possess the power of pardoning any SUCll offender, they would be wholly 
dependent upon his goodwill and pleusure for the eX2Y"cise of their mm 
p0\-Iers. Thus, in effect, the rights of the people intrusted to them 
woulc1 be placcG in ~erpetui11 jeopardy." 2 .Story § 1502 ~L ;,<·9. 
- ' - - -
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2. The need for confidentiality. 
The President also based his claim of executive privilege 
on an asserted need to preserve confidentiality in the Executive. The 
President argued that if the House may compel the production in an 
:ilnpeachment inquiry of evidence of cOmnlunications bet\veen the President 
and his advisers, the ability of Presidents to obtain candid advise 
in the future would be impaired. 
This is essentially a contention that the need for free and 
unfettered communications betHeen a President and his advisers out-
weighs the need to determine whether there has been impeachable Vlrong-
doing by the incumbent President. But the balance seems to have been 
struck, and struck the other way -- in favor of the power of inquiry 
-- when the impeachment provision was written into the"Constitution. 
}loreover, the President's argument exaggerates the likelihood of an 
L/ 
impeac.hment inquiry and thus the impairment of confidentiality. 
Only two Presidents (including President Nixon) out of thirty-seven 
have ever been the subject of impeachment investigations. It can 
scarcely be contended that the far~reaching inquiry into the delibera-
tions between President Johnson and his aides resulted in any impedi-
ment of the communications between Presidents and their advisers. 
There is no more reason to think that this inquiry will have that 
effect. 
1 / As Justice Story \VYote, "[T]he power of impeachment is not one 
~xpected in any governme.nt to be in constant or frequent exercise. It 
is rather intended for occasional and extraordinary cases, where a 
superior pO\ver, acting for the \vhole people, is put into operation to 
protect their rights, and to rescue their liberties from violation." 
1 Story § 751 at 522. 
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3. Who should decide Vlhether these claims of 
privilege are valid? 
There is ahvays a risk that the pmver of inquiry might 
be abused in the future. But the question is Vlho is to draVl the line. 
The sole power of impeachment is confided to the House; thus the 
Constitution commits the power to drau the line to the House. The 
pOVler is subject to review by the Senate Vlhen it must decide uhether 
to remove the officer impeached. Both are accountable to the people. 
As Chief Justice Marshall Vlrote: 
The Vlisdom and discretion of Congress, their identity 
Vlith the people, and the influence which their con--
stitutents possess at elections, are, in this, as in 
many other instances . . . the sole restraints on 
Vlhich [the people] have relied to secure [them] from 
•.• abuse [of a constitutional pm.;rer]. They are 
the restraints on \,;hich the people ClUSt often rely 
solely, in all representative governments. 1/ 
To permit the President, the subject of the inquiry, to decide upon 
his mm claim of privilege is to violate Lord Coke I s maxim -- "no 
2/ 
man shall be the judge in his own cause" -- and it Vlould enable the 
President to put himself beyond the impeachment pmver. To rely upon 
the Courts to resolve these questions of privilege would be in-
consistent vith the Constitutional cor.nnitment to the House of the 
"sole pmver of impeachment." 
Although it is for the Bouse, in the first instance, to decide 
the question of the validity of these claims of privilege, there is no 
1/ Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. at 86-87, 9 Wheat. at 197. 
2/ Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Coke Rpts. 1136, 77 E.R. 646 (1610). 
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need to insist upon a formal finding of contempt by the entire House. 
A finding of contempt adds nothing to the impeachment process. 
The President has made clear his in~ention to continue with his actions 
of noncompliance. Willful default has occurred, and the Committee 
has been advised of the President's rationale. The House can judge 
the validity of this in voting on a resolution of impeachment. The 
President's procedural rights are fully preserved by his opportunity 
1/ 
for trial in the Senate. 
IV. 
THE PRESIDENT'S REFUSAL TO COM:PLY WITH THE COHMITTEE'S 
SUBPOENAS AS GROUNDS FOR I:1PEACHHEt1T 
In only one instance has a person under investigation for 
possible impeachment refused to comply with Congressional demands for 
information. In 1879, the Committee charged with the duty of inquiry 
reported articles of impeachment against George Seward, former consul 
general at Shanghai. One article included a charge that Seward had 
concealed and refused to deliver certain records to the Committee. 
This suggests that the refusal to comply has been treated as grounds 
for impeachment. The precendential value is limited because the House 
2/ 
adjourned before voting on the articles. Moreover, the Judiciary 
Committee, ,,,hich had considered the question of SeHard' s refusal to 
1 / The Supreme Court has stated that fundamental fairness in a 
legislative hearing does not require the full range of rights given 
within the judicial setting but only IIreasonable notice of a charge 
and an opportunity to be heard in defense before punishment. • .• 11 
Grop~ v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 502 (1972). 
2/ r. Rep. No. 134, 45th Cong., 3d ~ess. at 6 (1879). 
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comply with the demands of the Committee, concluded that he had validly 
claimed his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and 
1/ 
thus refused to recowmend a contempt citation. 
Apart from precedent, however, the refusal to comply with 
impeachment inquiry subpoenas may well be considered as grounds for 
impeachmen t. Thus, the President's refusal likely violates t\VO federal 
statutes -- 2 U.S.C. § 192, making vri1lful noncompliance with a 
Congressional Committee subpoena a misdemeanor and 18 U.S.C. § 1505, 
making it a felony to obstruct a lavJful Congressional inquiry. 
But much more significant than the possible violation of a criminal 
statute is the conclusion that the President's noncompliance with the 
Committee's subpoenas is a usurpation of the :?mver of the House of 
Representatives and a serious breach of his duty to "preserve, protect 
and defend the Constitution of the United States." In refusing to 
comply \vi th limited, narrowly drawn subpoenas, which seek only 
materials necessary to conduct a full and complete inquiry into the 
existence of possible impeachable offenses, the President has undermined 
the ability of the House to act as the "Grand Inquest of the Nation." 
His actions threaten the integrity of the impeachment process itself; 
they v70uld render nugatory the pm'Jer and duty of the legislature, as 
the representative of the people, to act as the ultimate check on 
Presidential conduct. For this most fundamental reason the President's 
refusal to comply with the Committee's subpoenas is itself grounds 
for impeachment. 
1/ P. Rep. No. 141, 45th Cong., 3d Sess. (1879); 3 Hind's Precedents 
S lE99 at 56-57. 
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WILLFUL TAX EVASION 
1. 
On December 30, 1969 President Nixon signed the Tax Reform 
Act of 1969 into law. That Act included a provision eliminating the 
tax deduction for contributions of collections of private papers made 
to the government or to charitable organizations after July 25, 1969. 
On April 10, 1970 the President (an attorney who in the past 
had engaged in tax practice) signed his income tax return for 1969, 
claiming a deduction for the donation to the National Archives of 
pre-Presidential personal papers allegedly worth $576,000. (News Con-
ference, June 22, 1972, 8 Presidential Documents 1084) The President 
and his attorney Frank DeMarco went over the return page by page and 
di,scus,sed the tax consequences of the gift of papers deduction. (Kalmbach 
testimony, 7/17/74, T 4864-65) An appraisal valuing t:1C donated papers 
at that amount and a sheet describing the gift were attached to the return. 
These documents, which constitute part of the return signed by the President, 
assert that the gift had been made on March 27, 1969. (Impeachment 
Inquiry Staff, "Report Respecting Deduction Taken by the President For 
Years 1969 through 1972 for Gift of Papers Claimed to be made on March 27, 
1969," Note 67. Hereinafter cited as Tax Report.) 
The Internal Revenue Service has disallowed this deduction 
because it found that, as a matter of fact, the gift of papers was 
not made on or before July 25, 1969. (Tax Report, Appendices 9, 10) 
While the papers which constituted the gift were in the custody of 
the Archives before July 25, they were at that time merely an unsegre-
gated part of a much larger mass of pre-presidential papers. This 
large group of papers had been transferred on March 26 or 27, 1969 to 
the Archives at its request for purposes of sorting and storage. (Tax 
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Report, Note 15) Prior to July 25, 1969 no one other than Archives 
personnel had viewed the papers at the Archives. They had not been 
appraised, nor as of that date, had anyone made any determination as 
to which of these papers would constitute papers making the 1969 gift. 
That selection was begun only in November 1969; it was completed by 
Archives personnel in March 1970. 
There can be no doubt that the President knew that the Tax 
Reform Act required that, for the claim of a deduction to be valid, 
a gift must be completed by July 25, 1969. It is also clear that 
the President knew that his return indicated that the gift had been 
made on March 27, 1969. The question which remains is whether the 
President knew that the gift had not been made on that date. 
II. 
On the basis of its investigation, the IRS concluded that 
the President was negligent in the preparation of his tax returns and 
assessed a negligence penalty of 5%. (Tax Report, Appendices 9, 11) 
The IRS did not assess a civil penalty for fraud. For several reasons, 
. however , this conclusion by the IRS should not be considered determina-
tive of the factual issue before the Committee. First, of course, the 
Committee must reach its own independent conclusion; it cannot be 
bound by the conclusions of others. Second, the IRS itself acknowl-
edges that its investigation was incomplete. The IRS had no direct 
contact with the President -- as it would have with an ordinary taxpayer 
whose return was being investigated. When the IRS considered assessment 
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of a penalty, it had not interviewed one key witness, John Ehrlichman. 
Other witnesses had told inconsistent stories. The only memorandum 
in the files of the IRS which concerns the question of assessing a 
fr aud penalty in the President's case is deficien t. (Tax Report, 
Appendix 6) It accepts at face value self-serving testimony by 
)) 
several witnesses. It contains material errors. 
The staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxa-
tion, which also concluded that the gift of papers had not been made 
by July 25, 1969, refused to draw any conclusions about whether the 
President had committed fraud. The staff report said that it did not 
address the question of fraud (or the question of negligence) on the 
part of the President because it might be inappropriate, ·in vie,v of 
the impeachment inquiry. (Staff Report of Joint Committee on Internal 
Reyenue Taxation, Examination of President Nixon's Tax Returns for 1969 
through 1972, 4. Hereinafter cited as Joint Committee Report.) 
III. 
To be found guilty of criminal tax fraud, a taxpayer must 
have acted willfully to evade taxes. Willfulness in this context is 
construed to require an act that is "intentional or knowing or 
voluntary, as distinguished from accidental." (United States v. 
Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933». While the staff believes that the 
applicable standard for the Committee is not whether the President's 
conduct violated the criminal law, mere mistake or negligence by the 
President in filing false tax returns would clearly not provide 
11 For example, it concludes that the date of the appraisal of the 
President's papers by Ralph NeHman l1is irrelevant.". 
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grounds for impeachment. Therefore, the Committee may want to con-
sider the willfulness standard in deciding whether the President's 
tax deduction for the gift of papers constitutes ground for impeach-
ment. 
The question of willfulness in this case turns on whether 
the President knew that no gift had been made before July 26, 1969. 
This knowledge need not be proved by direct testimony or other proof 
of the President's state of mind; it may be inferred from all the 
events and circumstances surrounding the making of the gift and the 
preparation and execution of the tax return. (Battjes v. United 
States, 172 F.2d 1, 5 (6th Cir. 1949), United States v. Commerford, 
64 F.2d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1933)) 
It is most unlikely that the President would have been 
unaware of the details of a charitable contribution which involved 
over $500,000. At the end of 1968, the President made a much smaller 
gift to the Archives -- $80,000 worth of his papers (Tax Report, 
Note 8) -- and he was deeply involved in that gift. He discussed the 
deduction with his attorneys, and was briefed on the initiatives his 
attorneys were taking to deliver the papers to the government and the 
contents of alternative deeds of gift. (Tax Report, Notes 3, 5, 6) 
After the receipt of a memorandum and a detailed discussion with his 
attorney, the President personally, in late December 1968, signed a deed 
conveying papers worth approximately $80,000 to the United States. 
(Tax Report, Note 6) For the gift alleged to be made in 1969, how-
ever, of over $576,000 worth of papers, the President did not sign a 
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deed of gift; it was signed by Edward Morgan, a White House attorney. 
(Tax Report, Notes 6, 63) Morgan had no written or oral power of 
attorney from the President, and~never before or after executed a 
document of such importance in the President's name. (Tax Report, Note 24) 
The deed signed by Morgan was delivered to the Archives 
in April 1970. It was dated March 27, 1969, which precedes the July 
25, 1969 cut-off date, and the notarization by the President's tax 
attorney, Frank DeMarco, stated that the deed was executed on April 
21, 1969. In fact, as previously indicated, the selection of the 
papers constituting the $576,000 gift was not completed until March 
1970, and the deed ultimately delivered to the Archives was itself 
not executed until April 10, 1970. The claim of DeMarco and Morgan 
that the April 10, 1970 deed was a "re-execution" of a deed signed 
on April 21, 1969 has not been accepted by the IRS or the Joint 
Committee. (Joint Committee Report, 90-91. IRS Examination Report, 
Section I) Herbert Kalmbach, who was with Morgan and DeMarco on 
April 21, 1969 has no recollection of seeing a deed of gift of papers 
executed on that date or of any discussion respecting a gift of papers 
. or a deed. (Kalmbach testimony, July 17, 1974, T 4824-46) No deed 
executed in 1969 has ever been produced. 
The President's attorneys have claimed that, in late February, 
1969, the President told John Ehrlichman that he intended to make a 
bulk gift of papers during that year. They did not claim, however, 
that the President told Ehrlichman that such a gift was to be made at 
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once, or at any certain time before the end of the year, or, more 
important, before July 26, 1969. Nor was there any indication that 
the President was notified before July 26, 1969 of the delivery of 
the gift. If the President had expressed the wish in February that 
a completed gift be made promptly, he presumably would have 
executed the appropriate papers at the time of the transfer, or at 
least have been notified of the delivery. In fact, as has been 
noted, the papers were transferred to the Archives on March 26-27, 1969, 
not on the initiative of the Preiident or his staff, but at the request 
of the Archives personnel. (Tax Report, Note 15) 
On February 6, 1969, John Ehrlichman wrote a memorandum 
to the President on the subject of "Charitable Contri.butions and 
Deductions." Ehrlichman recited the 1968 gift of papers, and sug-
gested that the President could continue to obtain th~ maximum 
charitable deduction of 30 percent of his adjusted gross income by 
first contributing to charities proceeds from the sale of the Presi-
dent's \rritings in an amount equal to 20 percent of his adjusted gross 
income. Hith respect to "the remaining 10 percent," Ehrlichman's 
memorandum noted that it would "be made up of a gift of. your papers to 
the United States. In this way, we contemplate keeping the papers as 
a continuing reserve which we can use from now on to supplement other 
gifts to add up to the 30% maximum." There is a notation on the 
memorandum in the President's handwriting, ~vhich states" (1) good 
(2) Let me know what we can do on the foundation idea " (Tax 
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Report, Note 10) There is no reference in the February 6 memorandum 
to making a gift of papers in the year 1969 in an amount which would 
be sufficient to constitute the President's entire 30% charitable deduction 
for 1969 and five succeeding years. 
On June 16, 1969 Ehrlichman, in a memorandum to Morgan, 
conveyed a number of the President's decisions and concerns respecting his 
income taxes. An example of the extent to which the President was concerned 
with the details of his tax returns is represented by the following state-
ment in Ehrlichman's memorandum: "He wants to be sure that his business 
deductions include all allowable items. For instance, wedding gifts 
to Congressmen's daughters, flowers at funerals, etc. He has. in mind 
that there is some kind of a $25 limitation on such expenses"" With 
respect to charitable deductions the following was noted: "Will you 
please have someone carefully check his salary withholding to see if 
it takes into account the fact that he will be making a full 30% charitable 
deduction." (Tax Report, Note 34) Again, there is no indication that 
less than three months earlier a gift of papers in excess of $500,000 had 
already been made. 
It was not until shortly after November 7, 1969 that the 
President was given an appraisal respecting the papers sent to the Archives 
in March 1969. On November 7 Newman, after viewing the papers at the 
Archives for the first time on November 3, wrote to the President that 
he estimated the value of the entire collection of papers and other 
items at $ 2,012,000. (Tax Report, Note 38) 
_. ·''-0. 
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According to Newman, at a White House reception a week 
later, the President expressed to Newman his surprise at the high 
valuation. (Tax Report, Note 39) 
There is no'evidence that in February or March 1969, anyone, 
including the President or his advisers, could have foreseen the 
July 25 cut-off date for the deduction of personal papers as a 
charitable contribution. Absent knowledge of such a cut-off date, 
it would appear to be contrary to rational tax planning to make so 
early in the year a charitable contribution in an amount so large 
as to eliminate the possibility of making deductible charitable con-
tributions not only for that year, but for the five following years. 
This is especially true since, as indicated, the President on or 
about February 6, 1969 endorsed the proposal to have 2/3 of his 
maximum 30% charitable deduction come from contributing to charities 
proceeds from the sales of his writings and only 1/3 from annual 
'-------- . gifts of papers. 
The fact that no one could have foreseen in February or 
March 1969 a July 25 cut-off date is borne out by the chronology of 
the 1969 tax reform legislation. The tax reform act which the Presi-
dent sent to Congress on April 21, 1969 did not include any provisions 
affecting charitable deductions for gifts of papers. (Tax Report, 
Note 29) The House Ways and Means Committee did not announce until 
May 27, 1969 that it was even considering the elimination of the 
deduction for such gifts. On July 25, 1969, the Ways and Means 
[12250]
-9-
Committee announced it had decided to recommend this action to the 
House. (Tax Report, Note 30) The bill thereafter reported by the 
Committee on August 2, and passed by the House on August 7, would 
have continued to perm~t the deduction to be taken for gifts made 
until the end of 1969. (Tax Report, Note 31) On November 21, the 
Senate Finance Committee reported out a provision with a retroactive 
cut-off date of December 31, 1968. This was the first indication that 
an individual might not have until the end of 1969 to make a final 
gift of papers. The bill passed the Senate on December 11, with a 
December 31, 1968 cut-off date. (Tax Report, Notes 41, 42) Until 
December, 1969, when the conflict between the Senate and House bills 
was settled in conference, there was no reason to have completed 
early in the year any contributions for 1969. If the House date 
prevailed, a portion of the papers could be donated to the Archives 
\ 
just before the end of the year, as the President had done in 1968. 
If the Senate date prevailed, the President had no opportunity at 
all to make a deductible contribution in 1969. 
The conference comm.ittee, however, resolved the conflict 
between the House and Senate bills by selecting the retroactive date 
of July 25, 1969. (Tax Report, Note 44) A deduction for a gift of 
papers was therefore possible for 1969, but only if the President had 
made the gift by July 25. Having a large group of papers physically 
present at the Archives before the cut-off date provided a basis 
for claiming that a gift had been made. However, because only a 
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portion of the papers was to be contributed, and restrictions imposed 
as to who could examine them, a deed designating the specific papers 
which constituted the gift, and specifying the restrictions imposed, 
• 
was required. As indicated, a deed executed in 1970, but dated a 
year earlier, became that instrument and it was signed by a deputy 
counsel to the President. 
IV. 
The willful evasion of taxes by a President would be conduct 
incompatible with his duties of office, which obligate him faithfully 
to execute the laws. A violation of law in the context of the tax 
system, which relies so heavily on the basic honesty of citizens in 
dealing with the government, would be particularly serious on the 
part of the President also if it entailed an abuse of the power and 
prestige of his office. As Chief Executive, he might assume that his 
tax returns were not subject to the same scrutiny as those of other 
taxpayers. 
It was unlikely, for example, that the Archives would 
question a President as to the date of his gift. Although documents 
show that Archives employees thought that no gift was made in 1969, 
the Archives raised no question when the deed dated a year earlier 
was delivered in 1970. 
In May 1973, when the President's tax returns for 1971 and 
1972 were selected for audit by an IRS computer, agents were shown 
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a copy of Newman's appraisal, which evaluated the papers as of March 
27, 1969. The agents were satisfied without further inquiry. They 
did not ask whether the gift itself was made on that date; they did 
not ask to see the deed, as they would have done with any ordinary 
taxpayer, who did not have the power and prestige of the President. 
(Joint Committee Report, 94) 
Only after questions about the legitimacy of the deduction 
were raised in the press, did the Internal Revenue Service or the 
National Archives begin to re-examine their earlier acceptance of 
the President's claim. And only after the President learned that 
the IRS was going to reaudit his returns did he request the Joint 
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation to examine his deduction for 
the gift of papers. 
Archives personnel discovered that the deed of gift was 
not signed when it was purported to be signed. After this fact and 
others were disclosed, DeMarco, Morgan and Newman began revising 
stories which they had been telling for several months. When the 
Internal Revenue Service began investigating the deduction for the 
gifts of papers, the accounts of actions by DeMarco, Morgan and 
Newman, which had previously meshed with one another, began to differ. 
Even then, though substantial questions had arisen about the Presi-
dent's own involvement in the deduction, the IRS made no attempt to 
contact the President directly. When the staff of the Joint Com-
mittee submitted written questions to the President with respect 
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to the gift of papers and other matters, he failed to respond. 
Considering all the circumstances surrounding the alleged gift of papers 
and its inclusion as a deduction on the President's 1969 return, including 
the lack of a satisfactory response by the taxpayer, it was the judgment 
of Fred Folsom, a consultant to the Committee (,,,ho for 24 years was an 
attorney in the Criminal Section of the Justice Department's Tax 
Division and Chief of that section for 12 years) that "in the case of 
an ordinary taxpayer, on the facts as we know them in this instance, the 
case would be referred out for presentation to a Grand Jury for 
prosecution. II (Folsom testimony, 6/21/74, T 1976) 
1/ The charitable deduction taken for the gift of papers was not the 
only item disallowed by the IRS. It determined that for the period 1969 
through 1972 there were over eleven categories of improper deductions 
and unreported income totalling over $790,000. The Joint Committee 
staff rendered a harsher verdic::t; it determineo that the President1s 
improper deductions and unreported income for that period amounted (0 
over $960,000. 
" l 
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